> But when a backdoor is installed, the backdoor exists and history teaches that it’s only a matter of time before it’s also used by the bad guys and authoritarian regimes. Problem is that this scanning is necessarily fuzzy and there is going to be a false positive rate to it. And the way that you'll find out that you've tripped a false positive is that the SWAT team will knock your door down and kill your dog (at a…
Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competition point of view
91–100 of 318 posts
Re: Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competition point of view
#92> But when a backdoor is installed, the backdoor exists and history teaches that it’s only a matter of time before it’s also used by the bad guys and authoritarian regimes. Problem is that this scanning is necessarily fuzzy and there is going to be a false positive rate to it. And the way that you'll find out that you've tripped a false positive is that the SWAT team will knock your door down and kill your dog (at a…
This is wrong - the iCloud check is against known CSAM hashes, the false positive rate is essentially zero.
Re: Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competition point of view
#93> But when a backdoor is installed, the backdoor exists and history teaches that it’s only a matter of time before it’s also used by the bad guys and authoritarian regimes. Problem is that this scanning is necessarily fuzzy and there is going to be a false positive rate to it. And the way that you'll find out that you've tripped a false positive is that the SWAT team will knock your door down and kill your dog (at a…
This is wrong - the iCloud check is against known CSAM hashes, the false positive rate is essentially zero.
Re: Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competition point of view
#94Planting false evidence is getting a new twist here. The attacker doesn't even have to make a report! The victim's computer does it for him. Disk encryption malware may have new successor. Effective and scalable extortion as a service.
This is a great point. You don't even need to unlock an iPhone to take a picture. So in theory anyone with access to your phone for a few seconds could incriminate you with little effort.
Re: Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competition point of view
#95Re: Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competition point of view
#96Re: Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competition point of view
#97It'll start with protecting children. We all want to protect children, don't we? Why do you want children abused? Are you a child abuser, what do you have to hide? Next it's elderly people. We don't want our forgetful elders to get lost, do we? What if grandma wanders off but is in someone's picture, surely you want the police to know right that second where she is? Next up, terrorists! Four adult brown men in an unm…
Remember that it only scans against a known database of already found content, and does not try to find new content.
Re: Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competition point of view
#98> But when a backdoor is installed, the backdoor exists and history teaches that it’s only a matter of time before it’s also used by the bad guys and authoritarian regimes. Problem is that this scanning is necessarily fuzzy and there is going to be a false positive rate to it. And the way that you'll find out that you've tripped a false positive is that the SWAT team will knock your door down and kill your dog (at a…
This is wrong - the iCloud check is against known CSAM hashes, the false positive rate is essentially zero.
I highly doubt that
Re: Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competition point of view
#99Earlier quoted context omitted.
In liberal democracies legislators also protect fundamental rights from the whims of the majority. > if you polled the US that any sizable portion No, but they also would agree to that they should have an option to keep their data privately. Maybe the public should be polled about this tradeoff? For example the case of virtual CP has an interesting legal history https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-c…
>No, but they also wouldn't consent to having no option left to record their thoughts privately. Maybe the public should be polled about this tradeoff? It is fine if this is your argument, but you don't have to wrap this argument in with the very legality of CP. You can acknowledge something is and should be a crime while also being against these type of automated dragnets to find people guilty of said crime.
But there is a clear tradeoff between the two so saying that would be a useless platitude. If we really see the internet as an extension of our vocal chords, then we should have individual rights to it, especially considering the fact that the internet infrastructure is not provided by the governments themselves, only the spying is.
Re: Apple’s new abuse prevention system: an antritust/competition point of view
#100Apple will release this in their desktop pcs. The major consequence of this is that, a year down the line, microsoft will also be compelled/forced to join this "coalition of the good". After all, they already scan all your files for viruses, it would be a shame if they didn't scan for anything that is deemed incriminating and also call the cops on you. Of course, the children are being used as a trojan horse again. W…
> yet someone posessing an action movie is not considered a murderer. I think it is more similar to drugs, possesing one doesn't mean you are consuming it, yet it is an illegal substance and production, transportation and distribution are understandably not allowed.