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An AI agent deleted our production database. The agent's confession is below

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Re: An AI agent deleted our production database. The agent's confession is below

#861

Post by kshri24 »

jeremyccrane wrote: post #250
lpcvoid wrote: post #123

Learn to code yourself, stop using slop generators, then shit like this doesn't happen.

Senior software dev brother :)

No you are not. Anyone who is actually senior knows vibe coding sucks ass.

Please stop contributing to slop/chasing trends and care more for your customers, who are your bread and butter (provided they stick around after this debacle).

Re: An AI agent deleted our production database. The agent's confession is below

#862

Post by HighGoldstein »

grey-area wrote: post #238
amluto wrote: post #214

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Humans can do one thing that AI agents are 100% completely incapable of doing: being accountable for their actions.

Don’t forget learning, humans can learn, LLMs do not learn, they are trained before use.

Do we? Or are we born with pre-training (all the crucial functions the brain does without us having to learn them) and a context window orders of magnitude larger than an LLM?

Re: An AI agent deleted our production database. The agent's confession is below

#863

Post by motbus3 »

it is not intelligent, it is not emotional and it certainly didn't give an explanation. After actions were taken it generated a text that complied with your expectation.

It is still a next word predictor that happens to have really good prediction.

Never ever give admin credentials to an agent. You would never leave your car without parking breaks in a slope would you?

Re: An AI agent deleted our production database. The agent's confession is below

#864

Post by motbus3 »

alecco wrote: post #860
ad_hockey wrote: post #28

Minor point, but one of the complaints is a bit odd: > curl -X POST https://backboard.railway.app/graphql/v2 \ -H "Authorization: Bearer [token]" \ -d '{"query":"mutation { volumeDelete(volumeId: \"3d2c42fb-...\") }"}' No confirmation step. No "type DELETE to confirm." No "this volume contains production data, are you sure?" No environment scoping. Nothing. It's an API. Where would you type DELETE to confirm? Are the…

Guys, did you bother checking the poster's profile? https://xcancel.com/lifeof_jer . SEE THE TWEET BELOW. Smells like a ragebait post to me. Also search online for his alleged "PocketOS" company with software for car rental businesses. I couldn't find anything on Google. (Of course, I might be wrong) "The future of SEO is AIO" https://xcancel.com/lifeof_jer/status/2034409722624061772 March 18

Interesting. Indeed there are some sketch stuff

Re: An AI agent deleted our production database. The agent's confession is below

#865

Post by osakasaul »

nneonneo wrote: post #736

Accountability and responsibility for the AI chatbot/tool/agent still lie solely with the human operator. This is an excuse to try and deflect blame, rather than actually identify and prevent the root causes which led to the error. If the human operator cannot provide the necessary level of accountability - for example, because the agent acts too quickly, or needs high-level permissions to do the work that it's been…

[dead]

Re: An AI agent deleted our production database. The agent's confession is below

#867

Post by kikimora »

ericd wrote: post #656
kikimora wrote: post #565

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I did notice how Claude can start looking outside of working directory. It may scan home directory and find Homebrew token or SSH keys and wipe your GitHub repo.

Yes, it needs to be sandboxed very carefully. It should have no way to access anything outside of the directories you mount in the sandbox.

I wonder what is the approach you taking? In my dev env we have .env files that supposed to have dev api keys for staging and testing. Production parameters stored in parameter store. There is also deploy script, that can deploy into production given there is a token in AWS CLI.

I understand there is a way to keep Claude inside working dir. but how to limit it from accidentally deploying production, modifying terraform deleting important resources? If dev can run AWS cli ir terraform then Claude can…

Re: An AI agent deleted our production database. The agent's confession is below

#868

Post by galmanus »

ad_hockey wrote: post #28

Minor point, but one of the complaints is a bit odd: > curl -X POST https://backboard.railway.app/graphql/v2 \ -H "Authorization: Bearer [token]" \ -d '{"query":"mutation { volumeDelete(volumeId: \"3d2c42fb-...\") }"}' No confirmation step. No "type DELETE to confirm." No "this volume contains production data, are you sure?" No environment scoping. Nothing. It's an API. Where would you type DELETE to confirm? Are the…

agreed — confirmation belongs on the client side. but the harder question is "what is a client-side check when the client IS an llm agent?" a polite "are you sure?" doesn't bind a probabilistic generator that's motivated to finish the task. the version that actually works: declare the agent's allowed actions in a parsed config that's validated BEFORE the action is emitted. destructive verbs require the operator to approve a diff to that config first. still client-side — but the check isstructural, not behavioral. ended up doing this in bluewave (multi-tenant agent runtime) — explicit @scope and @rules blocks in a parsed .ssl spec, validated before each cycle. the agent literally cannot emit an action outside the declared scope. spec is open at github.com/Galmanus/ssl-spec — mit.
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