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WannaCry in-memory key recovery for Windows XP

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Re: WannaCry in-memory key recovery for Windows XP

#91
post #46
post #22

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Exactly. I would've thought the malware would ask a C&C server to generate a key pair and then only send the public key to the malware. But I guess perhaps that required too much processing power for the server. But then again this can also distributed: let a random victim generate an RSA keypair for another victim.

This allows computers cut off from the internet to be infected too. Juicy and the risk is minimal.

Bitcoin payment requires internet.

Re: WannaCry in-memory key recovery for Windows XP

#92

The attackers seem to have a poor grasp on cryptography. The entire point of RSA is that they don't have to generate the key locally. Just ship your ransomware with the attacker's public key, generate a symmetric key K locally, encrypt the data with K, encrypt K with the public key, offer to decrypt K for a ransom. There seems to be an inverse correlation between smart and evil in human beings which is reassuring, bu…

Alas, in order to optimize profits you wouldn't want to use a shared key pair. The risk of course that once your private key is disclosed then you'll potentially thwart future revenue.

In the scenario described, you're not giving back your private key, you're returning the decrypted key the victim needs to decrypt their data.

That key won't work for other victims.

Re: WannaCry in-memory key recovery for Windows XP

#93
post #46

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This allows computers cut off from the internet to be infected too. Juicy and the risk is minimal.

Bitcoin payment requires internet.

You don't need bitcoin payment to be infected.

Re: WannaCry in-memory key recovery for Windows XP

#94

The attackers seem to have a poor grasp on cryptography. The entire point of RSA is that they don't have to generate the key locally. Just ship your ransomware with the attacker's public key, generate a symmetric key K locally, encrypt the data with K, encrypt K with the public key, offer to decrypt K for a ransom. There seems to be an inverse correlation between smart and evil in human beings which is reassuring, bu…

Cryptography expert usually recommend not to use the same key (here the ransomware's public key) for transport and storage. Maybe the symmetric key should not even be stored locally. But the drawback is that with this approach the same symmetric key would be used to encrypt all files leaving it longer in memory. If 1 symmetric key is used per file it would mean that the ransomware would need to be queried for every f…

>On an unrelated note, I wonder if people thought about doing a DDOS on the onion service ... ?

Wouldn't this, if successful, just prevent victims from paying to decrypt their files?

Sure, it would stop the attackers from getting any bitcoin, but the victims' data would still be encrypted.

Re: WannaCry in-memory key recovery for Windows XP

#95

The attackers seem to have a poor grasp on cryptography. The entire point of RSA is that they don't have to generate the key locally. Just ship your ransomware with the attacker's public key, generate a symmetric key K locally, encrypt the data with K, encrypt K with the public key, offer to decrypt K for a ransom. There seems to be an inverse correlation between smart and evil in human beings which is reassuring, bu…

Well the thing is, if they had alot more knowledge about this stuff, they'd probably make way more money "going straight", though I'm sure there are some exceptions to this.
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