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Experimenting with Post-Quantum Cryptography

security.googleblog.com

1–10 of 41 posts

Re: Experimenting with Post-Quantum Cryptography

#4
As I understand it that the picture for symmetric encryption in a quantum computer world is still relatively rosy. The key strength of something like AES is halved, but with the important caveat that the difficulty is with respect to quantum operations rather than classical operations and there's no guarantee quantum computers will be able to scale as well over time as silicon has. The situation for asymmetric encryption is where the real potential trouble lies. Please correct me if I misunderstand the situation.

Re: Experimenting with Post-Quantum Cryptography

#6
post #3

> We explicitly do not wish to make our selected post-quantum algorithm a de-facto standard Like so many other things in computer science history, that seems like a great way to make it the de-facto standard.

If Google manages to prove it works and there are no better alternatives later on, then it will probably become the de-facto standard.

However, the second condition seems to not be met if Google is right, because they mention there are promising papers published.

­>Since we selected New Hope, we've noted two promising papers in this space, which are welcome.

Re: Experimenting with Post-Quantum Cryptography

#7

As I understand it that the picture for symmetric encryption in a quantum computer world is still relatively rosy. The key strength of something like AES is halved, but with the important caveat that the difficulty is with respect to quantum operations rather than classical operations and there's no guarantee quantum computers will be able to scale as well over time as silicon has. The situation for asymmetric encryp…

You are mostly correct. In fact the key strength of something like AES is realistically not even going to be reduced by half. In terms of the query complexity (the number of calls to AES that are needed) using Grover's algorithm the key strength is half what it would be with classical brute force. In practice though these queries must be implemented as quantum circuits and run a on quantum computer which adds a pretty large overhead.

This article is about the implementation of an asymmetric protocol based on the RLWE (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ring_Learning_with_Errors) problem.

Re: Experimenting with Post-Quantum Cryptography

#10
post #5

I discovered NTRU while searching for a fast alternative to RSA for asymmetric encryption. It's said to be quantum resistant as well but I can only vouch for its speed (it is very fast and served my purpose perfectly). https://github.com/NTRUOpenSourceProject/ntru-crypto

NTRU is patented though and requires you to use their GPL library for patent exemption, or have a paid license (as said in the project README). However, given that, there's also http://tbuktu.github.io/ntru/ as BSD, so I'm not sure how to square that with what the owners of NTRU publicly stated. Apparently the EU is also considering it for some sort of standardization?

Bernstein also recently released a paper on NTRU Prime which I just became aware of, although it makes no mention of the patent issue. https://ntruprime.cr.yp.to/ntruprime-20160511.pdf

In any case, it'd be interesting to get an answer on this, since NTRU has looked interesting for a long time, but the patents were pretty unfortunate.

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