Automakers Trying to Prevent Hackers from Commandeering Cars
1–10 of 29 posts
Re: Automakers Trying to Prevent Hackers from Commandeering Cars
#2That shouldn't be too hard. Disconnect all radios from management computers with an airgap. And if that goes at the cost of some functionality then so be it but the downsides of interconnected systems are heavier than the upsides.
At a minimum stick an 'airgap' switch in the dash somewhere and default it to 'on', or label it 'insecure' when off so the users know the risks.
Re: Automakers Trying to Prevent Hackers from Commandeering Cars
#3That shouldn't be too hard. Disconnect all radios from management computers with an airgap. And if that goes at the cost of some functionality then so be it but the downsides of interconnected systems are heavier than the upsides. At a minimum stick an 'airgap' switch in the dash somewhere and default it to 'on', or label it 'insecure' when off so the users know the risks.
a proper separation model with a bridge controlling which message can go from each zone would work as well without reduced functionality - the problem for now is not even that they had some fault in their security but that there was no security to begin with, everything listen to every other thing and can send messages to (almost) anything over the common car bus.
Re: Automakers Trying to Prevent Hackers from Commandeering Cars
#4But if these cars can be "commandeered", they (i.e. my movements) could also easily be tracked by the companies themselves (with the information then sold to "trusted partners"). For some reason, that frightens me more.
Re: Automakers Trying to Prevent Hackers from Commandeering Cars
#5That shouldn't be too hard. Disconnect all radios from management computers with an airgap. And if that goes at the cost of some functionality then so be it but the downsides of interconnected systems are heavier than the upsides. At a minimum stick an 'airgap' switch in the dash somewhere and default it to 'on', or label it 'insecure' when off so the users know the risks.
a proper separation model with a bridge controlling which message can go from each zone would work as well without reduced functionality - the problem for now is not even that they had some fault in their security but that there was no security to begin with, everything listen to every other thing and can send messages to (almost) anything over the common car bus.
Any bridge between an air gap poses a risk.
I am not sure why you would need access to the system that controls the breaks/steering/engine. Perhaps to pre-heat the car, or the sat-nav may feed topology to suspension etc.
If they introduce over the air software updates I would be more worried :/
Re: Automakers Trying to Prevent Hackers from Commandeering Cars
#6This title should only be "news" early on in the design stage. Were they not trying to prevent hackers from commandeering cars before they released them?
Also as others have said, airgap the systems.
Re: Automakers Trying to Prevent Hackers from Commandeering Cars
#7Earlier quoted context omitted.
a proper separation model with a bridge controlling which message can go from each zone would work as well without reduced functionality - the problem for now is not even that they had some fault in their security but that there was no security to begin with, everything listen to every other thing and can send messages to (almost) anything over the common car bus.
Any bridge between an air gap poses a risk. I am not sure why you would need access to the system that controls the breaks/steering/engine. Perhaps to pre-heat the car, or the sat-nav may feed topology to suspension etc. If they introduce over the air software updates I would be more worried :/
things like the Prius Dashboard, for example.
even if information required is one way read only by being read it's not airgapped, and thus requires some deliberate consideration in how the information flows and is filtered, because in a car there are physical wires carrying bit arounds
Re: Automakers Trying to Prevent Hackers from Commandeering Cars
#8That shouldn't be too hard. Disconnect all radios from management computers with an airgap. And if that goes at the cost of some functionality then so be it but the downsides of interconnected systems are heavier than the upsides. At a minimum stick an 'airgap' switch in the dash somewhere and default it to 'on', or label it 'insecure' when off so the users know the risks.
The problem is that doing so removes the ability to do the self parking, or doing something like the remote kill switch that they can invoke in case the vehicle is ever stolen.
Me personally, I know how to park and particularly care if my car is stolen..that's my insurance companies problem. So I could live without both of these features, but you can see how some would argue the opposite. I'm sure there are other tie ins, I'm just can't think of any other that as obvious.
Re: Automakers Trying to Prevent Hackers from Commandeering Cars
#9Earlier quoted context omitted.
a proper separation model with a bridge controlling which message can go from each zone would work as well without reduced functionality - the problem for now is not even that they had some fault in their security but that there was no security to begin with, everything listen to every other thing and can send messages to (almost) anything over the common car bus.
Any bridge between an air gap poses a risk. I am not sure why you would need access to the system that controls the breaks/steering/engine. Perhaps to pre-heat the car, or the sat-nav may feed topology to suspension etc. If they introduce over the air software updates I would be more worried :/
The earliest linkage that I know of between the vehicle data network and an entertainment system was to be able to automatically increase the radio/CD volume at higher speeds. This was long before phones were built in to the dashboard so there wasn't as much of a requirement for security, once you are inside the car the diagnostic connector will give you access to the whole network anyway.
I don't know of a read-only CAN controller, plus not all data values will be periodically broadcast over the vehicle network so you may need to be able to send out a request for something as well as listen for a reply. The standard firewall tools ought to be easy enough to adapt to filter CAN messages.
The first time I updated ECUs over the air would be over 15 years ago, I have not kept up with whether manufacturers were thinking of doing it routinely.
Re: Automakers Trying to Prevent Hackers from Commandeering Cars
#10Earlier quoted context omitted.
Any bridge between an air gap poses a risk. I am not sure why you would need access to the system that controls the breaks/steering/engine. Perhaps to pre-heat the car, or the sat-nav may feed topology to suspension etc. If they introduce over the air software updates I would be more worried :/
things like the Prius Dashboard, for example. even if information required is one way read only by being read it's not airgapped, and thus requires some deliberate consideration in how the information flows and is filtered, because in a car there are physical wires carrying bit arounds
Perhaps they could have two systems reading the data separately. Even if it means two battery monitors etc.
I know in the Audi Virtual Cockpit (virtual dashboard) they have two graphics cards for the display. I wonder how much of that is for performance, and how much is so if Google maps slows up, your speedometer doesn't freeze.