91–100 of 203 posts
Author here. I posted this on Sunday for a light read, but I guess it got traction today. Based on the comments I see here, I think the focus is going on the turnstiles just as it did when I worked there. While the cookie credentials are pushed aside. I think that's the security theater. We are worried about supposed active shooters, different physical threats while a backdoor to the company is left wide open. The tu…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I doubt these card readers would prevent someone leaving the part of their building they’re in, as that’s a lesson written in charred corpses and was a foundational aspect of health and safety becoming a thing: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Triangle_Shirtwaist_Factory_fi... In theory it might prevent access to other buildings, but equally often the card readers are around doors of mostly standard glass or near intern…
Or the Victoria Hall disaster (183 dead), or Cocoanut Grove (492 dead), or The Station Nightclub (100 dead), or The Beverly Hills Supper Club (165 dead), or..... Also in what world is a badge reader going to contain an armed gunman unless the walls, floors, doors, and windows are also bulletproof?? (Triangle shirtwaist fire resulted in 146 dead)
Bullets aren't universal door openers, and shooting your way through one lock doesn't magically unlock the next one.
I worked at a company that had effectively no physical security during work hours until the second time someone came in during lunch and stole an armload of laptops. Then we got card readers and a staffed front desk, and discovered our snack budget was too high because people from other companies on other floors were coming to ours for snacks too. I never felt the office was insecure, except in retrospect once it was…
Author here. I posted this on Sunday for a light read, but I guess it got traction today. Based on the comments I see here, I think the focus is going on the turnstiles just as it did when I worked there. While the cookie credentials are pushed aside. I think that's the security theater. We are worried about supposed active shooters, different physical threats while a backdoor to the company is left wide open. The tu…
> Based on the comments I see here, I think the focus is going on the turnstiles just as it did when I worked there. You titled the piece after the turnstiles and spent the overwhelming majority of the post talking about them (and surrounding physical features). The Jira ticket felt secondary, and when it was introduced in the middle of the post I was genuinely confused, thinking why the heck the card system was cont…
The incompetence of the turnstiles makes it a good focus for the story while the juxtaposition of the turnstiles with Jira exposes the company's hypocrisy.
Besides, visibility is sufficient as a deterrent. Back in India, there'd be a big difference between leaving an old man in a chair in front of the shop and having exactly zero people in front of the shop. There are classes of people you deter with the former who will not be deterred by the latter. The old man is not 'security' - anyone motivated can shut him up without much effort. And yet his presence works.
Author here. I posted this on Sunday for a light read, but I guess it got traction today. Based on the comments I see here, I think the focus is going on the turnstiles just as it did when I worked there. While the cookie credentials are pushed aside. I think that's the security theater. We are worried about supposed active shooters, different physical threats while a backdoor to the company is left wide open. The tu…
Perhaps part of the problem is that an active shooter is easy to visualize and understand whereas unsecured credentials stored in cookies are an abstract and difficult to visualize problem for management. Furthermore, turnstiles are easy to promote and take credit for. Secure web authentication would have to be explained to and understood by the boss's boss before credit for it could be claimed. I suspect it's these…
Do a poll of whether people would prefer that a mass shooting or a mass data breach occur at their place of work while they are there. I bet I know which one wins.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Or the Victoria Hall disaster (183 dead), or Cocoanut Grove (492 dead), or The Station Nightclub (100 dead), or The Beverly Hills Supper Club (165 dead), or..... Also in what world is a badge reader going to contain an armed gunman unless the walls, floors, doors, and windows are also bulletproof?? (Triangle shirtwaist fire resulted in 146 dead)
Theres footage online of a basic security door stopping an armed robber from escaping despite him trying to shoot the lock. Bullets aren't universal door openers, and shooting your way through one lock doesn't magically unlock the next one.
Author here. I posted this on Sunday for a light read, but I guess it got traction today. Based on the comments I see here, I think the focus is going on the turnstiles just as it did when I worked there. While the cookie credentials are pushed aside. I think that's the security theater. We are worried about supposed active shooters, different physical threats while a backdoor to the company is left wide open. The tu…
I worked at a company that had effectively no physical security during work hours until the second time someone came in during lunch and stole an armload of laptops. Then we got card readers and a staffed front desk, and discovered our snack budget was too high because people from other companies on other floors were coming to ours for snacks too. I never felt the office was insecure, except in retrospect once it was…
I once lived in Singapore for a while and we were all sure that nobody would steal anything anyway, so we just never bothered to lock the doors. (That was also very helpful if you wanted to stop for a quick coffee with a date in the middle of the night.) You could see the MacBooks from the street, but nothing ever went missing. I don’t know what exactly it was, but Singapore felt incredibly safe and crime-free.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
I once lived in Singapore for a while and we were all sure that nobody would steal anything anyway, so we just never bothered to lock the doors. (That was also very helpful if you wanted to stop for a quick coffee with a date in the middle of the night.) You could see the MacBooks from the street, but nothing ever went missing. I don’t know what exactly it was, but Singapore felt incredibly safe and crime-free.
Wait, explain the quick coffee bit? You'd let yourself into a random person's house to make coffee?