Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability
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Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability
#2At least they make a case for it. Security isn't just how you store passwords.
Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability
#3I take this approach to security: I do everything I can possibly think of to secure an application. Any barrier that you setup now could save you 100x the time (& pain) later. Saying that one part is secure enough is asking for trouble.
Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability
#4Couldn't they at least encrypt it, and store the key on a separate file?
*edit: I just want to be clear, I don't actually think encryption would a sufficient replacement for a good hashing function, the question was just pointing out how bad this decision by Hover was; not only do they decide to make the password recoverable, but they don't even take whatever meager opportunities there are to make it at least somewhat secure.
Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability
#5Sweet, thanks for the free paypal/facebook/google/ebay/bank logins!
Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability
#6Couldn't they at least encrypt it, and store the key on a separate file? *edit: I just want to be clear, I don't actually think encryption would a sufficient replacement for a good hashing function, the question was just pointing out how bad this decision by Hover was; not only do they decide to make the password recoverable, but they don't even take whatever meager opportunities there are to make it at least somewha…
What good would that do? If an attacker gets in, they can get the key just as easily as they can get the database.
Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability
#7Couldn't they at least encrypt it, and store the key on a separate file? *edit: I just want to be clear, I don't actually think encryption would a sufficient replacement for a good hashing function, the question was just pointing out how bad this decision by Hover was; not only do they decide to make the password recoverable, but they don't even take whatever meager opportunities there are to make it at least somewha…
I assume that's what they're talking about implementing in the last paragraph.
Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability
#8I've considered using Hover and switching away from Godaddy, particularly since Hover is recommended frequently on the TWiT network. That thought has instantly evaporated.
You absolutely cannot store passwords in plain text. There is no level of security you can wrap around the database that will ever be 100%. It only takes one mistake for everything to get exposed.
To try and reason that there is a trade off between customer support and security is ludicrous. Your reset emails aren't getting through? Work on fixing that damn system instead of exposing your customers to a world of hurt down the road.
Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability
#9Couldn't they at least encrypt it, and store the key on a separate file? *edit: I just want to be clear, I don't actually think encryption would a sufficient replacement for a good hashing function, the question was just pointing out how bad this decision by Hover was; not only do they decide to make the password recoverable, but they don't even take whatever meager opportunities there are to make it at least somewha…
What good would that do? If an attacker gets in, they can get the key just as easily as they can get the database.
It just adds one more wall but a short wall at that.
Re: Hover.com: we store & email passwords in plaintext for usability
#10Couldn't they at least encrypt it, and store the key on a separate file? *edit: I just want to be clear, I don't actually think encryption would a sufficient replacement for a good hashing function, the question was just pointing out how bad this decision by Hover was; not only do they decide to make the password recoverable, but they don't even take whatever meager opportunities there are to make it at least somewha…
What good would that do? If an attacker gets in, they can get the key just as easily as they can get the database.
Not necessarily, if they hack into one system then getting into another isn't automatic. If the passwords are in a separate filesystem/database than the key, and linked only with software, then unless it's the software that's comprised it would still increase the difficulty of getting both the password and key significantly. It also prevents trivial browsing of passwords via sql commands by rouge employees.