A Message to Our Customers (2016)
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A Message to Our Customers (2016)
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Re: A Message to Our Customers (2016)
#2Oh how the mighty have fallen.
Now I can’t help but wonder if this was all for show.
Re: A Message to Our Customers (2016)
#3bunch of discussion from when this was news:
Re: A Message to Our Customers (2016)
#4[deleted]
Re: A Message to Our Customers (2016)
#5Will only be available in wayback machine in a matter of time.
Re: A Message to Our Customers (2016)
#6What is the functional difference between the government demanding Apple add code to break device encryption, and the government demanding Apple add signatures that extend their on-device scanning beyond its intended scope of CSAM?
Apple seems to get a lot of credit for opposing the former, but gets mocked when they say they would oppose the latter. But as far as I can tell, the legal argument is exactly the same for both situations: can the government compel Apple to add functionality that they do not want to add?
Apple’s plans seem creepy to me, but I have been less than impressed with the specificity of arguments against it. Most seem to stop at “what if the government forces them to expand it” without addressing exactly how, under current federal law, the government would do that.
For example, see this Twitter thread arguing that it would be very difficult for the feds to do that:
https://twitter.com/pwnallthethings/status/14248736290037022...
Re: A Message to Our Customers (2016)
#7Our two mainstream options for mobile OS are one that stalks you everywhere you go and monitors what you do for the company behind it and one that will look on device at your pictures to possibly report to the government (with other governments likely licking their lips). This two party system is starting to stink.
> "However mobile OS's may now and then answer popular ends, they are likely in the course of time and things, to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the power of the people and to usurp for themselves the reins of government, destroying afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion." -- George Washington
Re: A Message to Our Customers (2016)
#8What is the functional difference between the government demanding Apple add code to break device encryption, and the government demanding Apple add signatures that extend their on-device scanning beyond its intended scope of CSAM? Apple seems to get a lot of credit for opposing the former, but gets mocked when they say they would oppose the latter. But as far as I can tell, the legal argument is exactly the same for…
> Apple’s plans seem creepy to me, but I have been less than impressed with the specificity of arguments against it. Most seem to stop at “what if the government forces them to expand it” without addressing exactly how, under current federal law, the government would do that.
It's not "the government". There are many governments around the world. What happens when China, Russia, or another country legislates using this technology for some other purpose. Those are big markets. Will Apple back out of them or give in?
Re: A Message to Our Customers (2016)
#9I'll never buy anything from Apple again. Apple was to me the walled but good-willed garden, caring about their profits by respecting their customers and taking a stance against widespread anti-democratic tendencies. I own an iWatch, two iPhones and two MacBook Pros (one privately owned, one from my current employer).
The selling points of apple to me were to provide excellent hardware combined with excellent software, combined with a guarantee to protect my privacy.
The first point still holds true, the 2nd not so much anymore, and the 3rd was destroyed by the most recent move.
My stance will cause a ripple effect, I convinced quite a few people to use apple if they can afford it due to their general stance and their commitment to democratic values. Not all of them will listen if I now tell the opposite story, but most will. I hope Apple feels the effects of this decision in one of the upcoming stock-holder meetings.
Of course, I don't believe this helps against child abuse or any crime at all, in fact I believe the opposite effect happens: criminals probably know about moves like this one far earlier than the general public and react accordingly.
Re: A Message to Our Customers (2016)
#10What is the functional difference between the government demanding Apple add code to break device encryption, and the government demanding Apple add signatures that extend their on-device scanning beyond its intended scope of CSAM? Apple seems to get a lot of credit for opposing the former, but gets mocked when they say they would oppose the latter. But as far as I can tell, the legal argument is exactly the same for…
>What is the functional difference between the government demanding Apple add code to break device encryption, and the government demanding Apple add signatures that extend their on-device scanning beyond its intended scope of CSAM?
Is this meant as a rhetorical question? Because they are pretty different from both a technical and policy perspective.
Breaking encryption means the government can have access to everything without restriction. It also means there is a backdoor for others to discover.
This approach of matching signatures means that the government needs to have specific content it is looking to match. The government asks "does the device have this specific file" and Apple returns a yes or no. They can't do broad searches for unknown content. Apple also remains as the gatekeeper between its users and the government when it comes to extending the scanning.
We can still be against the latter while acknowledging that this isn't as scary a scenario as the former and therefore it isn't purely a legal question of which approach Apple would be more likely to accept.