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Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources

reuters.com

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Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources

#91

In their attempt to make this extra private by scanning 'on device', I think they've managed to make it feel worse. If they scan my iCloud photos in iCloud, well lots of companies scan stuff when you upload it. It's on their servers, they're responsible for it. They don't want to be hosting CSAM. It feels much worse them turning your own, trusty iPhone against you. I know that isn't how you should look at it, but tha…

> I know that isn't how you should look at it, but that's still how it feels.

This is exactly how you should look at it. They turned your device against you.

Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources

#92
post #62

In their attempt to make this extra private by scanning 'on device', I think they've managed to make it feel worse. If they scan my iCloud photos in iCloud, well lots of companies scan stuff when you upload it. It's on their servers, they're responsible for it. They don't want to be hosting CSAM. It feels much worse them turning your own, trusty iPhone against you. I know that isn't how you should look at it, but tha…

In reality, the fact that they do the scanning on-device is actually better privacy-wise. But I can see how instinctually it “feels” wrong.

No it's not. Not scanning any content on device at all is better privacy wise.

Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources

#93
post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As I understand, they're acting as an agent of the government, it's a private company. So, the 4th amendment protecting against unreasonable searches _by the government_ does not apply.

It’s that third party doctrine that is so convenient when acquiring information otherwise requiring a warrant to obtain.

It's right up there with Wickard v. Filburn in terms of SCOTUS screw-ups.

Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources

#94
post #71

Earlier quoted context omitted.

you can self-host NextCloud on your laptop or desktop. you can use whichever flavor of Android you'd like - a lot of people like GrapheneOS

So, lemme preface this by saying I also use my own NAS at home and wholly support your push for self-hosting. That said, I'm gonna play devil's advocate here, because this is an area I admittedly haven't put much thought into. GP said: >... non-cloud services that provide me with automatic backups of everything I do if something happens to my apartment... And my first concern is that a laptop or desktop (or my NAS) w…

> And my first concern is that a laptop or desktop (or my NAS) won't fare well if an apartment is broken into and the devices are stolen, or they get severely damaged in a natural disaster. What might a good mitigation be for that that doesn't involve spinning up a VPS via DO, etc.?

occasional offsite backups of all of your data

Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources

#95

In their attempt to make this extra private by scanning 'on device', I think they've managed to make it feel worse. If they scan my iCloud photos in iCloud, well lots of companies scan stuff when you upload it. It's on their servers, they're responsible for it. They don't want to be hosting CSAM. It feels much worse them turning your own, trusty iPhone against you. I know that isn't how you should look at it, but tha…

Yes, thats exactly how i feel. I'd still hate it if my iCloud uploads are scanned but I'm already assuming that anyway.

But the fact that my iOS device can potentially report me to any authorities, for whatever reason, is crossing a line that makes it impossible to ever own an iPhone again. I bought my first one in 2007 so I'm not saying this lightly..

Does anybody know if this policy will extend to macOS too?

Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources

#96
post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As I understand, they're acting as an agent of the government, it's a private company. So, the 4th amendment protecting against unreasonable searches _by the government_ does not apply.

Acting as a agent, used to anyway, mean the 4th amendment attached to the company if they WERE NOT acting as an agent then the 4th would not apply. I think they way they get around that is not do not report to the FBI but instead to NCMEC a "non-profit"

> I think they way they get around that is not do not report to the FBI but instead to NCMEC a "non-profit"

No. The courts have already explicitly rejected the entity that NCMEC is a private entity. NCMEC can only handle child porn via special legislative permission and is 99% funded by the government.

The searches here are lawful because Apple searches out of their own free will and commercial interest and when there is something detected their employees search your private communications (which the EULA permits).

This is also why Apple must review the matches before reporting them-- if they just matched an NCMEC database and blindly forwarded then to NCMEC then it would be the NCMEC conducting the search and a warrant would be required.

Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources

#97

In their attempt to make this extra private by scanning 'on device', I think they've managed to make it feel worse. If they scan my iCloud photos in iCloud, well lots of companies scan stuff when you upload it. It's on their servers, they're responsible for it. They don't want to be hosting CSAM. It feels much worse them turning your own, trusty iPhone against you. I know that isn't how you should look at it, but tha…

Only thing I disagree with, it is how you should look at it and that's why it feels wrong, because it is wrong.

Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources

#98

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It seems easy as hell for them to just change the system to do server-side scanning instead of client-side scanning and it would probably be enough to calm the horde. I think people can understand, Apple can't have certain content on their servers. People have a much harder time understanding that Apple needs to make sure you don't have certain content on your phone.

If iCloud content was encrypted (as it should be given what Apple says about themselves and privacy) they wouldn’t and couldn’t care any less what the data on their servers contains since, ideally, they’d have no way of decrypting that data. No need for any privacy invasion! > Apple needs to make sure you don’t have certain content on your phone. Excuse me, what? What does Apple care what I have on my device?

> they wouldn’t and couldn’t care any less what the data on their servers

Except they're legally forced to care. Thats why this is happening at all. They have a legal obligation to care, encryption be damned. They chose to preserve encryption instead of preserve trust.

Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources

#99
post #95

In their attempt to make this extra private by scanning 'on device', I think they've managed to make it feel worse. If they scan my iCloud photos in iCloud, well lots of companies scan stuff when you upload it. It's on their servers, they're responsible for it. They don't want to be hosting CSAM. It feels much worse them turning your own, trusty iPhone against you. I know that isn't how you should look at it, but tha…

Yes, thats exactly how i feel. I'd still hate it if my iCloud uploads are scanned but I'm already assuming that anyway. But the fact that my iOS device can potentially report me to any authorities, for whatever reason, is crossing a line that makes it impossible to ever own an iPhone again. I bought my first one in 2007 so I'm not saying this lightly.. Does anybody know if this policy will extend to macOS too?

It has already be announced, this is not only iOS, but all Apple devices.

Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources

#100

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They're searching for different things though. To my knowledge, before now iOS has never scanned for fingerprints of specific photographs. It would be so darn easy to replace the CSAM database with fingerprints of known tiananmen square photos...

That is a distinction without a difference. I’m sure you could put together quite a good tank man classifier (proof: Google Reverse Image Search works quite well), and it’d catch variations which a perceptual hash wouldn’t. The only difference is intent. The technical risk has not changed at all.

That is to say face scanning is equally insidious as the new feature?
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