Grub with the partners of Sequoia Capital
grubwith.us
Grub with the partners of Sequoia Capital
1–10 of 30 posts
Re: Grub with the partners of Sequoia Capital
#2Nevertheless I think this charity bid model is a great use for the grubwith.us system.
Re: Grub with the partners of Sequoia Capital
#3I'm also curious as to how much these particular plates will end up going for considering all of the corporate cards out there held by CEOs who probably wouldn't mind schmoozing with Sequoia.
Re: Grub with the partners of Sequoia Capital
#4Although it is presented as a sealed bid/blind bid auction - when you submit your bid the following page seems to indicate the current minimum bid - which at the moment is $56. Nevertheless I think this charity bid model is a great use for the grubwith.us system.
Re: Grub with the partners of Sequoia Capital
#5Side note: I went to my first Grubwithus earlier this week and had a great time. If you have the opportunity, I definitely recommend you give it a try.
Re: Grub with the partners of Sequoia Capital
#6Although it is presented as a sealed bid/blind bid auction - when you submit your bid the following page seems to indicate the current minimum bid - which at the moment is $56. Nevertheless I think this charity bid model is a great use for the grubwith.us system.
I took that more as a "reserve" price to make sure Tres Agaves has their costs covered. I didn't expect it to go up as the bidding commenced. I could be wrong though.
Re: Grub with the partners of Sequoia Capital
#7Re: Grub with the partners of Sequoia Capital
#8However, for all K=# of seats, his Kth-price auction does not have the property that inputting your truthful value is your dominant strategy. The price should really be the bid of the K+1th person--otherwise, the Kth person can lower his bid in any outcome to the K+1th price/value (in descending order) and still obtain the seat. So it is not even a Nash Equilibrium to submit your truthful value.
So let's see how we can make the auction consistent with the desire to get everyone to bid their truthful value. If instead, the auction price was based on the 9th highest bid (which we assume to be the value) OR the reserve price (whichever one is higher), then it is everyone's dominant strategy to bid their value.
I don't want to rehash examples taught in an introductory Auction Theory class (which I greatly enjoyed), so if you're interested, take a look at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vickrey_auction
It's basically a fancy name for what I described, plus a few modifications and extensions.