I feel like Apple is intentionally over simplifying it for the purpose of this letter or maybe to push back on the FBI ask more easily. Apple could propose to secure access to the FBI using the same level of security that it uses to protect the access to the phone content for the owner of the phone himself. Tim Cook only talks about one solution of a "tool" that it could install. If the same level (and method) of sec…
A Message to Our Customers
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Re: A Message to Our Customers
#962Re: A Message to Our Customers
#963This is now the most-upvoted story HN has ever had.
Re: A Message to Our Customers
#964Re: A Message to Our Customers
#965Re: A Message to Our Customers
#9661)http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/telecom/Go...
2) http://www.reuters.com/article/us-blackberry-saudi-idUSTRE67...
3) http://www.thestar.com/business/2010/08/16/threats_of_blackb...
Re: A Message to Our Customers
#967Earlier quoted context omitted.
>Seriously, you need to stop this. You are the head of the executive branch of the government, of which the FBI is directly underneath your jurisdiction. Director James Comey is directly within your chain of command. You don't need to tell the man what he can do in his capacity as president, he knows what he can do. Identify the issue clearly and concisely, but don't try and tell him what he can and cannot do. Whethe…
The important thing is to voice your disapproval. I'm confident that my wording could be improved, but it's important that Obama quantify the sheer number of US citizens that disagree with this despicable act.
Re: A Message to Our Customers
#968Earlier quoted context omitted.
The packages on those chips are usually designed to be melded to the underlying structures enough that opening them destroys the keys they're attempting to hide.
I think you're missing my point here. Some people trot the argument that it's OK for the government to compel apple to deliver the backdoored firmware because the measures it would circumvent are not of cryptographic/information-theoretical nature. Then one could expand that argument by saying that compelling physical reverse-engineering is also OK because the devices are not built to be physically impossible (read:…
Re: A Message to Our Customers
#969Earlier quoted context omitted.
The problem is that once created, it would be easier for future warrants to ask Apple to simply re-perform the same trick it's done in the past. Apple's core argument is that allow this once opens the door to doing it repeatedly because right now Apple doesn't have the toolchain to do this. Once the toolchain exists, its deployment is trivial.
> The problem is that once created, it would be easier for future warrants to ask Apple to simply re-perform the same trick it's done in the past. That's not a problem at all. The issue is how the existence of the tool affects warrantless access. Where did we get the idea that it's bad in itself for law enforcement agencies to be able to break crypto when they have a warrant?