TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
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Re: TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
#2The link to the paper[1] is a 404. Did anyone manage to grab a copy of the paper? I haven't thought about lattices since gradschool crypto classes, and was excited to see if I could comprehend anything after 10 years. :(
Re: TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
#3[deleted]
Re: TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
#4The link to the paper[1] is a 404. Did anyone manage to grab a copy of the paper? I haven't thought about lattices since gradschool crypto classes, and was excited to see if I could comprehend anything after 10 years. :( [1]: http://tpm.fail/TPM-FAIL.pdf
It appears to be here now: http://tpm.fail/tpmfail.pdf
Re: TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
#5The link to the paper[1] is a 404. Did anyone manage to grab a copy of the paper? I haven't thought about lattices since gradschool crypto classes, and was excited to see if I could comprehend anything after 10 years. :( [1]: http://tpm.fail/TPM-FAIL.pdf
It appears to be here now: http://tpm.fail/tpmfail.pdf
Thanks!
Re: TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
#6In my view this is some kind of argument as for why you should not (ab)use TPM as general purpose HSM (ie. for something that it is not designed for) and it does not say much about the security when it is used correctly (as a local attacker that has TPM in state where it will sign literally anything I throw at it, what exactly does key recovery attack buy me?)
Re: TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
#7Is there a good reason for a security conscious hi value target shop to use VMs or docker when they don't control the whole box?
Re: TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
#8DELTE THIS, BAD GOYIM
Re: TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
#9Does this allow users to install custom OSs on devices with verified boot chains like game consoles and phones?
Re: TPM–Fail: TPM Meets Timing and Lattice Attacks
#10I have not read the paper, and I could be wrong. However, these appear to be attacks against the crypto implemented inside a TPM/fTPM.
The reference implementation of TPM 2.0 leaves the choice of the crypto library up to the platform vendor. If my suspicions are correct, it sounds like some of the platform vendors decided to use crypto libraries vulnerable to timing attacks. Hmmm...