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Today’s correction isn’t much like the dot-com bubble

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Re: Today’s correction isn’t much like the dot-com bubble

#91

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The people that matter - the investors - valued WeWork like a high margin software company. Then WeWork itself tried to value itself like a high margin software company in its S-1. Because WeWork's margins and revenue are similar to another very similar company - Regus - yet their valuation is more than 10x

WeWork and its investors did not try to value it like a high margin software company. WeWork was valued like a standard, overly optimistic growth company. This is another narrative invented by tech journalists who don’t understand how valuation works. Regus is a mature company with no plans for massive growth. Of course their Value (p/e of under 20 I believe) is going to reflect that. Meanwhile, look at any non-tech…

Adam Nuemann was certainly trying to push the "tech company" narrative. I heard a few old interviews with him and he was always sure to mention their "technology platform" and how they spent a very long time developing it.

So he must have thought someone was swallowing that.

Re: Today’s correction isn’t much like the dot-com bubble

#92

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is what amazes me; that there are so many supposedly intelligent individuals throwing money at shitty ideas. Google investing in Juicero comes to mind. It's like any semblance of due diligence is just an afterthought.

I think calling Juicero a shitty idea is too strong. It didn't end up working, and probably it was knowable in advance that it wouldn't, but the difference between early-stage Juicero and early-stage Keurig is smaller than most people gave it credit for. There's a strong and robust market (at least in the SF Bay Area) for weird expensive juices.

I agree, fresh juice on demand is a good idea (besides the fact that the amount of sugar is usually terrible for you).

But they had to have found out very early on with Juicero that squeezing the packets by hand basically produced as much juice as their expensive machine.

Re: Today’s correction isn’t much like the dot-com bubble

#93
post #4

The obvious counter-example to this is Slack, a "pure-tech" company whose value has halved since IPO, and there's a similar story with Snapchat (though its value has recovered somewhat in the past year).

I don’t think there’s fundamentally anything wrong with slack though. Investors just don’t understand it, I don’t think. I’ve read so many articles about how Microsoft is going to crush it with teams and it’s so obvious to anyone who has had to work with both of them that they simply are not competitors — really the only thing close to it is Discord and it’s not going after the enterprise market.

Microsoft Teams is definitely a direct competitor, and while it may not be nearly as good as slack, there are few companies out there with as many tentacles in Enterprise as Microsoft.

It would not be uncommon for an inferior product to win a significant market share. Especially when it comes to Enterprise software.

Re: Today’s correction isn’t much like the dot-com bubble

#94

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Slack's stock price chart has a "down and to the right" appearance.

It was valued at $7 billion or so early last year. so at today’s price, it still went up over 50% since then. so one could argue it is still overvalued. just because some greater fool declared it was worth $40 at some point doesn’t mean it’s now a bargain if it goes down to $20.

Indeed, I wasn't suggesting it was a good investment, just that the appearance of the chart is fairly consistent in moving toward a value of zero.

Re: Today’s correction isn’t much like the dot-com bubble

#95
post #58

The part about stock prices for non-tech and tech isn't entirely true, what about stocks like PD? Here's a company that's trying to posture itself as an enterprise grade ops system, stock is in the gutter

Nothing sexy about monitoring. You or I could build our own overnight. Twilio is the true leverage and why they command a much higher P/E multiple

Re: Today’s correction isn’t much like the dot-com bubble

#96

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I never understood the "grow fast at any cost" mentality. If you can't make your shit break-even or near-profitable at small scale, there is a big chance you will not be able to make it work at large scale.

An interesting brick and mortar example in the Bay Area was Fry's electronics. When they started, they grossly undercut all of the electronics brick and mortar stores and priced more like the distributors did rather than the stores. As a result their business grew quickly and the other stores were unable to compete and went out of business. Then with the market to themselves they raised their prices to increase their…

Agreed, but phrasing it in the “here’s what changed that most people don’t understand” language that VCs love:

“in the age of cheap money, scale is not a defensive moat”

When Fry’s was founded, it was so prohibitively difficult to get the funding to scale to their size, that competition was thwarted by lack of investment. Now? The trick is public knowledge; the funds are cheaply available to anyone able to scale a competitor. So the critical step two —- raise prices —- is impossible. Your margin is my opportunity, as they say.

What worked in 1985 when interest rates were ~8% doesn’t work when the great global pool of money is sloshing around, desperately seeking returns.

