1–10 of 40 posts
Was wondering how one could probably use https://github.com/FiloSottile/age or something.
(Not an emacs pro, so sure don't know some of the trivial ways to use this)
Probably you would get better answers about Emacs on https://emacs.stackexchange.com/ or https://www.reddit.com/r/emacs/ .
If you have gnupg installed, emacs can just open foo.org.gpg files directly. It decrypts on load and re-encrypts on save. Probably you would get better answers about Emacs on https://emacs.stackexchange.com/ or https://www.reddit.com/r/emacs/ .
It lets you encrypt/decrypt files or regions of a text file and is pretty easy to use.
This is not true. There was a proposal near the start of the year. That proposal has been almost entirely ignored.
Would age provide any advantage over GnuPG to make it worth the bother to switch to a new message format?
Orthogonal question: where can I learn more about Debian abandoning GPG?
I doubt this will happen any time soon.
come ask on libera in #emacs
For those you are new to IRC and want to take a quick glance at the channel without choosing clients and configuring them, here is a web-based interface to connect to the #emacs channel:https://web.libera.chat/#emacs
Here is the Matrix bridge for it accessible via Element's web interface: https://app.element.io/#/room/#emacs:libera.chat . The Matrix bridge could be useful for those who want their nick to stay connected to the channel even after closing the browser without having to set up an IRC bouncer for themselves.
>Debian abandoning it for signing packages and it's general lack of usage. This is not true. There was a proposal near the start of the year. That proposal has been almost entirely ignored. Would age provide any advantage over GnuPG to make it worth the bother to switch to a new message format? * https://articles.59.ca/doku.php?id=pgpfan:agevspgp
I don't want to reopen a can of worms on that very weird age vs. PGP thing you wrote (Debian isn't going to use age) but again, I think you should correct it, because it openly advocates for malleable unauthenticated encryption, which beclowns the rest of the points it tries to make. If you want to recover from single (or multiple) bit errors in your ciphertext, you don't relax authentication of your ciphertext; you forward-error-correct it.