Helm local code execution via a malicious chart

That description seems really unclear, like how can `Chart.lock` be a symlink to a `.bashrc`?

Is the vulnerability that you ship a chart with `Chart.lock -> ../.bashrc`, and then helm writes to `Chart.lock`?

Why is the fix specific to Chart.lock (https://github.com/helm/helm/commit/76fdba4c8c2a4829a6b7abb4...), wouldn't the fix be instead that "A chart cannot contain any symlinks outside of its root"?

For a moment I thought it was about the synth…!

https://tytel.org/helm/

What is the attack scenario here? Where are the security boundaries? How does the attacker gets their repository with a symlink in it to the victim? Is Helm typically run as a privileged user? How would this work? And why doesn't the vulnerability description give answers to these questions?

The original vulnerability description is not worded very well, here's my understanding of what's going on:

1. Attacker crafts a malicious Chart.yaml containing arbitrary code

2. Replaces Chart.lock with a symlink pointing to a sensitive file (like .bashrc or other startup scripts)

3. When you run helm dependency update, Helm processes the malicious Chart.yaml and writes the payload to whatever file the symlink targets

4. Code executes when the targeted file is next used (e.g., opening a new shell)

Why This Works: Helm follows the symlink during the dependency update process without validating the target, allowing arbitrary file writes outside the intended chart directory.

Is that from the past two years?