Gmail E2E is as terrible as expected
michal.sapka.pl
Gmail E2E is as terrible as expected
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Re: Gmail E2E is as terrible as expected
#2I think one of the growing threats lately in the community has been over malicious client-side javascript, especially when the client handles end-to-end encrypted content (used on sites like Proton, MEGA etc.), so requiring users to trust Google with the contents of these client pages, and by extension the emails themselves, seems (in my opinion) to defeat the entire point of this feature.
Some work in this area has been done in the form of browser extensions that are used to verify signed assets delivered to the client:
https://github.com/freedomofpress/webcat
https://github.com/tasn/webext-signed-pages
https://github.com/jahed/webverify
https://github.com/facebookincubator/meta-code-verify
But unfortunately for now, none of these are seeing wide adoption and this remains an unsolved issue. It also does not require anyone to use known-good, audited and verified open-source components, meaning even if the client code is signed, it can still be malicious... there must be a greater reason to trust the code than just "trust me bro".
Re: Gmail E2E is as terrible as expected
#3[flagged]
Re: Gmail E2E is as terrible as expected
#4This is how all HIPAA "secure email" works. Outlook, Zoho, clinic comms, BECAUSE it lets you revoke email access.
If you want an opportunity in this space, it isn't actually encrypted emails, but possibly standardizing and streamlining such "message pointers" and address endpoint verification.
Re: Gmail E2E is as terrible as expected
#5Doesn’t proton mail also do this for sending encrypted mail to folks with no encryption?
They ought to do pgp though
Re: Gmail E2E is as terrible as expected
#6Doesn’t proton mail also do this for sending encrypted mail to folks with no encryption? They ought to do pgp though
Can’t expect a civilian to manage pgp keys or go to key signing parties
Re: Gmail E2E is as terrible as expected
#7This was already happening, unfortunately. The user's mail agent is deemed untrustworthy (and so is the user), so every service which needs to send confidential data just turns your email into a notification with a link. There are so many of these, but often they are limited in scope. For sectors like healthcare you have companies offering this type of service to companies which need to adhere to security theatre standards such as ISO 27001, and because nations often have their own added requirements for specific sectors (think HIPAA in the US or NEN 7510 in the Netherlands) these services tend to remain focussed on single countries.
Then there are the national governments and things like insurance companies. All happily sending message notifications where you need to sign in to their own portals.
Securing email is too complex, so everyone builds their own secured portal thingy, and your mailbox has become a receptacle for notifications. Figuring out a solution would require cooperation, pragmatic lawmaking, and giving up those nice cashcows of moated portals, so it won't happen.
Re: Gmail E2E is as terrible as expected
#8Isn't this how banks send secure messages too? You can't send secure emails to arbitrary clients otherwise. PGP stands no chance of being adopted by regular users.
Re: Gmail E2E is as terrible as expected
#9Doesn’t proton mail also do this for sending encrypted mail to folks with no encryption? They ought to do pgp though
Can’t expect a civilian to manage pgp keys or go to key signing parties
The anti-establishment fervor of open source crypto developers is the reason this is a problem though.
Most people, for most things, don't need to verify trust outside of normal government channels.
i.e. any business I correspond with, trust is via the government that they are a business bound by the relevant legal system I live in.
Same story with communicating with basically anyone: if their GPG key was signed by the common government key, then hey, good enough for anyone.
The problem is...we don't have the infrastructure for any of this. And GPG key servers are inadequate for maintaining suitable privacy for people if they were used at this scale.
But we certainly could provide the means by existing technologies: e.g. nothing stops us making drivers licenses and other forms of ID smart cards.
Re: Gmail E2E is as terrible as expected
#10What happens if the sender's Google account ceases to exist for whatever reason? What if Google ceases to exist?
I know that there are a lot of HIPAA "secure email" solutions that also do this, but I don't want this to become more common practice then it already is...