OpenSSL 3.1
openssl.org
OpenSSL 3.1
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Re: OpenSSL 3.1
#2[deleted]
Re: OpenSSL 3.1
#3> Various assembler optimisations to a number of different algorithms (e.g. AES-GCM, ChaCha20, SM3, SM4, SM4-GCM) across multiple processor architectures
With modern compilers, how often (or in what circumstances) is it worth "hand-rolling" assembler code versus just letting the compiler do it? Does one make the assembler 'from scratch', or perhaps let the compiler generate the assembler and have a human look at it to see if there are any places it can be improved?
Re: OpenSSL 3.1
#4> Various assembler optimisations to a number of different algorithms (e.g. AES-GCM, ChaCha20, SM3, SM4, SM4-GCM) across multiple processor architectures With modern compilers, how often (or in what circumstances) is it worth "hand-rolling" assembler code versus just letting the compiler do it? Does one make the assembler 'from scratch', or perhaps let the compiler generate the assembler and have a human look at it t…
If you look at the output of your compiler many unnecessary loads/stores. Vectorized code in particular still comes out lacking even with intrinsics
In fact, you can benchmark openssl's assembly vs openssl's C: https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/crypto/aes/ae...
Granted, they aren't using intrinsics in that code, but a sufficiently smart compiler shouldn't need intrinsics
Re: OpenSSL 3.1
#5> Various assembler optimisations to a number of different algorithms (e.g. AES-GCM, ChaCha20, SM3, SM4, SM4-GCM) across multiple processor architectures With modern compilers, how often (or in what circumstances) is it worth "hand-rolling" assembler code versus just letting the compiler do it? Does one make the assembler 'from scratch', or perhaps let the compiler generate the assembler and have a human look at it t…
Compilers are capable of very effective optimizations, but they need certain guarantees to be able to apply them and sometimes it's a pain to communicate those guarantees adequately in your source code, or your platform targets don't support all the hints you might need to apply.
Re: OpenSSL 3.1
#6> Various assembler optimisations to a number of different algorithms (e.g. AES-GCM, ChaCha20, SM3, SM4, SM4-GCM) across multiple processor architectures With modern compilers, how often (or in what circumstances) is it worth "hand-rolling" assembler code versus just letting the compiler do it? Does one make the assembler 'from scratch', or perhaps let the compiler generate the assembler and have a human look at it t…
Most of the time, a human will do worse than the compiler. But, a human who knows what they're doing and understands the problem well can still improve on the output.
Re: OpenSSL 3.1
#7> Various assembler optimisations to a number of different algorithms (e.g. AES-GCM, ChaCha20, SM3, SM4, SM4-GCM) across multiple processor architectures With modern compilers, how often (or in what circumstances) is it worth "hand-rolling" assembler code versus just letting the compiler do it? Does one make the assembler 'from scratch', or perhaps let the compiler generate the assembler and have a human look at it t…
I think cryptography is one of the few places where it makes sense to do that. Because:
* There's not that much code involved.
* Many CPUs have instructions specifically made for accelerating cryptographic algorithms.
* Security may have specific requirements from the code, such as not giving away any secrets through timing. This may require writing very specific, suboptimal code intentionally.
Re: OpenSSL 3.1
#8> A FIPS 140-3 compliant FIPS Provider
This is actually a pretty big deal. FIPS 140 certifications are required for a lot of US Federal sales. The FIPS 140 standard changed sometime in the past year from major version 2 to major version 3 and lots of changes are required to certify against the v3 standard, even if you had a v2 certification. What's not obvious is that a lot of FIPS 140 certified software libraries are whitelabeled openssl. Because of the openssl teams hard work in getting this released, it really lowers the barrier to entry for companies trying to sell software to the US Federal government.
I wish the certifications were not as onerous as they were, but this is a big step forward for teams that are not staffed to read and implement several hundred pages of ISO standards for how to correctly implement crypto algorithms. Don't even get me started on how the standards you certify against are themselves copyrighted...
Re: OpenSSL 3.1
#9This seems like a stupid question, but is anyone releasing binaries of OpenSSL for Windows environments? Is there an expectation that OpenSSL will take reigns in MacOS environments from LibreSSL?
Re: OpenSSL 3.1
#10This seems like a stupid question, but is anyone releasing binaries of OpenSSL for Windows environments? Is there an expectation that OpenSSL will take reigns in MacOS environments from LibreSSL?