The PGP Problem • Hacker News Board

Re: The PGP Problem

#91

Post by olliej » Wed, Jul 17, 2019, 6:23 AM UTC

floatingatoll wrote: post #84

mstump wrote: post #79

I was an engineer at PGP from 2004-2011 and ended up running the server team as lead engineer. I wouldn't disagree with most of the points brought up by the author, both the code base and standard has accreted over time and it's incredibly complex. There were only a couple of people on the team that really understood all the facets of either the OpenPGP or SMIME/x509 standards. It's made worse in that it was a hack o…

Forcing iMessage to open will immediately result in MITM iMessage proxies that users can use to store iMessages that are meant to auto-delete, so that they can violate the wishes of the other party. These do not exist today because Apple binds iMessage to your hardware and bans your entire device when anyone is found to be operating such a service, either for themselves or others. Do you want open source clients that…

iMessage doesn't have any kind of auto deleted messages - it's a feature that messages are persistent across all your devices.

Re: The PGP Problem

#92

Post by jmspring » Wed, Jul 17, 2019, 6:23 AM UTC

Long story short - signed / encrypted emails are hard. SMIME doesn’t really exist any more. Sending secure email is hard.

Re: The PGP Problem

#93

Post by jdc » Wed, Jul 17, 2019, 6:24 AM UTC

mstump wrote: post #79

I was an engineer at PGP from 2004-2011 and ended up running the server team as lead engineer. I wouldn't disagree with most of the points brought up by the author, both the code base and standard has accreted over time and it's incredibly complex. There were only a couple of people on the team that really understood all the facets of either the OpenPGP or SMIME/x509 standards. It's made worse in that it was a hack o…

Have you looked at DIME?

https://darkmail.info

Re: The PGP Problem

#94

Post by meruru » Wed, Jul 17, 2019, 6:25 AM UTC

simonh wrote: post #78

Sniffnoy wrote: post #48

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Good question. Not sure. Although I don't see why I wouldn't, if they have a PGP key listed? (I guess there is some question over whether the listed key is actually them?) But my point is that, well, email is a good way to do that, and Signal isn't, so I'm going to use email rather than Signal. Honestly, I wouldn't focus on (3), because as I see it, if you can replicate the feel of email, things like (1)-(2), so that…

How does one list a public PGP key, is there a verified central listing service?

You can put it on your website or anywhere really. Some people use keybase.io for this.

Re: The PGP Problem

#95

Post by nightfly » Wed, Jul 17, 2019, 6:27 AM UTC

floatingatoll wrote: post #84

mstump wrote: post #79

I was an engineer at PGP from 2004-2011 and ended up running the server team as lead engineer. I wouldn't disagree with most of the points brought up by the author, both the code base and standard has accreted over time and it's incredibly complex. There were only a couple of people on the team that really understood all the facets of either the OpenPGP or SMIME/x509 standards. It's made worse in that it was a hack o…

Forcing iMessage to open will immediately result in MITM iMessage proxies that users can use to store iMessages that are meant to auto-delete, so that they can violate the wishes of the other party. These do not exist today because Apple binds iMessage to your hardware and bans your entire device when anyone is found to be operating such a service, either for themselves or others. Do you want open source clients that…

You can violate the wishes of the other party by taking a screenshot or, in the extreme, a photo of the screen. You're only preventing the very lazy/unmotivated from retaining messages.

Re: The PGP Problem

#96

Post by garmaine » Wed, Jul 17, 2019, 6:27 AM UTC

wodenokoto wrote: post #88

thayne wrote: post #76

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> It's not like I can read your emails unless I break into Google's servers, no? Well, first of all, "breaking in" isn't the only way someone might get access to data on Google's servers. There are such thing's as subpoenas, not to mention that it is possible a Google employee might abuse access to servers. And then I would be _very_ surprised if google doesn't use the content of your emails for advertisement and tra…

> And then I would be _very_ surprised if google doesn't use the content of your emails for advertisement and tracking purposes. That would go against their own privacy policy. But they are one change away from doing it.

Really? When gmail came out they were explicitly up front about using the content of the email to deliver targeted ads. Has that changed?

Re: The PGP Problem

#97

Post by taeric » Wed, Jul 17, 2019, 6:36 AM UTC

I don't understand why the use of Yubikeys for a non-exportable key isn't valid for folks that care about security. I mean, I get that not everyone will use it. The vast majority won't. However, the vast majority don't care about security at this level. So... what is the actual criticism? If you care about security, use the keys, right? That feels no different from "use some other product."

Re: The PGP Problem

#98

Post by AmericanChopper » Wed, Jul 17, 2019, 6:38 AM UTC

jeroenhd wrote: post #82

Whent talking about alternatives, Signal and WhatsApp get mentioned because they're easy to use. They are. Signal is pretty secure. WhatsApp probably is as well but we can't be sure. That is, until it isn't anymore. WhatsApp already has a key extraction protocol built right in for its Web interface. Signal has a web (Electron) interface as well, and a shitty one at that, where the messages also get decrypted. For Wha…

I think the real problem is that nobody has ever created a decent PKI, and I doubt a sufficiently secure PKI is even possible.

CAs require you to trust people that aren’t supposed to be party to the communication (trust both not to be hostile, and not to be insecure themselves).

All other forms of PKI offer entirely impractical authentication mechanisms. With signal and the like, your options are

1) Verify keys by being in the same room as the other party before communication, and after every key rotation

2) Just hope that the keys are genuine...

The only thing that you can trust is that the party you’re communicating with is one of potentially many holders of the correct key.

Re: The PGP Problem

#99

Post by [deleted] » Wed, Jul 17, 2019, 6:45 AM UTC

floatingatoll wrote: post #84

mstump wrote: post #79

I was an engineer at PGP from 2004-2011 and ended up running the server team as lead engineer. I wouldn't disagree with most of the points brought up by the author, both the code base and standard has accreted over time and it's incredibly complex. There were only a couple of people on the team that really understood all the facets of either the OpenPGP or SMIME/x509 standards. It's made worse in that it was a hack o…

Forcing iMessage to open will immediately result in MITM iMessage proxies that users can use to store iMessages that are meant to auto-delete, so that they can violate the wishes of the other party. These do not exist today because Apple binds iMessage to your hardware and bans your entire device when anyone is found to be operating such a service, either for themselves or others. Do you want open source clients that…

[deleted]

Re: The PGP Problem

#100

Post by maufl » Wed, Jul 17, 2019, 6:47 AM UTC

I use my PGP key (with a Yubikey) for two things, the pass password manager and as an SSH authentication key. Is there a replacement for those two use cases where I can store my private key on a hardware token?