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When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

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Re: When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

#91
post #90

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Full disk encryption is still be broken, given a decade or 3. You might care about that risk or not, but the fact is still there. The point still is that if the attacker has unencumbered access to your device then indeed _further_ use of the device is unrecommended to say the least. It doesn't matter if you had or did not have full disk encryption. It does not matter if you had or did not have Thunderbolt. An extreme…

> Full disk encryption is still be broken, given a decade or 3. What? FDE is all symmetric crypto, long since 256-bit, and I think all AES. AES is extremely well understood, and the threat scenario for FDE is also purely cold attacks so even any side channels are irrelevant. I've never seen any feasible attack suggested even in principle, so I'm curious what you have in mind in 10-30 years. If you're thinking "quantu…

I simply measured the time it took from the introduction of DES to when it was no longer "recommended" and substracted the years since AES was standarized, then added a decade of margin of error.

It does not sound to me far fetched to think that AES will be similarly "unrecommended" in such amount of time even if there is absolutely no evidence right now.

Re: When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

#92
post #86

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It is not like ssh at all. It is a problem that secrets are kept in the flash and it is also a problem that those secrets are sent over the untrusted channel.

The key is transferred only on the initial connection, after that a challenge/response mechanism is used. So from UX point of view it achieves similar TOFU, even if the technical details vary a bit. Sure, its bit worse but it is still very much trust on first use.

After the device is connected, use looks like a key consistency aware system like an ssh client. It is as you note very different in the first protocol run.

To extract the device secret value, an attacker needs to connect the target device to an attacker device. As you note, the thunderbolt device leaks the secret value over the untrusted channel. Impersonation of that device after that moment is trivial as a result.

The entire cryptographic protocol is broken from the start.

Re: When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

#93
post #83

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Many smaller devices do not require tools and are trivial to clone. Any of the victim devices will do. It's not only useful to attack a target computer. Device identifiers and capabilities are not bound to the security level secret values. Drop off a pre-cloned video adapter in a conference room. If it is used and as a result authorized by a targeted computer at a later moment in time, it's game over. An attacker may…

You almost certainly know more about this than me, but hasn't macOS been breaking this attack --- malicious PCIE DMA --- for several years now with its IOMMU configuration? Ivan Krstic has a whole series of BH slides about this, and in the context of T2. The point about attacking trusted devices and pre-cloning devices is well taken.

Yes. With MacOS and Thunderbolt 3 devices on Apple hardware the IOMMU is used as expected. This should handle DMA attacks when booted into MacOS.

An important caveat: the IOMMU alone will not handle every other issue that comes with malicious PCI(e) devices.

Re: When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

#94
post #90

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Full disk encryption is still be broken, given a decade or 3. What? FDE is all symmetric crypto, long since 256-bit, and I think all AES. AES is extremely well understood, and the threat scenario for FDE is also purely cold attacks so even any side channels are irrelevant. I've never seen any feasible attack suggested even in principle, so I'm curious what you have in mind in 10-30 years. If you're thinking "quantu…

I simply measured the time it took from the introduction of DES to when it was no longer "recommended" and substracted the years since AES was standarized, then added a decade of margin of error. It does not sound to me far fetched to think that AES will be similarly "unrecommended" in such amount of time even if there is absolutely no evidence right now.

Oh, so you just made it up out of whole cloth with zero understanding of the actual math? I guess that answers my question then.

Re: When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

#95
post #94

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I simply measured the time it took from the introduction of DES to when it was no longer "recommended" and substracted the years since AES was standarized, then added a decade of margin of error. It does not sound to me far fetched to think that AES will be similarly "unrecommended" in such amount of time even if there is absolutely no evidence right now.

Oh, so you just made it up out of whole cloth with zero understanding of the actual math? I guess that answers my question then.

