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In Defense of Probability (1985) [pdf]

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Re: In Defense of Probability (1985) [pdf]

#5
post #3
post #2

Why is there a glaring typo in the first sentence of the abstract? "In this paper, it is argued that probability theory, when used correctly, is suffrcient for the task of reasoning under uncertainty."

The paper is probably OCRed.

We can fix it. I have started a git repo for this https://github.com/michaelchristophernewyork/probability

please help clean up if you have time.

Re: In Defense of Probability (1985) [pdf]

#6
post #3
post #2

Why is there a glaring typo in the first sentence of the abstract? "In this paper, it is argued that probability theory, when used correctly, is suffrcient for the task of reasoning under uncertainty."

The paper is probably OCRed.

Good point. The rendering of "sufficient" probably uses the triple-ligature for "ffi", where all 3 characters are merged.

The author, Peter Cheeseman, is a reputable figure and a solid practitioner. I'm sure he's just as annoyed that, on the second page, his own name is misspelled as "Cheesemart" ;-).

People may recognize him as a co-creator of the AutoClass software for Bayesian clustering, which was very popular in the late 1990s - the explanatory paper has 1700 citations.

Re: In Defense of Probability (1985) [pdf]

#8
post #3
post #2

Why is there a glaring typo in the first sentence of the abstract? "In this paper, it is argued that probability theory, when used correctly, is suffrcient for the task of reasoning under uncertainty."

The paper is probably OCRed.

Author's name is also misspelled in the header on one of the early pages. It's obviously been scanned and OCRed.

Re: In Defense of Probability (1985) [pdf]

#9
post #4

Its ironic, today we could really use a paper "in defense of fuzzy logic"

Having used a fuzzy logic model to do some analysis on a social project in the 90's and a heating problem around the same time frame, I don't think fuzzy logic needs a defense, it needs a PR agency.

Re: In Defense of Probability (1985) [pdf]

#10
I could add that truth-likeness might not adequately accommodated by a subjective-probability degree-of-belief model. For example, while I might believe both of these propositions to be true, p=1, one is more uhh truth like:

Donald Trump weighs 107 kg. Donald Trump weighs less than the sun.

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