Live data from Hacker News

A Message to Our Customers

apple.com

961–970 of 1001 posts

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#961
post #921

I feel like Apple is intentionally over simplifying it for the purpose of this letter or maybe to push back on the FBI ask more easily. Apple could propose to secure access to the FBI using the same level of security that it uses to protect the access to the phone content for the owner of the phone himself. Tim Cook only talks about one solution of a "tool" that it could install. If the same level (and method) of sec…

I dont know if there can be a practical solution based on what you said. If an FBI agent could do it, he could lose that methodology due to him getting hacked or he could do that on purpose with malicious intent( theoretically speaking).

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#966
Cannot be more glad to see Apple's stand on this. Let's not forget what happened with Blackberry some 5 years ago. India, Saudi Arabia and UAE got monitoring ability on its platform:-

1)http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/telecom/Go...

2) http://www.reuters.com/article/us-blackberry-saudi-idUSTRE67...

3) http://www.thestar.com/business/2010/08/16/threats_of_blackb...

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#967

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Seriously, you need to stop this. You are the head of the executive branch of the government, of which the FBI is directly underneath your jurisdiction. Director James Comey is directly within your chain of command. You don't need to tell the man what he can do in his capacity as president, he knows what he can do. Identify the issue clearly and concisely, but don't try and tell him what he can and cannot do. Whethe…

The important thing is to voice your disapproval. I'm confident that my wording could be improved, but it's important that Obama quantify the sheer number of US citizens that disagree with this despicable act.

The important thing is to voice your disapproval in a manner that a) identifies the issue and b) identifies your stance on the issue. Your comment misses the mark on a) by being down right wrong, and your stance on b) comes across as you believing you know more about these matters than the people executing them. The fact that you come across that way without having a clear understanding of the issue is going to lead them to dismissing your disapproval.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#968

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The packages on those chips are usually designed to be melded to the underlying structures enough that opening them destroys the keys they're attempting to hide.

I think you're missing my point here. Some people trot the argument that it's OK for the government to compel apple to deliver the backdoored firmware because the measures it would circumvent are not of cryptographic/information-theoretical nature. Then one could expand that argument by saying that compelling physical reverse-engineering is also OK because the devices are not built to be physically impossible (read:…

The devices ARE built to be physically impossible to open without destroying their contents.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#969
post #601

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The problem is that once created, it would be easier for future warrants to ask Apple to simply re-perform the same trick it's done in the past. Apple's core argument is that allow this once opens the door to doing it repeatedly because right now Apple doesn't have the toolchain to do this. Once the toolchain exists, its deployment is trivial.

> The problem is that once created, it would be easier for future warrants to ask Apple to simply re-perform the same trick it's done in the past. That's not a problem at all. The issue is how the existence of the tool affects warrantless access. Where did we get the idea that it's bad in itself for law enforcement agencies to be able to break crypto when they have a warrant?

Outside the all writs act, parties generally can't be compelled to perform activities by the court that they don't already perform in the course of business. So this is significant (warrant or otherwise) because it's the court asking apple to create a process de novo that didn't exist before.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#970
This is ugly. If Apple can indeed break into the phone, they need to say, "We have to stop production now. All of our engineers will need to be behind this. It will cost us at least a billion dollars, if we can do it. We will miss deadlines for new products and software. Write us a check for $1 billion and we will start on it. We may need a few billion more. Write the check - we'll do what we can do. And lets hope we don't accidentally destroy the evidence doing it."
Post reply on HN