About the security content of iOS 9.3

#1

Post by wooster » Mon, Mar 21, 2016, 7:48 PM UTC

About the security content of iOS 9.3
support.apple.com

Re: About the security content of iOS 9.3

#2

Post by jgrahamc » Mon, Mar 21, 2016, 7:56 PM UTC

Waiting for the paper on this:

    Impact: An attacker who is able to bypass Apple's certificate pinning, 
    intercept TLS connections, inject messages, and record encrypted attachment-
    type messages may be able to read attachments

    Description: A cryptographic issue was addressed by rejecting duplicate 
    messages on the client.

    CVE-2016-1788 : Christina Garman, Matthew Green, Gabriel Kaptchuk, Ian Miers, 
    and Michael Rushanan of Johns Hopkins University

Re: About the security content of iOS 9.3

#3

Post by abritishguy » Mon, Mar 21, 2016, 8:33 PM UTC

So many memory corruption issues, I'd like to think in 5/10 years time this would be solved and everything written in a safe language but maybe I'm being optimistic.

Re: About the security content of iOS 9.3

#4

Post by knodi » Mon, Mar 21, 2016, 8:39 PM UTC

abritishguy wrote: post #3

So many memory corruption issues, I'd like to think in 5/10 years time this would be solved and everything written in a safe language but maybe I'm being optimistic.

Thats the same thing people said 10 years ago.

Re: About the security content of iOS 9.3

#5

Post by brokentone » Mon, Mar 21, 2016, 9:26 PM UTC

Is the big security roll up here due to external or internal scrutiny of iOS security spawned by the FBI inquiry perhaps?

Re: About the security content of iOS 9.3

#6

Post by tambourine_man » Mon, Mar 21, 2016, 9:28 PM UTC

abritishguy wrote: post #3

So many memory corruption issues, I'd like to think in 5/10 years time this would be solved and everything written in a safe language but maybe I'm being optimistic.

If by safe you mean memory managed by default with opting out (unsafe keyword, or something similar), then I would bet so.

If you mean safe like there's no way a programer can screw this (100% memory managed like JavaScript, Python, Ruby) than I'd bet not.

Re: About the security content of iOS 9.3

#7

Post by abritishguy » Mon, Mar 21, 2016, 9:42 PM UTC

tambourine_man wrote: post #6

abritishguy wrote: post #3

So many memory corruption issues, I'd like to think in 5/10 years time this would be solved and everything written in a safe language but maybe I'm being optimistic.

If by safe you mean memory managed by default with opting out ( unsafe keyword, or something similar), then I would bet so. If you mean safe like there's no way a programer can screw this (100% memory managed like JavaScript, Python, Ruby) than I'd bet not.

The former, something like Rust.

Re: About the security content of iOS 9.3

#8

Post by runesoerensen » Mon, Mar 21, 2016, 9:50 PM UTC

jgrahamc wrote: post #2

Waiting for the paper on this: Impact: An attacker who is able to bypass Apple's certificate pinning, intercept TLS connections, inject messages, and record encrypted attachment- type messages may be able to read attachments Description: A cryptographic issue was addressed by rejecting duplicate messages on the client. CVE-2016-1788 : Christina Garman, Matthew Green, Gabriel Kaptchuk, Ian Miers, and Michael Rushanan…

The blog post (which includes link to the paper) has been submitted here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=11332377

Re: About the security content of iOS 9.3

#9

Post by daenney » Mon, Mar 21, 2016, 10:11 PM UTC

"This issue was addressed through improved input validation." Valuable refresher for everyone.

Re: About the security content of iOS 9.3

#10

Post by mhw » Mon, Mar 21, 2016, 10:26 PM UTC

Hmm:

    CVE-2016-1752 : CESG
    CVE-2016-1750 : CESG

I wonder if that's " rel="nofollow">https://www.cesg.gov.uk/>, which is "the Information Security Arm of GCHQ". If so I guess we should be thankful that they saw these vulnerabilities is a risk rather than an opportunity.