Attested Audio with ZKP
ddkang.github.io
Attested Audio with ZKP
1–10 of 16 posts
Re: Attested Audio with ZKP
#2> The hardware manufacturer can destroy the private key after it is placed on the device. By doing so, the private key is inaccessible!
I'm pretty sure the private key is very accessible, if it's used at runtime which it is. Just not easily.
Re: Attested Audio with ZKP
#3I would say there is a better way of doing this. In the forensic community it has been long known that audio can be timestamped and fingerprinted by the 50/60hz electrical hum in the background. In many countries this hum is recorded so it can be used later as evidence.
Unless counter-forensics are applied, AI audio is not going to have the right hum.
It’s not cryptographically secure, but it gives good assurance and doesn’t require tamper resistant hardware (which makes the cryptographic security dependent on how secure the resident keys are)
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electrical_network_frequency...
Re: Attested Audio with ZKP
#4[flagged]
Re: Attested Audio with ZKP
#5I would say there is a better way of doing this. In the forensic community it has been long known that audio can be timestamped and fingerprinted by the 50/60hz electrical hum in the background. In many countries this hum is recorded so it can be used later as evidence. Unless counter-forensics are applied, AI audio is not going to have the right hum. It’s not cryptographically secure, but it gives good assurance and…
But isn't it really easy to apply those counter-forensics? It seems like it's much easier to fake a hum on a digitally created audio file than to change or remove the hum from existing file.
Re: Attested Audio with ZKP
#6> The hardware manufacturer can destroy the private key after it is placed on the device. By doing so, the private key is inaccessible! I'm pretty sure the private key is very accessible, if it's used at runtime which it is. Just not easily.
Yeah. People have been hoping for a signed "Photoshop-proof camera" since digital image manipulation was invented, but it has the same limitations as any form of DRM. It only slows people down a bit. There's also the analog hole - i.e. just stick your "attested" microphone in front of a speaker
Re: Attested Audio with ZKP
#7> The hardware manufacturer can destroy the private key after it is placed on the device. By doing so, the private key is inaccessible! I'm pretty sure the private key is very accessible, if it's used at runtime which it is. Just not easily.
Yeah. People have been hoping for a signed "Photoshop-proof camera" since digital image manipulation was invented, but it has the same limitations as any form of DRM. It only slows people down a bit. There's also the analog hole - i.e. just stick your "attested" microphone in front of a speaker
or rip out the wires and attach whatever speaker you want, not really detectable
Re: Attested Audio with ZKP
#8I don't understand how this avoids any simple attack both for audio or video:
- Alter/manipulate the audio/video has much as you want.
- Play it.
- Have a "attested" microphone/video recording the "manipulated audio/video".
For video maybe you can actually try to prove that's recording a screen not the real event, but seems much harder for audio, you can just say the echos/ distortions came from the environment...
Re: Attested Audio with ZKP
#9I don't understand how this avoids any simple attack both for audio or video: - Alter/manipulate the audio/video has much as you want. - Play it. - Have a "attested" microphone/video recording the "manipulated audio/video". For video maybe you can actually try to prove that's recording a screen not the real event, but seems much harder for audio, you can just say the echos/ distortions came from the environment...
I think in this case the point would be to trust the source publishing the audio and not content.
I cam see a gpg like registry where news stations publish their public keys to verify that their audio / video snippets have not been tampered with.
Re: Attested Audio with ZKP
#10I don't understand how this avoids any simple attack both for audio or video: - Alter/manipulate the audio/video has much as you want. - Play it. - Have a "attested" microphone/video recording the "manipulated audio/video". For video maybe you can actually try to prove that's recording a screen not the real event, but seems much harder for audio, you can just say the echos/ distortions came from the environment...
It doesn't. It's called the "analog hole" and has caused much head shaking with regards to the media cartels' attempts at digital restrictions management on the output side.
Trying to secure that regime on the input side would seem to be even more fraught with problems. At least using the analog hole for the output side causes quality degradation from reencoding the content (the most common goal is digital redistribution). Whereas on the input side, the content begins in the digital domain so it's not even adding an extra analog step.