Consciousness as a State of Matter (2014)
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Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter (2014)
#2[deleted]
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter (2014)
#3http://www.math.columbia.edu/~woit/wordpress/?p=6551
>>> Tegmark’s career is a rather unusual story, mixing reputable science with an increasingly strong taste for grandiose nonsense. In this book he indulges his inner crank, describing in detail an utterly empty vision of the “ultimate nature of reality.”
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter (2014)
#4To me, this read like Alan Sokal's Postmodernism troll piece. I understand Tegmark is a reputable physicist, but the abstract could have been written by Deepak Chopra after skimming a math text.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter (2014)
#5Even if it wasn't nonsense, it would be.
Because the description focuses on how we perceive the world; not on who is this we that perceives.
The mystery of consciousness in the observer, not in what it observes.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter (2014)
#6Even if it wasn't nonsense, it would be. Because the description focuses on how we perceive the world; not on who is this we that perceives . The mystery of consciousness in the observer, not in what it observes.
You have my upvote, but I'm still scratching my head over your first sentence.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter (2014)
#7Even if it wasn't nonsense, it would be. Because the description focuses on how we perceive the world; not on who is this we that perceives . The mystery of consciousness in the observer, not in what it observes.
I feel you have it backwards. That there are observers doesn't seem like much of a mystery: there doesn't seem to be anything mysterious about observers beyond the right kind of computation. The mystery is the qualitative experience of conscious observers, the feel, the what it is like to be, etc.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter (2014)
#8Even if it wasn't nonsense, it would be. Because the description focuses on how we perceive the world; not on who is this we that perceives . The mystery of consciousness in the observer, not in what it observes.
I feel you have it backwards. That there are observers doesn't seem like much of a mystery: there doesn't seem to be anything mysterious about observers beyond the right kind of computation. The mystery is the qualitative experience of conscious observers, the feel, the what it is like to be, etc.
But what could it mean to be an "observer" other than to have said "qualitative experience?"
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter (2014)
#9Even if it wasn't nonsense, it would be. Because the description focuses on how we perceive the world; not on who is this we that perceives . The mystery of consciousness in the observer, not in what it observes.
I feel you have it backwards. That there are observers doesn't seem like much of a mystery: there doesn't seem to be anything mysterious about observers beyond the right kind of computation. The mystery is the qualitative experience of conscious observers, the feel, the what it is like to be, etc.
> "beyond the right kind of computation"
Could you explain this?
The observer isn't a mystery, I agree. But the original comment seems spot on: if you are describing consciousness as a state of matter, then you're saying something like, "matter inherits a different set of qualities when it's in a consciousness state (as opposed to a solid or liquid state)." If the state change leads to a change of quality, then you're once again proclaiming consciousness as an object with observable qualities rather than a the observer without quality. This is fine if we're talking about an observable consciousness, but then who is that observer?
I agree with the original comment that this paper is nonsense. I'm surprised how many papers are spent discussing consciousness this way. In biological terms, fine. In physical terms, impossible.
Re: Consciousness as a State of Matter (2014)
#10Even if it wasn't nonsense, it would be. Because the description focuses on how we perceive the world; not on who is this we that perceives . The mystery of consciousness in the observer, not in what it observes.
I feel you have it backwards. That there are observers doesn't seem like much of a mystery: there doesn't seem to be anything mysterious about observers beyond the right kind of computation. The mystery is the qualitative experience of conscious observers, the feel, the what it is like to be, etc.
To me it does. What is an observer? Is it distinguishable from its memory? If not, what do you have to do to a memory to add observer to it?
Can we make a conscious machine? Why not? Maybe we can by simulating a brain exactly. But can we then figure out what in our model makes the sim-brain conscious? Can we turn it on and off?
Most of our insights into how human mind works actually describe how a philosophic zombie will work. But I am not one and I would like to know what am I.