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Microsoft terminates VeraCrypt account, halting Windows updates

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Re: Microsoft terminates VeraCrypt account, halting Windows updates

#91
post #22

I still hope that one of these days people in general will realize that executable signing and SecureBoot are specifically designed for controlling what a normal person can run, rather than for anything resembling real security. The premises of either of those "mitigations" make absolutely no sense for personal computers.

I strongly disagree on the Secure Boot front. It's necessary for FDE to have any sort of practical security, it reduces malicious/vulnerable driver abuse (making it nontrivial), bootkits are a security nightmare and would otherwise be much more common in malware typical users encounter, and ultimately the user can control their secure boot setup and enroll their own keys if they wish.

Does that mean that Microsoft doesn't also use it as a form of control? Of course not. But conflating "Secure Boot can be used for platform control" with "Secure Boot provides no security" is a non-sequitur.

Re: Microsoft terminates VeraCrypt account, halting Windows updates

#92

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This guy thinks that if you rephrase an argument but put some symbols around it you’ve refuted it statistically. P(robably not)

The argument is that P(customer wants to run their own firmware) cancels out and 2,3 are just the raw probability of you on the receiving end of an evil maid attack. If you think this is a high probability, a locked bootloader won’t save you.

Very neat, but 1) is not really P(customer wants to run their own firmware), but P(customer wants to run their own firmware on their own device).

So, the first term in 1) and 2) are NOT the same, and it is quite conceivable that the probability of 2) is indeed higher than the one in 1) (which your pseudo-statistical argument aimed to refute, unsuccessfully).

Re: Microsoft terminates VeraCrypt account, halting Windows updates

#93

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Tradeoffs. Which is more likely here? 1. A customer wants to run their own firmware, or 2. Someone malicious close to the customer, an angry ex, tampers with their device, and uses the lack of Secure Boot to modify the OS to hide all trace of a tracker's existence, or 3. A malicious piece of firmware uses the lack of Secure Boot to modify the boot partition to ensure the malware loads before the OS, thereby permanent…

1. P(someone wants to run their own firmware) 2. P(someone wants to run their own firmware) * P(this person is malicious) * P(this person implants this firmware on someone else’s computer) 3. The firmware doesn’t install itself Yeah I think 2 and 3 is vastly less likely and strictly lower than 1.

I encourage you to re-evaluate this. How many devices do you (or have you) own which have have a microcontroller? (This includes all your appliances, your clocks, and many things you own which use electricity.) How many of these have you reflashed with custom firmware?

Imagine any of your friends, family, or colleagues. (Including some non-programmers/hackers/embedded-engineers) What would their answers be?

Re: Microsoft terminates VeraCrypt account, halting Windows updates

#94
post #91
post #22

I still hope that one of these days people in general will realize that executable signing and SecureBoot are specifically designed for controlling what a normal person can run, rather than for anything resembling real security. The premises of either of those "mitigations" make absolutely no sense for personal computers.

I strongly disagree on the Secure Boot front. It's necessary for FDE to have any sort of practical security, it reduces malicious/vulnerable driver abuse (making it nontrivial), bootkits are a security nightmare and would otherwise be much more common in malware typical users encounter, and ultimately the user can control their secure boot setup and enroll their own keys if they wish. Does that mean that Microsoft do…

Anything that restricts user freedom is entirely bad, even if it's at the expense of security.

Re: Microsoft terminates VeraCrypt account, halting Windows updates

#95
post #88

Earlier quoted context omitted.

What's easier, and bitlocker doesn't count. I want my FDE to be based on a password or a keyfile, not simply by some code in the motherboard. I want it encrypted until I, the operator, provide some data to unlock. In my limited experience with bitlocker, the disk is decryptable automatically as long as it's in the original motherboard.

> and bitlocker doesn't count. Wat? Bitlocker is the answer to your question. > In my limited experience with bitlocker, the disk is decryptable automatically as long as it's in the original motherboard. It's unlocked (not decrypted) when the OS boots, yes. You can optionally enforce (not on Home) other unlock methods, such as PIN before the OS boots. > I want my FDE to be based on a password or a keyfile, not simply…

If someone steals my laptop, and there is no factor of decryption requiring something I possess or know, then the only use of that disk being encrypted is that I can throw it out more safely at end of life. Thieves/LEO has the data because they have the motherboard.

If bitlocker has a PIN/passphrase decrypt option, then I missed it.

Re: Microsoft terminates VeraCrypt account, halting Windows updates

#96
post #91

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I strongly disagree on the Secure Boot front. It's necessary for FDE to have any sort of practical security, it reduces malicious/vulnerable driver abuse (making it nontrivial), bootkits are a security nightmare and would otherwise be much more common in malware typical users encounter, and ultimately the user can control their secure boot setup and enroll their own keys if they wish. Does that mean that Microsoft do…

Anything that restricts user freedom is entirely bad, even if it's at the expense of security.

[deleted]

Re: Microsoft terminates VeraCrypt account, halting Windows updates

#97
post #91
post #22

I still hope that one of these days people in general will realize that executable signing and SecureBoot are specifically designed for controlling what a normal person can run, rather than for anything resembling real security. The premises of either of those "mitigations" make absolutely no sense for personal computers.

I strongly disagree on the Secure Boot front. It's necessary for FDE to have any sort of practical security, it reduces malicious/vulnerable driver abuse (making it nontrivial), bootkits are a security nightmare and would otherwise be much more common in malware typical users encounter, and ultimately the user can control their secure boot setup and enroll their own keys if they wish. Does that mean that Microsoft do…

>It's necessary for FDE to have any sort of practical security

why? do you mean because evil maid attacks exist? anyone that cared enough about that specific vector just put their bootloader on a removable media. FDE wasn't somehow enabled by secure boot.

>bootkits are a security nightmare and would otherwise be much more common in malware

why weren't they more common before?

serious question. Back in the 90s viruses were huge business, BIOS was about as unprotected as it would ever possibly be, and lots of chips came with extra unused memory. We still barely ever saw those kind of malware.

Re: Microsoft terminates VeraCrypt account, halting Windows updates

#98

I'm confused why they can't just generate their own signing key and deploy it alongside the installer. Using arbiter platforms like this sounds like a great way to footgun yourself.

Because a bad guy can also generate their own signing key and deploy it alongside the installer.

See Notepad++ for how that winds up.

Re: Microsoft terminates VeraCrypt account, halting Windows updates

#99
post #91

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I strongly disagree on the Secure Boot front. It's necessary for FDE to have any sort of practical security, it reduces malicious/vulnerable driver abuse (making it nontrivial), bootkits are a security nightmare and would otherwise be much more common in malware typical users encounter, and ultimately the user can control their secure boot setup and enroll their own keys if they wish. Does that mean that Microsoft do…

Anything that restricts user freedom is entirely bad, even if it's at the expense of security.

But...it doesn't restrict user freedom. If the user wishes to do so, they can disable SB.

Re: Microsoft terminates VeraCrypt account, halting Windows updates

#100
post #22

I still hope that one of these days people in general will realize that executable signing and SecureBoot are specifically designed for controlling what a normal person can run, rather than for anything resembling real security. The premises of either of those "mitigations" make absolutely no sense for personal computers.

I don't know about executable signing, but in the embedded world SecureBoot is also used to serve the customer; id est provide guarantees to the customer that the firmware of the device they receive has not been tampered with at some point in the supply chain.

well, unless govt tells MS to tamper it
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