U.S. Supreme Court deems half of Oklahoma a Native American reservation

AFAIU, title recordation is a relatively recent thing. And the logic of adverse possession, which I think is a vestige of early statutes of limitations (retained out of principle or ad hoc, I dunno), mirrors the logic of later equitable remedies. Fundamentally, adverse possession doesn't magically transfer title, but because the court refuses to grant the ejectment request of the prior possessor who sat on his rights, the person in possession thus has better title than anyone else in the world in terms of what can be claimed in court.

More generally that reflects the logic of traditional property law under the Common Law--ownership is about having better rights to possession than anyone else in a relative sense, not about some singular, abstract title. Emphasis on formal properly titles is how you distinguish continental Civil Law from Common Law, or from many of the rules that controlled prior to the emergence of the Common Law.[1] Once courts of Equity came about you could then ask the court to quiet title, which can be used to change any formal title registrations and prevent future litigation, though technically that would have been (and often remains) unnecessary to legally deed such property. And adverse possession has been so well established for so long that most jurisdictions have kept it enshrined in statute. Though like the Rule Against Perpetuities, many jurisdictions have eviscerated it.

[1] There are actually strong arguments that formal title requirements are a barrier to the development of more egalitarian economies. Formal titles seem an obvious and easy solution when you're in the elite, or in the context of an already well-developed political and economic environment. But formalisms often make it too easy for the rich and sophisticated to screw over the poor--you take their money, you give them possession, then at some later date (maybe even a later generation) it's all taken away because nobody ever got the valid imprimatur of some bureaucrat. You would think such a simple rule would benefit the poor, but that's not how it plays out it practice. Some economists argue these effects remain consequential in many Latin American and other jurisdictions, particularly ex-colonies of continental powers like France and Spain. In the domains of property and contract law, China has quite deliberately incorporated many Anglo-American principles and rules in its legal reforms precisely because formalisms can create hidden costs far greater than what they seem to save. And I think traditional Chinese property law, at least, also leaned in a similar direction, which is why the phenomenon of so-called nail houses existed in the first place--because the courts recognized (albeit haphazardly) certain possessory entitlements that didn't arise from any formal title, which in communist China were few and far between.

Textualism involves interpreting words with the same meaning that they would have had at the time whey were written.

Originalism involves interpreting words in the same way they would have been intended at the time when they were written.

To express the crux of the difference, I've seen multiple sources use the example of "cruel and unusual punishment".

Textualism would look at the words: what did "cruel" and "unusual" mean in the 1790? Do those definitions describe a particular punishment?

Originalism would instead consider intent: would a particular punishment have been considered to be "cruel and unusual" in 1790?

Beyond the obvious, what they have in common is what they don't consider: purpose, history, or present meaning.

For fun:

Purposivism would consider the purpose of the clause: is a punishment the sort of thing the clause was written to protect against?

Doctrinalism would look at the way the clause has been interpreted by the court in the past: how does the punishment under consideration compare to punishments previously considered cruel and unusual?

Structuralism would examine the clause and its relationship to the rest of the document in which it was written: perhaps the fact that the clause follows "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed ..." offers guidance.

Judicial pragmatism would consider the context, apply inductive reasoning, and consider the future implications of a ruling. (I don't think I've summarized this one well https://www.iep.utm.edu/leglprag/#H2 may be useful.)

No, what he is describing is adverse possession, which is different from prescriptive easement; adverse possession converts ownership, prescriptive easement provides an easement (usage rights without ownership.)

> and is legal (depending on your jurisdiction).

No, adverse possession and prescriptive easement are both conditioned on open and notorious trespass, which is an illegal action.