Secure Boot on ESP32 Platforms
thistle.tech
Secure Boot on ESP32 Platforms
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Re: Secure Boot on ESP32 Platforms
#2Re: Secure Boot on ESP32 Platforms
#3Re: Secure Boot on ESP32 Platforms
#4Informative, but if you’re building ordinary consumer hardware please don’t enable secure boot on your ESP32 device. There’s a thriving ecosystem of open source software (for example ESPHome) that gives flexibility to how a device is used and long term support long after your project or company has failed. We don’t need more electronic landfill rubbish when motivated individuals could tinker with them instead.
To do otherwise presents unnecessary risk.
Re: Secure Boot on ESP32 Platforms
#5Informative, but if you’re building ordinary consumer hardware please don’t enable secure boot on your ESP32 device. There’s a thriving ecosystem of open source software (for example ESPHome) that gives flexibility to how a device is used and long term support long after your project or company has failed. We don’t need more electronic landfill rubbish when motivated individuals could tinker with them instead.
The future of computing is that all code running on a device is one of the two S's: Signed or Sandboxed. To do otherwise presents unnecessary risk.
Re: Secure Boot on ESP32 Platforms
#6Informative, but if you’re building ordinary consumer hardware please don’t enable secure boot on your ESP32 device. There’s a thriving ecosystem of open source software (for example ESPHome) that gives flexibility to how a device is used and long term support long after your project or company has failed. We don’t need more electronic landfill rubbish when motivated individuals could tinker with them instead.
The future of computing is that all code running on a device is one of the two S's: Signed or Sandboxed. To do otherwise presents unnecessary risk.
Re: Secure Boot on ESP32 Platforms
#7Earlier quoted context omitted.
The future of computing is that all code running on a device is one of the two S's: Signed or Sandboxed. To do otherwise presents unnecessary risk.
That’s fine, assuming we pass laws mandating that signing keys can be controlled by end users. Otherwise we end up where no-one really owns their devices any more, every device would be merely temporarily rented.
Re: Secure Boot on ESP32 Platforms
#8Earlier quoted context omitted.
That’s fine, assuming we pass laws mandating that signing keys can be controlled by end users. Otherwise we end up where no-one really owns their devices any more, every device would be merely temporarily rented.
How could that work? A consumer would be required to build the firmware and flash it to the product themselves?
Re: Secure Boot on ESP32 Platforms
#9Informative, but if you’re building ordinary consumer hardware please don’t enable secure boot on your ESP32 device. There’s a thriving ecosystem of open source software (for example ESPHome) that gives flexibility to how a device is used and long term support long after your project or company has failed. We don’t need more electronic landfill rubbish when motivated individuals could tinker with them instead.
The future of computing is that all code running on a device is one of the two S's: Signed or Sandboxed. To do otherwise presents unnecessary risk.
>To do otherwise presents unnecessary risk.
Unnecessary risk to whom? To monopolies that want to control the devices?
I would say the future is requiring open-source flashable firmware to every programmable chip on every piece on industrial or consumer equipment sold.
My vision of the future is farther away than the Signed&Sandboxed, but we should collectively take efforts to minimize damage from the near future of locked down devices controlled by unknown parties.
Re: Secure Boot on ESP32 Platforms
#10Earlier quoted context omitted.
The future of computing is that all code running on a device is one of the two S's: Signed or Sandboxed. To do otherwise presents unnecessary risk.
>The future of computing is that all code running on a device is one of the two S's: Signed or Sandboxed. >To do otherwise presents unnecessary risk. Unnecessary risk to whom? To monopolies that want to control the devices? I would say the future is requiring open-source flashable firmware to every programmable chip on every piece on industrial or consumer equipment sold. My vision of the future is farther away than…
AI will create perfect Sybil attacks. The reality dictates our need of a signal for humanness. To know an interaction is a real human and not an indistinguishable simulation of one. Picture if the internet was flooded with 100 trillion malign actors and trolls, each tireless, merciless, skilled at both social manipulation and cyber attacks, with no way to tell if they are real people or not. Even a live video call with them cannot be trusted, not even if they look and sound like someone you know.
We're not there yet, but how far out do you feel confidant in saying that will still be the case? Two years? Five?