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The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

plato.stanford.edu

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Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#91

Post by jblwps »

omarhaneef wrote: post #56
mjburgess wrote: post #44

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's an argument for a research paradigm, its not an argument for the truth. If there are fatal problems with Theory-A, Theory-A isn't true. No matter how much Theory-A might help with some other problem you have. The CCTM is the research paradigm for modern AI, parts of cognitive science, etc. -- and insofar as it provides a clear set of assumptions to arrive at useful models, so be it. Alexa can turn the lights o…

I disagree that a problem with theory-A means theory-A is not "true." Our favorite theories: say relativity or QM have plenty of problems but we still work on them. But your argument with Alexa is in my view in the wrong "direction." Alexa doesn't know what it means to be a light, and perhaps a computer "never" will. But the real question is, how do humans "know what a light is", or what do you mean when you say a hu…

> I disagree that a problem with theory-A means theory-A is not "true." Our favorite theories: say relativity or QM have plenty of problems but we still work on them.

I think you're actually agreeing here with mjburgess' point that therefore theory-A should be taken as the basis for a research paradigm.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#92

Post by naasking »

antonvs wrote: post #73
naasking wrote: post #62

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> What is an illusion without consciousness? A perception that, divorced from all other facts, entails a false conclusion. So your perception of conscious subjectivity could indeed be an illusion.

"Your perception of conscious subjectivity" implies consciousness. Put another way, how would you program a computer to have a perception of conscious subjectivity, as opposed to just blindly and unconsciously executing its instructions?

> "Your perception of conscious subjectivity" implies consciousness.

No it doesn't! Assuming by "consciousness", you mean a phenomenon that's not reducible to unconscious particle interactions, which is typically what is meant in philosophical discussions of this topic.

We have some mechanistic theories for consciousness [1]. It basically amounts to the same sort of illusion that your single core CPU uses to achieve the illusion of parallelism, ie. context switching between internal and external mental models produces the illusion of consciousness.

[1] https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2015.0050...

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#93

Post by TuringTest »

naasking wrote: post #92
antonvs wrote: post #73

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"Your perception of conscious subjectivity" implies consciousness. Put another way, how would you program a computer to have a perception of conscious subjectivity, as opposed to just blindly and unconsciously executing its instructions?

> "Your perception of conscious subjectivity" implies consciousness. No it doesn't! Assuming by "consciousness", you mean a phenomenon that's not reducible to unconscious particle interactions, which is typically what is meant in philosophical discussions of this topic. We have some mechanistic theories for consciousness [1]. It basically amounts to the same sort of illusion that your single core CPU uses to achieve…

> Assuming by "consciousness", you mean a phenomenon that's not reducible to unconscious particle interactions

I'd say that's an unfounded assumption, which doesn't come up in the argument you're responding to - even if it's somewhat 'popular' elsewhere.

The argument made is that consciousness is (or includes) a form of perception; not that this perception is independent of mechanistic components. With this definition, you assertion that 'conscious subjectivity is an illusion' is inconsistent, as an illusion is a complex form of perception that requires a consciousness to perceive it.

Following your CPU example, there is parallelism from the point of view of the program being executed, even if it's simulated from a single-core mechanical basis (threads and context-switching).

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#94

Post by naasking »

TuringTest wrote: post #93
naasking wrote: post #92

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> "Your perception of conscious subjectivity" implies consciousness. No it doesn't! Assuming by "consciousness", you mean a phenomenon that's not reducible to unconscious particle interactions, which is typically what is meant in philosophical discussions of this topic. We have some mechanistic theories for consciousness [1]. It basically amounts to the same sort of illusion that your single core CPU uses to achieve…

> Assuming by "consciousness", you mean a phenomenon that's not reducible to unconscious particle interactions I'd say that's an unfounded assumption, which doesn't come up in the argument you're responding to - even if it's somewhat 'popular' elsewhere. The argument made is that consciousness is (or includes) a form of perception; not that this perception is independent of mechanistic components. With this definitio…

> I'd say that's an unfounded assumption, which doesn't come up in the argument you're responding to - even if it's somewhat 'popular' elsewhere.

It's not really. Consciousness quite literally does not exist in mechanistic/eliminativist conceptions of consciousness like the link I provided, just like cars don't really exist because they aren't in the ontology of physics. My clarification of "assumption" is simply because many people don't know this.

> Following your CPU example, there is parallelism from the point of view of the program being executed, even if it's simulated from a single-core mechanical basis (threads and context-switching).

No, there is concurrency but not parallelism.

Re: The Computational Theory of Mind (2015)

#95

Post by TuringTest »

naasking wrote: post #94
TuringTest wrote: post #93

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Assuming by "consciousness", you mean a phenomenon that's not reducible to unconscious particle interactions I'd say that's an unfounded assumption, which doesn't come up in the argument you're responding to - even if it's somewhat 'popular' elsewhere. The argument made is that consciousness is (or includes) a form of perception; not that this perception is independent of mechanistic components. With this definitio…

> I'd say that's an unfounded assumption, which doesn't come up in the argument you're responding to - even if it's somewhat 'popular' elsewhere. It's not really. Consciousness quite literally does not exist in mechanistic/eliminativist conceptions of consciousness like the link I provided, just like cars don't really exist because they aren't in the ontology of physics. My clarification of "assumption" is simply bec…

> just like cars don't really exist because they aren't in the ontology of physics

If I understand you correctly, that's a pretty harsh criterion for existence, isn't it? Even though a car is just a composite of metal atoms under a precise configuration and not a metaphysical entity on itself, you can still use it to drive you home. I suppose that makes me an utilitarian.

> No, there is concurrency but not parallelism.

You're right, my bad. I've forgotten my precision from my college days. Still, that's good enough for the program, just like my consciousness is good enough for me, even if it's entirely mechanistic and doesn't exist in the same way that cars don't exist.

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