Seriously? Are you saying you expect something encrypted with AES _today_ to remain inaccessible _for the next 3 decades_? I'd have a hard time finding anyone even remotely claiming that. How many crypto recommendations from 30 years ago are still not entirely 'questionable' today? 50 years? AES as a recommendation is not even half that old. The algorithm may survive with changes; but the actual encrypted data, I would not bet on it.

If you have anything that claims that AES is different enough to warrant this extra optimism, I would love to have a look.

Re: When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

#96
post #94

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Oh, so you just made it up out of whole cloth with zero understanding of the actual math? I guess that answers my question then.

Seriously? Are you saying you expect something encrypted with AES _today_ to remain inaccessible _for the next 3 decades_? I'd have a hard time finding anyone even remotely claiming that. How many crypto recommendations from 30 years ago are still not entirely 'questionable' today? 50 years? AES as a recommendation is not even half that old. The algorithm may survive with changes; but the actual encrypted data, I wou…

>Seriously? Are you saying you expect something encrypted with AES _today_ to remain inaccessible _for the next 3 decades_?

Yes, seriously. In fact to be clear (since you edited your time down to a mere 30 years) I fully expect something encrypted with 256-bit full AES today to remain inaccessible for all of foreseeable human existence [1]. I mean, it's hard to even really know where to begin here because it's not clear you've so much as looked at a wikipedia page on this before, and really don't grasp how non-linear improvements have been. DES is your cited milestone, but the primary weakness of it was simply that it had a 56-bit key. That's a mere 72 thousand trillion. A 256-bit key isn't "~4.6 times as hard" though, it's "the number atoms in the entire galaxy times as hard". 2^256 is around the lower bound of the estimated number of atoms in the entire universe. A 512-bit key is something like "an entire universe of atoms for every single atom in the universe". These are non-intuitively big numbers.

The algebraic framework of AES is pretty straight forward, and decades better knowledge went into it. But mainly it's that non-linear advances in computing meant that by the end of the 90s tech had caught up with and surpassed what was needed for the kind of keys necessary to make brute force utterly impossible with margin to spare, by anything within the known laws of physics. There have been academic attacks which mildly reduce full AES below brute force, but they simply don't matter at all in practice. 2^254 is better than 2^256, but still impossible. I already cited quantum computers, there we have the math to show that if a fully scalable general purpose one could ever be made it'd allow a quadratic speedup. And against a 128-bit it'd drop it to less than 2^64 and that'd be fairly trivial. But everything modern moved over to 256-bit keys ages ago (FileVault 2 for example was 9 years ago and it was not remotely the first) and it'd be relatively trivial to double keys again at this point if anyone was really concerned.

Side channel attacks are a real issue too for many purposes. But FDE is an exception, since it exclusively is for defending data at rest. That simply nullifies an entire range of tricky implementation issues for this threat model.

Again seriously: you can't just do linear historical extrapolation without at least knowing a bit of why those things went that way and what the foundations are. It's like you being surprised I'd expect algebra or calculus to remain relevant "for the next 3 decades".

>I'd have a hard time finding anyone even remotely claiming that.

Would you now? Here, let me help by starting you off with this guy named Bruce Schneier [2]:

>There is a significant difference between an academic break of a cipher and a break that will allow someone to read encrypted traffic. (Imagine an attack against Rijndael that requires 2^100 steps. That is an academic break of the cipher, even though it is a completely useless result to anyone trying to read encrypted traffic.) I believe that within the next five years someone will discover an academic attack against Rijndael. I do not believe that anyone will ever discover an attack that will allow someone to read Rijndael traffic. So while I have serious academic reservations about Rijndael, I do not have any engineering reservations about Rijndael.

If my expectation is wrong, well at least I can't be ashamed of the company I'd be in.

----

1: Maybe it's possible to brute force 128-bits if we convert the entire solar system into a Matrioshka brain or something like that, I haven't crunched the math. But that's far enough out into transcendent territory that I don't think it's relevant to any data in existence today.

