Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'd make a wild guess that when parent is talking about 'control', they mean that if a miner is located within China, the Chinese government has the ability to put a gun to that miners head and tell them what to do.
With that kind of control, they could just put a gun to anyone's head and ask them to start mining bitcoin and do it the way they want them to. It wouldn't have to depend on how many bitcoin miners are in China at the moment.
BTC Endgame
91–100 of 278 posts
Re: BTC Endgame
#92Earlier quoted context omitted.
> China gains no benefit from destroying Bitcoin; Citation needed on this one I'm afraid. If nothing else, a currency that the Party cannot control would be A Problem. China did not have much economic benefit in halting the ANT IPO, yet it did not go through all the same. There _might_ be a benefit in allowing bitcoin to continue to exist of course, if they think it advances their cause more than it hurts it. But as…
Why haven’t they destroyed it then?
Re: BTC Endgame
#93Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'd make a wild guess that when parent is talking about 'control', they mean that if a miner is located within China, the Chinese government has the ability to put a gun to that miners head and tell them what to do.
With that kind of control, they could just put a gun to anyone's head and ask them to start mining bitcoin and do it the way they want them to. It wouldn't have to depend on how many bitcoin miners are in China at the moment.
The gun in the head strategy works best when you're only asking your populace to do simple things. For complex, technical tasks, the usual response is "Oops, I can't concentrate while you've got a gun against my head", and then you can shoot them but that's not going to help your task get accomplished any quicker. (This is also why working conditions at say Google or Apple tend to be pretty good, and why Soviet scientists were treated relatively well even if the rest of the population wasn't.)
Re: BTC Endgame
#94Earlier quoted context omitted.
The attack scenario is an adversarial nation state who is not motivated economically and is intent on sabotage of the network.
I don't understand what you're getting at, I was pointing out why Bitcoin hasn't moved to PoS even if it may actually be better.
I think the answer to what you actually said is; miners don't control consensus on the network - it's not up to them, it's up to fullnodes/users who can change the ruleset whenever they want.
Re: BTC Endgame
#95Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'd make a wild guess that when parent is talking about 'control', they mean that if a miner is located within China, the Chinese government has the ability to put a gun to that miners head and tell them what to do.
With that kind of control, they could just put a gun to anyone's head and ask them to start mining bitcoin and do it the way they want them to. It wouldn't have to depend on how many bitcoin miners are in China at the moment.
Re: BTC Endgame
#96There's a much simpler endgame: China starts enacting export controls on ASICs.
Re: BTC Endgame
#97You don't need a DoS attack under the assumptions of this project. It's already assumed that you control ~80% of hash rate, so you execute a 51% attack that mass double-spends coins and destroy all confidence in the integrity of the currency. Poof, nobody uses it. Note that China already controls ~65% of Bitcoin hash rate, so if they wanted to execute this right now, they probably could. That they haven't is one reas…
Will Bitcoin even be that decentralized in 50 years? The miners control the network, and most mining is done by big companies now and their data centres. If it’s like other companies, won’t they gradually acquire one another until there is only 1-2 companies controlling almost the entire future crypto economy? The scale of the computing power we are talking about is not something that individuals can compete with
Re: BTC Endgame
#98I've monitored the chain for years, and empty blocks are very very common. I know there is a civil war of people that want to make the block size larger vs keep it the same... I think at this point it they would both agree that every block should at least be 90%+ full before it is accepted. That seems like a simple fix.
The attackers would then like just fill up the blocks passing a tiny amount of bitcoin between all their wallets, but at that point they might as well just use the mempool.
In the end, if you have mining dominance, you win. No point denying that. If you want to "ban" miners, or rewrite history, bitcoin is no longer decentralized.
Re: BTC Endgame
#99Earlier quoted context omitted.
This isn't a temporary speeedbump, it's a permanent end to proof of work mining as an investable activity (and viable sybil resistance mechanism for bitcoin).
Remember UASF? If incentives align amongst users, nodes, merchants and exchanges Bitcoin absolutely will switch to another mining algorithm and now the attacker has to start from 0. If the attacker attempts to keep up the game of cat-and-mouse long enough they will eventually go bankrupt and will no longer be able to participate. And this theoretical discussion completely dismisses the fact that it's nearly impossibl…
Re: BTC Endgame
#100Earlier quoted context omitted.
I'd make a wild guess that when parent is talking about 'control', they mean that if a miner is located within China, the Chinese government has the ability to put a gun to that miners head and tell them what to do.
With that kind of control, they could just put a gun to anyone's head and ask them to start mining bitcoin and do it the way they want them to. It wouldn't have to depend on how many bitcoin miners are in China at the moment.