I think the actual investment dynamics are more nuanced (i.e. investors aren’t completely naive), but it’s still true that this get-a-monopoly-and-raise-prices approach is a business strategy from a very different era.

Re: Today’s correction isn’t much like the dot-com bubble

#97

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I never understood the "grow fast at any cost" mentality. If you can't make your shit break-even or near-profitable at small scale, there is a big chance you will not be able to make it work at large scale.

Everyone agrees with that statement. The hard question is what "can't" means. Companies with a grow fast mentality always insist they could break even, and often present financial metrics indicating they do break even with the proper adjustments for purely growth-related costs. There's no obvious rule for how much you should trust a company's adjustments.

“We lose money on every sale, but make it up on volume”

A bit of history of that joke: https://www.barrypopik.com/index.php/new_york_city/entry/we_...

> 6 February 1833, New York (NY) Evening Post, pg. 2, col. 2:

> Among the business anomalies which meet the eye of a stranger visiting New-York, are the placards exhibited in the windows of the retail shops, informing passers by that the stock in trade within is selling off at prime cost, or according to the more alluring announcement which some have adopted, at fifty per cent. less than cost. A person attracted by this lure to become a purchaser, must soon come to the conclusion that either the veracity of the dealer is not of the most scrupulous description, or else that he laid in his goods at enormous prices. One in the habit of passing these shops, must at least smile to perceive that notwithstanding their owners have been selling off their goods “at less than cost” for so long a time, their shelves continue to be as well filled as ever. We have heard of one individual, who “wishing to retire in consequence of declining health,” was five years disposing of his merchandise, “at prime cost,” and at the end of this time he found his capital so much augmented that he removed into a more busy part of the city, and entered into trade on a much larger scale than before. How is it that trades-people can sell their goods at less than they paid for them, and yet realize a handsome profit, is one of those mysteries of commerce which we never could penetrate. Perhaps they are like the Irish mercer, who, having assured a lady customer that the silk he desired to dispose of to her actually cost him more per yard than he charged for it, was asked how he then could afford to sell it so low. “Ah, madam, he replied, we depend for our profit on selling a large quantity.”

Re: Today’s correction isn’t much like the dot-com bubble

#98

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The people that matter - the investors - valued WeWork like a high margin software company. Then WeWork itself tried to value itself like a high margin software company in its S-1. Because WeWork's margins and revenue are similar to another very similar company - Regus - yet their valuation is more than 10x

WeWork and its investors did not try to value it like a high margin software company. WeWork was valued like a standard, overly optimistic growth company. This is another narrative invented by tech journalists who don’t understand how valuation works. Regus is a mature company with no plans for massive growth. Of course their Value (p/e of under 20 I believe) is going to reflect that. Meanwhile, look at any non-tech…

The latest Wework TV ads sell it as an “operating system” for workspaces, among much other showy language filled with business-transforming technology buzzwords. It definitely sounds like they’re marketing as some unique proprietary tech, and I wouldn’t be surprised at all if the aim was to justify their absurd valuation figures.

Re: Today’s correction isn’t much like the dot-com bubble

#99
post #95
post #58

The part about stock prices for non-tech and tech isn't entirely true, what about stocks like PD? Here's a company that's trying to posture itself as an enterprise grade ops system, stock is in the gutter

Nothing sexy about monitoring. You or I could build our own overnight. Twilio is the true leverage and why they command a much higher P/E multiple

I agree with you but I’d phrase it differently. Perhaps that neither monitoring nor sms is “sexy,” but that you could reasonably hack together a monitoring MVP over a weekend but not a telephony MVP. There’s a natural barrier from the underlying problem domain.

Re: Today’s correction isn’t much like the dot-com bubble

#100

There’s another often unwritten element here around companies basing their valuation on false markets. For example, if I sell $2 for $1 that’s a false market. Of course I can grow like crazy and gobble up lots of customers. I could even “disrupt” existing players like those stodgy old companies (banks) that sell $2 for $2.15 (a loan). The VC subsidies for some of these companies are so high that they are basically se…

That's not an uncommon nor unheard of tactic in business. Fuel growth, and capture the market for your brand, by selling at a loss. The trick is always the transition to profitability. Generally, this comes through layoffs and maybe price increases.

I think the problem is that a lot of these companies are trying this strategy with Juicero-like products. The moment they pivot to profitability, anyone else can just start squeezing at a lower cost.

Is Uber or We really making something that can't quickly be copied, even at a local level, once prices are doubled or tripled?

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