Earlier quoted context omitted.
I've been thinking about this for a while, and the early conclusion I've come to, is that 64bits of provable random entropy in a password that's also memorable is a very high bar to clear. Imagine this, you take four word types/groups, say, substantive, verb, adverb, preposition/place. You list 128 of each - all with identified uniqly by the first two letters. You let a machine pick a word from each column at random.…
Why truncate the words down to the first two letters? Are you reinventing xkcd 936?
And while it might feel good to pretend full words add entropy, if you assume the attacker knows your system - it really doesn't (hence "guaranteed" entropy).
As for diceware, I don't find those passwords easy to remember - especially past 60 bits of entropy. But use what works for you.