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Local privilege escalation via execve()

freebsd.org

1–10 of 116 posts

Re: Local privilege escalation via execve()

#3
post #2

> IV. Workaround > No workaround is available. Oh dear.

> V. Solution

> Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date, and reboot the system.

Not everyone can just freebsd-update and reboot, so yes, "Oh dear." is a good response to this.

Re: Local privilege escalation via execve()

#4
post #2

> IV. Workaround > No workaround is available. Oh dear.

> V. Solution > Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date, and reboot the system. Not everyone can just freebsd-update and reboot, so yes, "Oh dear." is a good response to this.

Anyone relying on a 30+ year old monolith kernel written in C to not have some exploitable LPEs lurking should stay in basket weaving and out of sysadmin.

Re: Local privilege escalation via execve()

#8
post #2

> IV. Workaround > No workaround is available. Oh dear.

> V. Solution > Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date, and reboot the system. Not everyone can just freebsd-update and reboot, so yes, "Oh dear." is a good response to this.

Why can't they? Upgrading and rebooting is kinda the standard response for most security issues. So I would expect something like Ansible's playbooks for this exact scenario. You might also have it setup as a staggered rollout.

Re: Local privilege escalation via execve()

#9
post #4

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> V. Solution > Upgrade your vulnerable system to a supported FreeBSD stable or release / security branch (releng) dated after the correction date, and reboot the system. Not everyone can just freebsd-update and reboot, so yes, "Oh dear." is a good response to this.

Anyone relying on a 30+ year old monolith kernel written in C to not have some exploitable LPEs lurking should stay in basket weaving and out of sysadmin.

Not sure why the snark but if people are running FreeBSD then they should be...basket weaving instead of using it? Yes, the correct solution is to patch and reboot but not everyone is in a place to jump and do that which is why a temp workaround, if possible, would be welcome
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