Ok Google: please publish your DKIM secret keys

I don't see non repudation as that bad a thing. Are people any less likely to be blackmailed due to technical deniability of email contents? I feel that for most, that wouldn't matter.

Interesting/educational read but I'm still not convinced that this unintended side effect is a bad thing - it seems like a desirable property to have authenticated emails. Matt argues this might lead to regular folks (as opposed to politicians) getting blackmailed, but:

1) it seems unlikely this cryptographic proof is needed (he acknowledges this criticism in the post), and

2) what seems more likely to me is that politicians would intentionally _not_ opt in to any alternate solution and use that deniability for their own advantage. (Also as an alternate he proposes GPG, which I know Matt knows is laughable).

You might want to validate your emails more than a few months out.

Regardless of if your emails are valid or not, blackmail is still a crime. Not being able to have your emails validated doesn't protect you from blackmail. The power of blackmail is often in the social cost of the accusation itself. The thing that protects you from blackmail is not getting involved in things you can be blackmailed for.

This is like saying don't lock your doors so that nobody can break and enter into your house.

Put the company you work for in your threat model, and this becomes relevant to you.

The corporate world is mired in zero-sum competition, and some of your colleagues are willing to do things that will shock and appall you if it increases their chance of "winning".

Try working in defense, finance, or security as a closet anarchist. Have a few Chomsky books in your Amazon purchase history? Good luck climbing the Amazon corporate ladder.

> Google could launch the process right now by releasing its ancient 2016-era private keys. Since the secrecy of these serves literally no security purpose at this point, except for allowing third parties to verify email leaks, there’s no case for keeping these values secret at all.

I've used Google's DKIM signatures to timestamp call recordings for years by putting a sha256 of the attached recording in the subject, so "literally no security purpose" isn't true!

(though I should probably go through and timestamp those signatures right now them using another method, just in case this guy's idea gains any traction)