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Uncorrectable freedom and security issues on x86 platforms (2016)

decentralize.today

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Re: Uncorrectable freedom and security issues on x86 platforms (2016)

#91

Post by cyphar »

amluto wrote: post #84

> These technologies, in turn, are used to implement various forms of remote control and Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies, including Secure Boot, which even now requires FOSS users to purchase a license from Microsoft to boot FOSS on affected machines that lack an appropriate Secure Boot override. I dislike the mandatory use of these features as much as the next nerd, but this is inaccurate FUD. Secure Bo…

> > These technologies, in turn, are used to implement various forms of remote control and Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies, including Secure Boot, which even now requires FOSS users to purchase a license from Microsoft to boot FOSS on affected machines that lack an appropriate Secure Boot override.

> I dislike the mandatory use of these features as much as the next nerd, but this is inaccurate FUD. Secure Boot is a code in flash that checks the signature of whatever you try to boot against some rather complicated policy. It's regular code and would work more or less the same on any platform that runs machine code off of ROM or flash.

"Regular code" doesn't mean it's not proprietary, and doesn't mean that it's not concerning for free software users.

> And FOSS users don't need to purchase any license from anyone. They can use a tool like Linux Foundation's PreLoader or Red Hat's shim (open source but awkward to modify because you need the signed binary to boot on a stock system) to boot anything they like. No negotiations, no license, no communication with MS at all.

Those preloaders are signed by Microsoft. While it is a good hack for distributions at the moment, it doesn't mean that Microsoft is no longer in the loop. They still have an incredibly worrying amount of control over what can run on modern hardware.

Re: Uncorrectable freedom and security issues on x86 platforms (2016)

#92

Post by cyphar »

pjc50 wrote: post #72
bogomipz wrote: post #13

I was struck by the following passage: >including Secure Boot, which even now requires FOSS users to purchase a license from Microsoft to boot FOSS on affected machines that lack an appropriate Secure Boot override." Can someone explain this to me, would this be for instance be Lenovo laptops making a deal with Microsoft since Windows is the default OS installed on these laptops? Is Microsoft mandating all OEMs/hardw…

> now requires FOSS users to purchase a license from Microsoft to boot FOSS This isn't actually true, is it?

They charge a fee to get a certificate that you can use to submit binaries to be signed with the Microsoft signing service. If you're a user of a distribution you won't have this problem, because distributions have already paid and have a hack "shim" which effectively enrols the distribution's own keys into the trustdb. But if you wanted to make your own distribution you would have to pay.

Re: Uncorrectable freedom and security issues on x86 platforms (2016)

#93

Post by graycat »

nickpsecurity wrote: post #70
graycat wrote: post #26

I'm trying to understand all of this and especially the threats to privacy, control of my computing hardware, and data security. I read about some new hard/software for secure boot , etc., but don't recall all the details now. So, for a shorter approach, suppose I just buy a processor from AMD, a motherboard from ASUS, hard disk drives from Western Digital, etc., and plug it all together for myself. So, then I'm the…

Do you still work at Fedex in Memphis? If so, we're in same vicinity. Maybe we have lunch some time and Ill tell you all about the various subversions going on. :)

No, I'm not in Memphis or with FedEx but am in NYS and doing a startup.

Re: Uncorrectable freedom and security issues on x86 platforms (2016)

#94

Post by int_19h »

saurik wrote: post #87

> Major distributions have worked around this issue by purchasing a signing key from Microsoft for their binary packages, but the end user is unable to modify the signed software without a license from Microsoft, even though they have the source code available to them under the GPL. Is this an accurate description of what is happening? (I don't pay much attention to desktop systems: I spend most of my time concentrat…

I don't think GPLv3 anti-DRM clauses would kick in here. They would if 1) someone was distributing a combination of a Secure Boot-only machine with your software installed on it, and 2) the loader (which is the only thing really validated by Secure Boot) would actually try to continue the chain of trust, and validate all the other bits, such that the user cannot run a modified version of your software.

I'm pretty sure that neither of those is the case, however. Once the system boots using the signed loader, it's really just Linux, and you're free to replace the kernel and any bit of userspace as usual.

Furthermore, I seriously doubt that anyone is selling machines with Linux preinstalled that have Secure Boot which cannot be turned off - simply because that would become known pretty fast, and even aside from licensing issues, would elicit a very hostile reaction from the community (and hence many potential buyers).

Re: Uncorrectable freedom and security issues on x86 platforms (2016)

#95

Post by hinkley »

bubblethink wrote: post #50

While it would be great to liberate x86, more than 4 billion people in the world use mobile phones, and phones are beyond saving. x86 is in very healthy shape compared to the clusterfuck that is the smartphone industry. If you think that coreboot is a fringe project, you need to head over to replicant or neo900 to see what the fringe actually is.

I thought Apple was working on their own baseband chip? I assume that's what you're alluding to, yeah?

