Vuvuzela – Private messaging system that hides metadata
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Re: Vuvuzela – Private messaging system that hides metadata
#2[deleted]
Re: Vuvuzela – Private messaging system that hides metadata
#3you win just for the project name.
Re: Vuvuzela – Private messaging system that hides metadata
#4you win just for the project name.
I thought the example conversation was quite cute also :p
Re: Vuvuzela – Private messaging system that hides metadata
#5> In practice, the message latency would be around 20s to 40s, depending on security parameters and the number of users connected to the system.
Haven't had time to read the paper yet - is this an inherent property of the system, or a number that could be reduced by future work?
Re: Vuvuzela – Private messaging system that hides metadata
#6> In practice, the message latency would be around 20s to 40s, depending on security parameters and the number of users connected to the system. Haven't had time to read the paper yet - is this an inherent property of the system, or a number that could be reduced by future work?
seems inherent - servers operate in rounds and each round carries legit traffic plus enough noise to allow traffic metadata to drown in nothingness and forward it to a whole server chain to avoid an adversary to control all the servers, so as you scale servers need more time to forward and mixin traffic
Re: Vuvuzela – Private messaging system that hides metadata
#7Re: Vuvuzela – Private messaging system that hides metadata
#8The added noise reminds me of WASTE, which was infamously created by Justin Frankel at Nullsoft to protest the post-acquisition atmosphere at AOL...
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/WASTE
https://web.archive.org/web/20100317095429/http://www.rollin...
Re: Vuvuzela – Private messaging system that hides metadata
#9> In practice, the message latency would be around 20s to 40s, depending on security parameters and the number of users connected to the system. Haven't had time to read the paper yet - is this an inherent property of the system, or a number that could be reduced by future work?
seems inherent - servers operate in rounds and each round carries legit traffic plus enough noise to allow traffic metadata to drown in nothingness and forward it to a whole server chain to avoid an adversary to control all the servers, so as you scale servers need more time to forward and mixin traffic
Could someone much smarter than me do some napkin math and figure out roughly what kind of tradeoff in security you make by limiting the noise?
20-40 seconds is fine if you are releasing NSA secret files and want the chance of metadata discovery to be But it's too much to use as a regular form of conversation between average parties who just want to set a precedent that all conversations by default should be un-monitorable.
However what if that number was down to ~5 seconds? Now it's tolerable. But the tradeoff is, what does the chance of detectability go up to? 1%? 5%? 50%?