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Changes to Trusted Certificate Authorities in Android Nougat

android-developers.blogspot.com

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Re: Changes to Trusted Certificate Authorities in Android Nougat

#2

Post by ffernand »

I first learned about this from the tweet https://twitter.com/agl__/status/751184962049576960

This renders tools like mitmproxy un-usable. But really, if it's your device, why can't you see your own traffic?

I can understand how this might improve security, but it locks you out of the conversation your own phone is having. Feels like reverse privacy; Not even you can know what you're saying!

Re: Changes to Trusted Certificate Authorities in Android Nougat

#3

Post by deftnerd »

I would rather see the OS let people load the cert but then require the user enter their PIN, password, or unlock drawing. Then the cert can be signed by the PIN/etc and trusted.

This would allow certs to be added, but prevent them from being silently side-loaded by an admin or malware. Changing your PIN would invalidate the cert but you could just be prompted to resign them.

Re: Changes to Trusted Certificate Authorities in Android Nougat

#4

Post by spikengineer »

ffernand wrote: post #2

I first learned about this from the tweet https://twitter.com/agl__/status/751184962049576960 This renders tools like mitmproxy un-usable. But really, if it's your device, why can't you see your own traffic? I can understand how this might improve security, but it locks you out of the conversation your own phone is having. Feels like reverse privacy; Not even you can know what you're saying!

I believe Android is taking this approach because of hawkish network appliances vendors selling all too powerful gear to enterprises and these enterprises don't care about what to decrypt and what not and causing too many weaknesses on the way.

I belive MITM decryption for enterprises is a flawed way of identifying intrusions and doesn't stop or hinder any intrusions. It only provides a false sense of security.

Intruders will always be able to fool appliances by using encapsulation of multiple encryption protocols or using non-standard protocols.

Re: Changes to Trusted Certificate Authorities in Android Nougat

#7

Post by wyldfire »

I was going to try writing an addon/extension to chrome to make a visible warning indicator when this site was trusted only via user added certs. That would've allowed me to see when my company was intercepting my traffic at the proxy (the proxy decides not to intercept some sites, mostly ones w/pinned certs). Unfortunately this info doesn't seem to be available to the framework. :(

Re: Changes to Trusted Certificate Authorities in Android Nougat

#8

Post by 616c »

And here I was thinking a fun first project would be a socat client with self-signed certs for remote access.

The more I want to learn about smart phone development and ecosystem, the more offputting it gets by the year.

But yeah, use our PlayApp Store we can better track you in real time. OUR certs are WITHOUT DOUBT TRUSTWORTHY.

Sometimes I feel neckbeards will beat us youngbloods to death for the sins we let pass.

Re: Changes to Trusted Certificate Authorities in Android Nougat

#9

Post by kem »

deftnerd wrote: post #3

I would rather see the OS let people load the cert but then require the user enter their PIN, password, or unlock drawing. Then the cert can be signed by the PIN/etc and trusted. This would allow certs to be added, but prevent them from being silently side-loaded by an admin or malware. Changing your PIN would invalidate the cert but you could just be prompted to resign them.

This is a bit confusing to me: "apps that target API level 24 will—by design—not honor such CAs unless the app explicitly opts in."

So the app opts in?

Seems strange to me. What you're suggesting makes a lot more sense.

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