Re: Uncorrectable freedom and security issues on x86 platforms (2016)

#96

Post by theamk »

narrator wrote: post #63

Want complete software freedom? How about the MIPS chips the Russian military uses[1]? Those don't have an NSA back door. Sucks you can't really buy them as they are only made for use in Russian military and government applications. "Last year, the Russian government announced that it doesn't want to rely on Intel and AMD chips from the U.S. anymore and will focus more on using homegrown chips from Russia." [1] http:…

Well, the actual CPU cores are designed by Imagination Technologies, which are based in UK. I would not be so sure that they are fully safe.

You can make an argument that it is still an improvement, because there are no obvious binary blobs required by the system. But in this case, I would recommend going for one of the many Chinese ARM cores -- at least you can buy them easily.

Re: Uncorrectable freedom and security issues on x86 platforms (2016)

#97

Post by nickpsecurity »

graycat wrote: post #93
nickpsecurity wrote: post #70

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Do you still work at Fedex in Memphis? If so, we're in same vicinity. Maybe we have lunch some time and Ill tell you all about the various subversions going on. :)

No, I'm not in Memphis or with FedEx but am in NYS and doing a startup.

Oh ok. Nvm. Guess Ill keep doing it a bit at a time here then. Others covered this topic well, though.

Re: Uncorrectable freedom and security issues on x86 platforms (2016)

#98

Post by graycat »

timonovici wrote: post #43
graycat wrote: post #26

I'm trying to understand all of this and especially the threats to privacy, control of my computing hardware, and data security. I read about some new hard/software for secure boot , etc., but don't recall all the details now. So, for a shorter approach, suppose I just buy a processor from AMD, a motherboard from ASUS, hard disk drives from Western Digital, etc., and plug it all together for myself. So, then I'm the…

1. The motherboad has a ARC chip, that loads a firmware included in the flash chip. That ARC chip is supposedly inside the PCH (Platform Controller Hub, a north bridge on steroids) - it's efectively in the silicon, you can't remove it. 2. Depends on the motherboard and the BIOS written in the flash chip 3. No. They are already signed. 4. If somebody controls them and ask them to do so. All that's necesary is a LAN co…

The motherboard I have in mind is the ASUS m5a97 r2.0. Back in October, 2015 I got a PDF on that motherboard at

http://data.manualslib.com/pdf2/42/4150/414970-asus/m5a97_r2...

Just checking, the PDF does mention the Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI) but not ARC or PCH.

That ASUS manual does mention that the UEFI BIOS does offer automatic updating of the BIOS version; that feature, if enabled, does seem to raise security concerns.

Looking at the UEFI page of Wikipedia at

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unified_Extensible_Firmware_In...

there is

> UEFI can support remote diagnostics and repair of computers, even with no operating system installed.[3]

which seems to raise some security concerns. Also it does appear that some people trying to install an operating system might encounter some mud wrestling. Maybe what I'm intending to do with Microsoft's Windows 7, 10, and Server will be easy enough.

Thanks.

Re: Uncorrectable freedom and security issues on x86 platforms (2016)

#99

Post by doubleunplussed »

saurik wrote: post #87

> Major distributions have worked around this issue by purchasing a signing key from Microsoft for their binary packages, but the end user is unable to modify the signed software without a license from Microsoft, even though they have the source code available to them under the GPL. Is this an accurate description of what is happening? (I don't pay much attention to desktop systems: I spend most of my time concentrat…

I'm not 100% sure that this is what's being referred to, but in Ubuntu for example, the initial bootloader is a program called "shim". Microsoft signed shim - so computers with secureboot will run it.

Shim contains keys from Canonical or someone (I'm not sure), and verifies that GRUB has been signed by Canonical before running it. Then when GRUB runs the kernel, it calls back into shim first to verify the kernel has also been signed (Actually that last step wasn't enabled yet last time I checked).

So basically, until Microsoft changes their keys, by signing shim they've given Canonical permission to sign things. But unless you disable secureboot, you can't run a custom kernel unless you convince Canonical or Microsoft to sign it.

Re: Uncorrectable freedom and security issues on x86 platforms (2016)

#100

Post by xvilka »

nickpsecurity wrote: post #67
0x0 wrote: post #8

Isn't it sci-fi-level incredible, and frankly both scary and shady, that every modern x86 CPU has this forced sub-ring-0 control program? And that the CPU vendors apparently go to extreme lengths in hiding its functionality? Why would even large vendors like Apple or Dell agree to this? The 30-minute timeout is particularly mischievous. It's like they REALLY want to slow down any effort at patching out the ME. Are we…

It's the kind of stuff the boring, slow-moving, TCG group were talking about long ago for improved DRM and security. Then they advertised their backdoors publicly as vPro while people here argued why Intel rand was trustworthy (lol). They sold that as management benefit for enterprises. Eventually those gradual changes got to the current point. Although I recommend switching off x86, I don't buy the claim that we can…

There is DMP x86 (no x86_64 though) CPUs manufacturer: http://www.dmp.com.tw/
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