Live data from Hacker News

Nethammer: Inducing Rowhammer Faults Through Network Requests

arxiv.org

1–10 of 19 posts

Re: Nethammer: Inducing Rowhammer Faults Through Network Requests

#7
post #2

It’s about time Intel offers consumers ECC RAM support.

ECC wont help, you need row access counters(target row refresh/TRR) directly in ram chips, or in memory controller. With switch to DDR4 JEDEC had a chance of standardizing those mitigations, but that would cost additional cents per chip, cant have that!

Re: Nethammer: Inducing Rowhammer Faults Through Network Requests

#8
post #3

How is this different exactly from Throwhammer?

> Throwhammer works by registering a large amount of memory space called a buffer on the network card of the targeted device. [1]

> Nethammer is the first truly remote Rowhammer attack, without a single attacker-controlled line of code on the targeted system. Systems that use uncached memory or flush instructions while handling network requests, e.g., for interaction with the network device, can be attacked using Nethammer. Other systems can still be attacked if they are protected with quality-of-service techniques like Intel CAT. We demonstrate that the frequency of the cache misses is in all three cases high enough to induce bit flips. [2]

[1]: https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2018/05/attac...

[2]: https://arxiv.org/pdf/1805.04956.pdf

Re: Nethammer: Inducing Rowhammer Faults Through Network Requests

#10
post #3

How is this different exactly from Throwhammer?

Throwhammer: > 9.375 million packets per second

Nethammer: > 1 024 000 packets per second over a 500 Mbit/s connection ......Hence, we conclude that in theory...

Both currently at best lead to server crash, and are highly impractical.

Post reply on HN