Building a Titan: Better security through a tiny chip
android-developers.googleblog.com
Building a Titan: Better security through a tiny chip
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Re: Building a Titan: Better security through a tiny chip
#2So the new Pixel includes U2F hardware in the device? That's cool - apparently, the flagship Chromebook has dormant U2F hardware, too.
Unfortunately, some providers (mainly Twitter) poorly implemented U2F by only allowing one device per account.
Re: Building a Titan: Better security through a tiny chip
#3I've been using the Titan, my main feature request is to require a delay on pressing the large button to activate the beacon. Any time I pull it out of my pocket or bump it, it lights up and starts broadcasting. Yubico had this problem, there are images online of random keys showing up in tweets/social status updates etc. I just got their new usb-c nano, and they added a delay that helps out when you accidentally bump it.
Re: Building a Titan: Better security through a tiny chip
#4> Finally, in the interest of transparency, the Titan M firmware source code will be publicly available soon. While Google holds the root keys necessary to sign Titan M firmware, it will be possible to reproduce binary builds based on the public source for the purpose of binary transparency.
and
> Transparency around every step of the design process — from logic gates to boot code to the applications — gives us confidence in the defenses we're providing for our users. We know what's inside, how it got there, how it works, and who can make changes.
This should be a boon for security researchers! I'm really looking forward to what comes out of fuzzing that whole subsystem. I imagine attacks against the secure enclave would be a lot easier to perform (and ideally, report to Apple) if it was feasible to attack it with pure software.
Re: Building a Titan: Better security through a tiny chip
#5Is it made clear anywhere how memory for the Titan enclave works, and whether they've done something similar to Apple with encrypted memory busses?
Re: Building a Titan: Better security through a tiny chip
#6I've been using the Titan, my main feature request is to require a delay on pressing the large button to activate the beacon. Any time I pull it out of my pocket or bump it, it lights up and starts broadcasting. Yubico had this problem, there are images online of random keys showing up in tweets/social status updates etc. I just got their new usb-c nano, and they added a delay that helps out when you accidentally bum…
Different Titan.
Re: Building a Titan: Better security through a tiny chip
#7> For example, packing as many security features into Titan M's 64 Kbytes of RAM required all firmware to execute exclusively off the stack.
Do what now?
Edit: seriously what does that sentence mean? Executing off the stack is super dangerous. Even on an M3 you can (and should) setup the MPU to have a non executable stack.
Re: Building a Titan: Better security through a tiny chip
#8I've been using the Titan, my main feature request is to require a delay on pressing the large button to activate the beacon. Any time I pull it out of my pocket or bump it, it lights up and starts broadcasting. Yubico had this problem, there are images online of random keys showing up in tweets/social status updates etc. I just got their new usb-c nano, and they added a delay that helps out when you accidentally bum…
Note that the Titan Security Key and the Titan M chip are two different things. In both cases the firmware is created and signed by Google in the USA, but the hardware used for the secure element in the Pixel 3 handsets and the Titan Security Key are different.
Also, the Bluetooth Titan Security Key has its own battery since it nees to be able to power the BT radio when it's not connected to anything else. So if you accidentally hit its button while you pull it out of your pocket, it can start transmitting.
In the case of the USB-C and USB Security Keys, (a) they are powered off of the USB bus, and have no batteries, so they are inactive when they are not powered up, and (b) all U2F keys don't need to to look like a keyboard (e.g., be a USB HID device). So random strings showing up when you accidentally touch a U2F key is never a thing. The issue with Yubikeys is that the can be both a U2F security key as well as a traditional HOTP token. If you disable the HOTP feature in a Yubikey device (using the Yubikey personalization tool), the problem of random HOTP passwords showing up in tweets, etc., goes away.
Re: Building a Titan: Better security through a tiny chip
#9Is it made clear anywhere how memory for the Titan enclave works, and whether they've done something similar to Apple with encrypted memory busses?
The post says 64 KB of RAM which is presumably on-chip.
Re: Building a Titan: Better security through a tiny chip
#10I hope Google sells these chips with a breakout board. Even better if you could order them with custom root signing keys