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Serverless Security: What's Left to Protect?

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Re: Serverless Security: What's Left to Protect?

#2
> However, managing granular permissions for hundreds or thousands of functions is very hard to do.

When building a FaaS app from scratch granular permissions are manageable. Functions are small, so it’s easy to reason about the capabilities they need and write tight policies.

I don’t see why this doesn’t scale to a larger FaaS app.

I think the real trick is to avoid the bundling of functions and policies the article suggests people do out of convenience.

I’m working on a practical guide to Lambda and IAM policies here:

https://github.com/nzoschke/gofaas/blob/master/docs/per-func...

Re: Serverless Security: What's Left to Protect?

#3
post #2

> However, managing granular permissions for hundreds or thousands of functions is very hard to do. When building a FaaS app from scratch granular permissions are manageable. Functions are small, so it’s easy to reason about the capabilities they need and write tight policies. I don’t see why this doesn’t scale to a larger FaaS app. I think the real trick is to avoid the bundling of functions and policies the article…

It's entirely doable to manage permissions granularly, but it's not the most natural thing to do. It's FAR easier to broaden permissions.

The more functions you have and the more time they've had to morph, the more likely they are to have far greater permissions than they should.

Re: Serverless Security: What's Left to Protect?

#5
OS and server stack updates aren’t a case of “more secure”. Somebody still needs to do that work, and you’re trading the responsibility of doing it for the promise that somebody else will (often with no visibility into how and when).

DoS is only “solved” by “infinite capacity” insofar as you’re willing to pay for the capacity. If you have any spending caps in place, you’ll be DoSed by burning through your budget. DoS protecting must happen at a lower level than that.

Re: Serverless Security: What's Left to Protect?

#6
as a system administrator, I find the summary as laughable as the FAAS movement itself.

"FaaS takes on the responsibility for “patching” the underlying servers, freeing you from OS patching"

So a sysadm-er, devops admin will be rolling these out and back with CI on a regular basis to dev,test and prod.

"Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are naturally thwarted by the (presumed) infinite capacity Serverless offers."

Unless youre invoicing department is cutting cheques to cloudflare, you'd be surprised just how limited the service is. Capacity might be amorphously defined as infinite on paper, but network capacity is quite real.

"Since the OS is unreachable, attackers will shift their attention to the areas that remain exposed – and first amongst those would be the application itself."

the OS is reachable, what you mean to say is that its not your problem.

Re: Serverless Security: What's Left to Protect?

#7
I don't necessarily agree with serverless thwarting DoS attacks. While technically it makes it easy to scale to accommodate the increase load (in the same way that auto-scaling will). The denial of a service is the result of your inability to pay for that "infinite" scalability.

Personally I'd much rather have to deal with my service being offline for the duration of a DoS attack, then have my company go broke from having to pay for the capacity allocated to servicing the attack.

Re: Serverless Security: What's Left to Protect?

#8
Admin'ing a system is hard work requiring a deep understanding of many different application, os and network systems, rigorous attention to detail, good communication skills and being subscribed to a variety of fractured news and alert systems to sort out what inbound patches and mitigations are relevant and what can/should be applied.

Which leads me to the point of FAAS (and other managed services like Heroku, etc). which is to let you put up a web service on the increasingly hostile and dangerous Internet without either:

- Learning all of the above (none of which is taught in a standard CS degree)

- Hiring a Sysadmin for six figures.

Any time FAAS comes up people correctly point out that a sysadmin still needs to do the work of handling the underlying OS updates, etc - which misses the point. It's the difference between flying in a 737 that's been inspected by a certified mechanic who is looking for a hundred things it would never occur for me to even consider and flown by a pilot with thousands of hours in the cockpit versus someone who flies their small aircraft a couple weekends a month and does their own inspections.

In general, I trust that the security and SRE teams at Google, AWS, Microsoft who are the main people deploying building out these FAAS systems have a better handle on these things than whoever is handling sysadmin tasks on random VPS.

Re: Serverless Security: What's Left to Protect?

#10

"Since the OS is unreachable" Woah slow down there what? That's a significant presumption. This 'serverless' thing is a fad.

I don't think it's a fad, we will see more like this, just another layer of abstraction.

Might have been better to write, assuming the OS is unreachable - which is the security contract I assume.

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