2: https://web.archive.org/web/20090201005720/http://www.schnei...

EDIT TO YOUR EDIT:

>If you have anything that claims that AES is different enough to warrant this extra optimism, I would love to have a look.

Literally any intro to this topic at all that you'd find as in the first few results of going to your search engine of choice and typing "advanced encryption standard". This isn't some niche weird thing. You going "well DES was made obsolete by advances in computing power in the 90s which means AES will be too in a few decades" is the weird thing.

EDIT 2:

Also at some point here we're going to get HN rate limited on replies, discussion on HN isn't intended to support very long chains. I don't know if we'll be able to say anything else, so I'd just leave with really encouraging you to skim through a few intro to modern cryptography pieces, and/or look at the math itself. It's interesting stuff and obviously under girds much of the modern world. In fact the entire history of cryptography leading to this point is really fascinating, what kind of secret message systems people used over millennia and how developing mathematics and computers have fundamentally systematized and changed the nature of it.

Re: When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

#97
post #86

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The key is transferred only on the initial connection, after that a challenge/response mechanism is used. So from UX point of view it achieves similar TOFU, even if the technical details vary a bit. Sure, its bit worse but it is still very much trust on first use.

After the device is connected, use looks like a key consistency aware system like an ssh client. It is as you note very different in the first protocol run. To extract the device secret value, an attacker needs to connect the target device to an attacker device. As you note, the thunderbolt device leaks the secret value over the untrusted channel. Impersonation of that device after that moment is trivial as a result.…

> To extract the device secret value, an attacker needs to connect the target device to an attacker device. As you note, the thunderbolt device leaks the secret value over the untrusted channel.

If victin device is connected to attacker host, then only responses to challenges are potentially leaked. That might allow active mitm, but not cloning the key. That's the whole reason TFA needed to go poking around in flash to get the keys.

Not saying that TB is the best security protocol in the universe, but as far as I can tell the vulnerabilities exposed here are mostly implementation flaws rather than protocol level issues.

Re: When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

#98
post #23

This is the kind of garbage that the infosec community often memes about. A marketing website, a domain name, a cute logo for a vanity project masquerading as security research. Basically every one of the "seven" vulnerabilities boils down to "if someone can flash the SPI of the thunderbolt controller then xxx" but if they can flash the TB SPI, then they can also flash the BIOS SPI which has a lot of the same "vulner…

[deleted]

Re: When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

#99
post #23

This is the kind of garbage that the infosec community often memes about. A marketing website, a domain name, a cute logo for a vanity project masquerading as security research. Basically every one of the "seven" vulnerabilities boils down to "if someone can flash the SPI of the thunderbolt controller then xxx" but if they can flash the TB SPI, then they can also flash the BIOS SPI which has a lot of the same "vulner…

> Basically every one of the "seven" vulnerabilities boils down to "if someone can flash the SPI of the thunderbolt controller then xxx" but if they can flash the TB SPI, then they can also flash the BIOS SPI which has a lot of the same "vulnerabilities" but arguably is more impactful.

The section "3.1.3 Cloning victim device including challenge-response keys (SL2)" does not require flashing the victim system, it only requires reading flash from victim device which seems lesser hurdle.

Re: When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

#100
post #48
post #38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Physical access is just such a rich attack surface that keeping your computer away from malicious actors is the right and proper solution. An extreme example a pentester imparted to me once was, if someone could spend sufficient time alone with my laptop, they could remove my hard drive and insert it into an identical laptop with a hardware or firmware backdoor preinstalled. We were discussing nation-state adversarie…

> Physical access is just such a rich attack surface that keeping your computer away from malicious actors is the right and proper solution. Keeping attackers away from your computer is certainly the best solution, just as keeping your computer off the network is the simplest answer to avoiding network security issues. But that's not always an option, so we still need to care about it. > An extreme example a penteste…

You raise some interesting points, and have force me to question my assumptions that this is simply a lost cause.
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