The metaphysical presuppositions of formal logic
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The metaphysical presuppositions of formal logic
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Re: The metaphysical presuppositions of formal logic
#2This article does a great deal to point out the problem, but then just kicks the can down the road.
Yes, metaphysics comes before Logic but metametaphysics comes before metaphysics. Ad infinitum.
All this does is shift the discussion from the laws of logic to the laws of metaphysics - it is turtles all the way down.
There is no way to get off this hamster wheel without a shift of perspective, but computer scientists should feel right at home anywhere recursion arises.
Focus on the laws and the lawmaker. What are laws? Why do we create laws? What do we use laws for? How effective are we at encoding these laws in language?
When we think of laws as designed rather than discovered we become more conscientious in our own inventions.
Re: The metaphysical presuppositions of formal logic
#3This article does a great deal to point out the problem, but then just kicks the can down the road. Yes, metaphysics comes before Logic but metametaphysics comes before metaphysics. Ad infinitum. All this does is shift the discussion from the laws of logic to the laws of metaphysics - it is turtles all the way down. There is no way to get off this hamster wheel without a shift of perspective, but computer scientists…
Which assumes a designer, so now we've compounded the presuppostions. And I don't see how more presuppositions means were more conscientious of them. Or conscious of them, if that was your meaning.
Re: The metaphysical presuppositions of formal logic
#4This article does a great deal to point out the problem, but then just kicks the can down the road. Yes, metaphysics comes before Logic but metametaphysics comes before metaphysics. Ad infinitum. All this does is shift the discussion from the laws of logic to the laws of metaphysics - it is turtles all the way down. There is no way to get off this hamster wheel without a shift of perspective, but computer scientists…
Which assumes a designer, so now we've compounded the presuppostions. And I don't see how more presuppositions means were more conscientious of them. Or conscious of them, if that was your meaning.
The designer is not assumed.
I am it. I design formal systems.
Formal systems are human inventions. Any expression or description of the “laws of thought” are subject to the limits of self-expression and the expressive power of your formal language. The “laws of thought” are rules of thumb. Useful Heuristics - not universal authorities.
I recommend Luciano Floridi’s recent work in “The Logic of information: Philosophy as conceptual design.”
https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/the-logic-of-information-a-theor...
Re: The metaphysical presuppositions of formal logic
#5It's important to sometimes step back and think about whether what you are doing actually makes sense. There are some assumptions about how formal logic is done in ITP (interactive theorem proving) systems that should be challenged. Here is my opinion about that: https://doi.org/10.47757/practal.1
Re: The metaphysical presuppositions of formal logic
#6This seems too vague to me, like a lot of philosophical posts out there.
> For example, if it is true that Aunt May believes that Spider-Man fights crime, then even though Spider-Man = Peter Parker, it does not follow that Aunt May believes that Peter Parker fights crime.
If you can't substitute Peter Parker for Spider-Man, then they are by definition not equal...
Re: The metaphysical presuppositions of formal logic
#7IMO This article is a mess.
Starts with an interesting premise, the foundations of logic (or rather, what people are taught as the foundations of logic) introduces unspoken assumptions. Then it goes on to illustrate with the worst example I can think off.
modern physics’ mathematical representations [...] tend to insinuate an eternalist rather than presentist conception of time.
Then it descends further into an unnecessarily jargon that can only be described as a debate about the sex of angels.
Re: The metaphysical presuppositions of formal logic
#8IMO This article is a mess. Starts with an interesting premise, the foundations of logic (or rather, what people are taught as the foundations of logic) introduces unspoken assumptions. Then it goes on to illustrate with the worst example I can think off. modern physics’ mathematical representations [...] tend to insinuate an eternalist rather than presentist conception of time. I don't know which modern physicists h…
But will a Physicist ever tell you whether time is continuous or discrete?
Re: The metaphysical presuppositions of formal logic
#9This seems too vague to me, like a lot of philosophical posts out there. > For example, if it is true that Aunt May believes that Spider-Man fights crime, then even though Spider-Man = Peter Parker, it does not follow that Aunt May believes that Peter Parker fights crime. If you can't substitute Peter Parker for Spider-Man, then they are by definition not equal...
There are different kinds of "equality", beyond the one you are invoking: https://ncatlab.org/nlab/show/equality#DifferentKinds
The most obvious example of A != A being true I can think of is the evaluation of this expression in any programming language:
Time.now == Time.nowRe: The metaphysical presuppositions of formal logic
#10This article does a great deal to point out the problem, but then just kicks the can down the road. Yes, metaphysics comes before Logic but metametaphysics comes before metaphysics. Ad infinitum. All this does is shift the discussion from the laws of logic to the laws of metaphysics - it is turtles all the way down. There is no way to get off this hamster wheel without a shift of perspective, but computer scientists…
Its not turtles all the way down, because there is a preexisting substrate that allows the discussion to happen in the first place.
It is not a presupposition, because to merely state the _possibility_ of it being a presupposition necessitates its existence. There has to be some kind of preexisting substrate that enables thought.
A recursive function can't run without a machine to run it.