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Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise

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961–970 of 1001 posts

Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise

#961

Yikes! Do you have any info on the individual's background or possible motivations?

Has Jia in any way posted a response to the incident?

My assumption would be that he knows the jig is up, and is probably going to do everything he can to jettison the JiaTan account, lest any IPs he uses be turned over to authorities.

Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise

#962
post #42

Very annoying - the apparent author of the backdoor was in communication with me over several weeks trying to get xz 5.6.x added to Fedora 40 & 41 because of it's "great new features". We even worked with him to fix the valgrind issue (which it turns out now was caused by the backdoor he had added). We had to race last night to fix the problem after an inadvertent break of the embargo. He has been part of the xz proj…

Can legal action be taken against the author if it's found he maliciously added the backdoor?

Good luck with that. We don't even know what country is he from. Probably from China but even if so. Good luck finding him among 1.5 Billions.

Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise

#963

Which nation state (if any) is most likely behind this? China based on name, or is this a red herring? The perpetrator did most GitHub actions between 10 and 18 UTC, which sort of rules out US based, unless the messages were scheduled. Consistent with Europe to Asia. See clickhouse for data: https://play.clickhouse.com/play?user=play#U0VMRUNUICogRlJPT...

Could easily be someone in the EST time zone. There aren't that many events that would be earlier than 8am EST.

Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise

#964
post #42

Very annoying - the apparent author of the backdoor was in communication with me over several weeks trying to get xz 5.6.x added to Fedora 40 & 41 because of it's "great new features". We even worked with him to fix the valgrind issue (which it turns out now was caused by the backdoor he had added). We had to race last night to fix the problem after an inadvertent break of the embargo. He has been part of the xz proj…

his account is active again on github https://github.com/JiaT75

Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise

#965
post #514
post #42

Very annoying - the apparent author of the backdoor was in communication with me over several weeks trying to get xz 5.6.x added to Fedora 40 & 41 because of it's "great new features". We even worked with him to fix the valgrind issue (which it turns out now was caused by the backdoor he had added). We had to race last night to fix the problem after an inadvertent break of the embargo. He has been part of the xz proj…

GitHub has suspended @JiaT75's account. EDIT: Lasse Collin's account @Larhzu has also been suspended. EDIT: Github has disabled all Tukaani repositories, including downloads from the releases page. -- EDIT: Just did a bit of poking. xz-embedded was touched by Jia as well and it appears to be used in the linux kernel. I did quick look and it doesn't appear Jia touched anything of interest in there. I also checked the…

account is back online https://github.com/JiaT75

Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise

#966

For someone who does not understand the packages used, could you please summarize in layman non technical terms. Thanks I did read the main post.

This link helped a little. https://gist.github.com/thesamesam/223949d5a074ebc3dce9ee78b...

This is perfect summary https://research.swtch.com/xz-timeline

Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise

#967

A lot of software (including https://gitlab.com/openconnect/openconnect of which I'm a maintainer) uses libxml2, which in turn transitively links to libzma, using it to load and store compressed XML. I'm not *too* worried about OpenConnect given that we use `libxml2` only to read and parse uncompressed XML… But I am wondering if there has been any statement from libxml2 devs (they're under the GNOME umbrella) about p…

> only to read and parse uncompressed XML… how does libxml2 know to decompress something? does it require you, as the caller, to explicitly tell it to? or does it look at the magic bytes or filename or mimetype or something?

> how does libxml2 know to decompress something? > > does it require you, as the caller, to explicitly tell it to?

In the entry point/function that we use, `xmlReadMemory` (https://gnome.pages.gitlab.gnome.org/libxml2/devhelp/libxml2...), it doesn't handle compressed XML at all.

But there are indeed others where it attempts to auto-detect compression, although as I understand it from the docs only ZLib compression is autodetected… though I suspect these may be out-of-date and it may autodetect any/all compiled -in compression algorithms.

Regardless, the fact that it links with liblzma is cause for concern, given the mechanism of operation of the liblzma/xz backdoor.

Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise

#968
post #514

Earlier quoted context omitted.

GitHub has suspended @JiaT75's account. EDIT: Lasse Collin's account @Larhzu has also been suspended. EDIT: Github has disabled all Tukaani repositories, including downloads from the releases page. -- EDIT: Just did a bit of poking. xz-embedded was touched by Jia as well and it appears to be used in the linux kernel. I did quick look and it doesn't appear Jia touched anything of interest in there. I also checked the…

account is back online https://github.com/JiaT75

Hopefully still locked just visible so people can find and alayze his contributions.

Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise

#969

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Pure speculation but my guess is a specific state actor ahem is looking for developers innocently working with open source to then strongarm them into doing stuff like this.

many people are patriots of their countries. if state agency would approach them proposing to have paid OSS work and help their country to fight terrorism/dictatorships/capitalists/whatever-they-believe, they will feel like killing two birds with one job

While this seems plausible, it is notable that this person seems to be anonymous from the get go. Most open source maintainers are proud of their work and maintain publicly available personas.

Re: Backdoor in upstream xz/liblzma leading to SSH server compromise

#970
post #449

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think this has been in the making for almost a year. The whole ifunc infrastructure was added in June 2023 by Hans Jansen and Jia Tan. The initial patch is "authored by" Lasse Collin in the git metadata, but the code actually came from Hans Jansen: https://github.com/tukaani-project/xz/commit/ee44863ae88e377... > Thanks to Hans Jansen for the original patch. https://github.com/tukaani-project/xz/pull/53 There were…

Wow, what a big pile of infrastructure for a non-optimization. An internal call via ifunc is not magic — it’s just a call via the GOT or PLT, which boils down to function pointers. An internal call through a hidden visibility function pointer (the right way to do this) is also a function pointer. The even better solution is a plain old if statement, which implements the very very fancy “devirtualization” optimization…

Right, IFUNCs make sense for library function where you have the function pointer indirection anyway. Makes much less sense for internal functions - only argument over a regular function pointer would be the pointer being marked RO after it is resolved (if the library was linked with -z relro -z now), but an if avoids even that issue.
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