Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is worse than Docusign. What do 6000 people at Zendesk do? It's a simple ticket management software with maybe 10 features
I am actually seriously interested in what people there do day to day. I’m wondering this about a lot of very large companies, I would definitely watch a documentary about that.
1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
91–100 of 437 posts
Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#92Reported this exact bug to Zendesk, Apple, and Slack in June 2024, both through HackerOne and by escalating directly to engs or PMs at each company. I doubt we were the first. That is presumably the reason they failed to pay out. The real issue is that non-directory SSO options like Sign in with Apple (SIWA) have been incorrectly implemented almost everywhere, including by Slack and other large companies we alerted i…
Directory SSO: These are systems like Google Workspace or Okta, which maintain a central directory of users and their access rights.
Non-directory SSO: These are services like "Sign in with Apple" (SIWA) or GitHub authentication, which don't maintain such a directory.
Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#93It is challenging for Zendesk to enforce or fix DKIM, SPF, and DMARC issues across all client domains so better to just ignore it :grimace:
Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#94Slack seems to be getting off too easy here. The security—as implemented by Fortune 500 customers??—of an org-wide security domain (i.e. what everyone in an org can see) depends on whether any of the supported OAuth providers can be tricked into provisioning an account with @targetorg.com? This architecture makes 0 sense to me. Even if an org has totally outsourced its identity and auth management to Google (is this…
Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#95Though his pondering of 'why do companies use third party support systems instead of rolling their own' gave his age away :)
Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#96It sounds like the author got stiffed by Zendesk on this bug, $0 due to email spoofing being out of scope. The $50k was from other bug bounties he was awarded on hackerone. It's too bad Zendesk basically said "thanks" but then refused to pay anything. That's a good way to get people not to bother with your big bounty program. It is often better to build goodwill than to be a stickler for rules and technicalities. Sid…
> due to email spoofing being out of scope. I believe their logic was that only the domain owner can adequately prevent email spoofing by proper SPF/DMARC configuration, and that it’s the customers’ fault if they don’t do that. Which isn’t entirely wrong.
Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#97Slack seems to be getting off too easy here. The security—as implemented by Fortune 500 customers??—of an org-wide security domain (i.e. what everyone in an org can see) depends on whether any of the supported OAuth providers can be tricked into provisioning an account with @targetorg.com? This architecture makes 0 sense to me. Even if an org has totally outsourced its identity and auth management to Google (is this…
Tangentially, this does raise one of my big issues with using OAuth2 for single-sign-on though, which is that it really doesn't address the third-party authorization problem well. Ok, you're bob@example.com, Google has verified that, and example.com is our domain, so we're letting you into our app Foobar. Now what? The scopes you requested were for Google APIs only and have nothing to do with Foobar really. So now we need to implement an authorization system in Foobar that decides what bob@example.com can actually do. This part, and how to do it right, gets glossed over (at best!) by discussions on OAuth2. It also gets glossed over by product and security when they want things "SSO-enabled", which means development time doesn't get budgeted for it. Even just using groups to control coarse access levels requires integration with provider-specific APIs. OAuth2 is great for identity and authentication, but far too little attention has been paid to doing authorization right.
Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#98Earlier quoted context omitted.
zendesk is 6k employees, they have general council on staff
I think paulpauper is saying the researcher that finds the vulnerability needs a lawyer.
Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#99Earlier quoted context omitted.
zendesk is 6k employees, they have general council on staff
This is worse than Docusign. What do 6000 people at Zendesk do? It's a simple ticket management software with maybe 10 features
Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#100Another example of how weasley Zendesk can be: They created a fake band called "Zendesk Alternative" just in an attempt to pollute the Google results if you search for an alternative to Zendesk. http://zendeskalternative.com/ While not illegal, it shows the way they think, a sort of manipulative pettiness.
that is hilarious, but also the most non punk rock thing I've ever read. if Apple did it, every one here would be fawning over how genius of a move it were