91–98 of 98 posts
Earlier quoted context omitted.
https://github.com/esurharun/kyle/blob/master/lib/kyle.rb#L1... ret += Constants::PASSWORD_CHARS[c % Constants::PASSWORD_CHARS.length] Looks like biased output. Also, what is this? (From https://github.com/sceptive/Forgiva ) algorithm forgiva-iterative-hashing Input: Value to hashed as DATA, Algorithm array AARRAY Ouput: Hashed input data final_value = DATA for each character C in DATA algorithm = AARRAY index of (C…
It generates underterministic way of calculation for a time-span of a successfull brute-force attack. Various hashing and encryption algorithms runs in different performance values. Thus, estimating for a CPU/GPU power or time range to attack Forgiva is more harder than other systems. Every master-key generates a different time and processor cost as you see. So this makes estimations fail for all attacking sessions.
This is generally a bad thing and sounds like it will open you up to some kind of timing attack in the future.
> It generates underterministic way of calculation for a time-span of a successfull brute-force attack.
This doesn’t improve security and just adds unnecessary complexity.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
What evidence do you have that your scheme is any more future proof than, say, Argon2? No, just using a bunch of different primitives is not going to guard against the kind of breaks found in bcrypt or scrypt, which aren't really breaks at all.
Forgiva is not a key-derivation algorithm itself to compare with Argon2 but a combination way for various hashing and encryption algorithms along PBKDF2 "depending on master-key". So it's as much future-proof as master-key generated algorithm sequence. And in this case which methods would you offer and prefer for future-proofing with comparison to other KDFs?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
It's probably because different understanding of same terms. With "complexity" word we mean hardness to generate. It doesnt adds up more algorithms but character sets and hashing algorithms for PBKDF2 respectively.
Why, exactly, would a user ever want to generate a password with a weaker KDF? A password with lower levels of string complexity might make sense --- 1Password's strong passwords can sometimes be rejected by crappy websites. A password that sacrifices cryptographic strength in order to save a few tens of milliseconds of KDF, though, makes no sense at all . Also: really, you should not be using PBKDF2.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Why, exactly, would a user ever want to generate a password with a weaker KDF? A password with lower levels of string complexity might make sense --- 1Password's strong passwords can sometimes be rejected by crappy websites. A password that sacrifices cryptographic strength in order to save a few tens of milliseconds of KDF, though, makes no sense at all . Also: really, you should not be using PBKDF2.
Honest question: what's wrong with PBKDF2?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Forgiva is not a key-derivation algorithm itself to compare with Argon2 but a combination way for various hashing and encryption algorithms along PBKDF2 "depending on master-key". So it's as much future-proof as master-key generated algorithm sequence. And in this case which methods would you offer and prefer for future-proofing with comparison to other KDFs?
I would use an analysed algorithm such as Argon2 and be done with it. If you're so worried about bcrypt, why do you use PBKDF2 which is no better?
But regarding criticizes probably there will be bcrypt, scrypt and argon2 implementations as options on the next release.
The encrypted password database is an advantage. You have to steal it to be able to even try cracking. If it's fully deterministic, anyone with any output can go nuts trying to crack the master password, and then get all other credentials.
How does this handle situations where the generated password isn't accepted by the site? eg. Is too long, absolutely must have at least one symbol and one number, etc. How does this handle changing passwords? How can I know from the master secret that xyz.com is on the 4th password?
>> How does this handle situations where the generated password isn't accepted by the site? eg. Is too long, absolutely must have at least one symbol and one number, etc. You can specify password length if it gets too long and it's character set provides symbols, numbers and letters in it. >> How does this handle changing passwords? It has a renewal mechanism to switch to a new password. >> How can I know from the ma…
So then there has to be metadata to list the site domain, username, which generation of password, which characters are allowed or disallowed, length, KDF difficulty, etc? Where is that information stored?
What I'm getting at is with a brain wallet I only need to remember my secret and know the algorithm used to generate the key. With this it seems like you need a database to store more information, and without it, it's difficult to get your passwords back.