Peach App Token Reuse Flaw
hakobaito.co.uk
Peach App Token Reuse Flaw
1–10 of 35 posts
Re: Peach App Token Reuse Flaw
#2Re: Peach App Token Reuse Flaw
#3Access to an unencrypted client device is usually game over for most apps' data security anyway.
[0] https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=v1.peachapi.c...
(OP: love the graphic design and appropriate color scheme!)
Re: Peach App Token Reuse Flaw
#4While I agree that the tokens must be expired on logout, it's hard to gain access to the token via MITM because the API requests are performed over TLS [0]! This point seems glossed over in the post. You would need access to a client app directly to be able to inspect its storage or sniff the traffic yourself to determine the token being used. Access to an unencrypted client device is usually game over for most apps'…
Re: Peach App Token Reuse Flaw
#5Re: Peach App Token Reuse Flaw
#6The font on that webpage is disgusting.
Re: Peach App Token Reuse Flaw
#7While I agree that the tokens must be expired on logout, it's hard to gain access to the token via MITM because the API requests are performed over TLS [0]! This point seems glossed over in the post. You would need access to a client app directly to be able to inspect its storage or sniff the traffic yourself to determine the token being used. Access to an unencrypted client device is usually game over for most apps'…
Re: Peach App Token Reuse Flaw
#8Thanks.
Re: Peach App Token Reuse Flaw
#9While I agree that the tokens must be expired on logout, it's hard to gain access to the token via MITM because the API requests are performed over TLS [0]! This point seems glossed over in the post. You would need access to a client app directly to be able to inspect its storage or sniff the traffic yourself to determine the token being used. Access to an unencrypted client device is usually game over for most apps'…
Is there really that much additional security over deleting tokens locally when logging out, but expiring all existing tokens (using a timestamp) on password change?
Blacklisting individual tokens requires storing them in the db and then looking them up each time a user logs in. It seems like given the app already uses TLS, the tiny security gain isn't big enough to justify the performance impact.