Hardened_malloc
github.com
Hardened_malloc
1–7 of 7 posts
Re: Hardened_malloc
#2Re: Hardened_malloc
#3The GitHub mentions 8B canaries after allocated blocks, how realistic is it that canaries can be overwritten as they were allocated in an overflow attack to continue writing the payload?
However, as someone who does this type of exploitation for fun and has a little bit of experience with heap attacks, I doubt the canaries are particularly effective at stopping exploits, and the README basically admits this as well.
Re: Hardened_malloc
#4Re: Hardened_malloc
#5I'd love to see this as easily enabled in mainstream distros like Debian. Perhaps by being incorporated into the major libraries? Memory safety problems are a huge problem and this looks like it would counter many of the heap related ones. Thoughts?
Until then, LD_PRELOAD is your friend (assuming you build with semantic interposition).
Re: Hardened_malloc
#6I'd love to see this as easily enabled in mainstream distros like Debian. Perhaps by being incorporated into the major libraries? Memory safety problems are a huge problem and this looks like it would counter many of the heap related ones. Thoughts?
The devs are especially interested in a distribution of musl with hardened_malloc integrated for easy static linking. Until then, LD_PRELOAD is your friend (assuming you build with semantic interposition).
How taboo is it to just patch glibc and maintain it your own repo? Or even make it public.
Re: Hardened_malloc
#7The GitHub mentions 8B canaries after allocated blocks, how realistic is it that canaries can be overwritten as they were allocated in an overflow attack to continue writing the payload?