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Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

anthropic.com

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Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#851

Post by tptacek »

SpicyLemonZest wrote: post #849
tptacek wrote: post #845

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Important to understand it's not one-and-done; you can't "Mythos" Chrome and then put a checkmark next to it. It's a continuous process.

Can't you? My understanding is that that's exactly how security scans usually work - you run an analysis, find all the vulnerabilities, and then the continuous process is only there to check against the introduction of new vulnerabilities. Is that not the right mental model?

No, you cannot.

(A "security scanner" is a one-and-done proposition because it's deterministic and is going to find what it finds the first time you run and nothing more. But a software security assessment project you run every year on the same target with different teams will turn up different stuff every year. I'm at pains to remind people how totally lame source code security scanners are. People keep saying "static analyzers already do this" and like, nobody in security takes those tools seriously.)

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#852

Post by supern0va »

GoatInGrey wrote: post #813
WithinReason wrote: post #670

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Is Anthropic lying about model capabilities? If not, where is the overselling?

March 2025, Anthropic was claiming that 90% of code would be written by LLMs in three to six months, and "essentially all" code within twelve months. This was one week after closing a Series E round for $3.5 billion. When they began working on their Series F round for $13 billion. You shouldn't need more than that to understand what's going on here. The Claude Code leak revealed that Anthropic runs Claude-operated bo…

>March 2025, Anthropic was claiming that 90% of code would be written by LLMs in three to six months, and "essentially all" code within twelve months.

There's a pretty big difference between "We predict in X time frame our model will be capable of Y" and "Our model did Y."

This is like watching someone measure the size of an object and saying "I don't believe you because you guessed it was X before you pulled out your tape measure."

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#853

Post by jstummbillig »

ofjcihen wrote: post #586
nbardy wrote: post #582

Earlier quoted context omitted.

There is step changes that actually merit this though. And a zero day machine IS one of those. It went from 4% zero day success rate to 85% on firefox. Can you not see the significance of that?

I mean I work in this world and overhype is constant. Additionally those numbers are somewhat meaningless without more context.

Can you explain why they are meaningless without more context?

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#854

Post by 8593376393 »

bottlepalm wrote: post #470
LiamPowell wrote: post #399

> Mythos Preview identified a number of Linux kernel vulnerabilities that allow an adversary to write out-of-bounds (e.g., through a buffer overflow, use-after-free, or double-free vulnerability.) Many of these were remotely-triggerable. However, even after several thousand scans over the repository, because of the Linux kernel’s defense in depth measures Mythos Preview was unable to successfully exploit any of these…

We've very quickly reached the point where AI models are now too dangerous to publicly release, and HN users are still trying to trivialize the situation.

[dead]

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#855

Post by LordDragonfang »

maccard wrote: post #689
LordDragonfang wrote: post #673

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> “I think… I don’t know… we might be six to twelve months away from when the model is doing most, maybe all of what SWEs (software engineers) do end to end.” I think it's disingenuous (as disingenuous as you're accusing these marketing teams of being) to paraphrase that as "being told on one hand that we are 6 months away from AI writing all Code". It's merely stating that it's a real possibility. (It's also disinge…

We’ve been suggesting that programmers are going to be replaced by simpler programming languages, gui programming tools, no code tools, low code tools, and now AI. The real big step was when Claude code came out and introduced the agentic loop where it could self validate against tests/linters/tooling, but everything after that had been penned as miraculous when IME it’s a new iteration of the same thing - wild hallu…

> We’ve been suggesting that programmers are going to be replaced by simpler programming languages, gui programming tools, no code tools, low code tools, and now AI.

The difference is that it's actually working this time. Non-programmers are writing full apps. Sure, they're simple ones, often just CRUD and UI, but it actually is changing things in a way it never has before. You can't assert something is the same as everything previous when there's already evidence that it's different.

> No - you don’t get to make wild predictions and say “oh I didn’t actually mean that, look how succesful we are though”.

Except that's not what's happening here. I'm criticizing you for misrepresenting what claim was made in the first place. No where in your evidence have you shown anyone "walking the claim back". If anything, TFA is claiming evidence of an LLM doing "most" of what SWEs do "end to end" three months ahead of schedule.

If you want to present evidence Dario (or another CEO -- I'm sure Sama has made much more fantastic claims that you could falsify) made claims that didn't pan out, be my guess, but don't tell falsehoods about the evidence you are presenting.

(And no, I'm not counting breathless tech reporters -- everyone knows how much to trust them when they report a cure for cancer -- they'll say everything is a miracle cure. But the fact that hundreds of "miracle weight loss cures" that never panned out made the new in the past several centuries didn't make GLP1s fake just because they had the same type of hype.)

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#858

Post by SpicyLemonZest »

tptacek wrote: post #851
SpicyLemonZest wrote: post #849

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Can't you? My understanding is that that's exactly how security scans usually work - you run an analysis, find all the vulnerabilities, and then the continuous process is only there to check against the introduction of new vulnerabilities. Is that not the right mental model?

No, you cannot. (A "security scanner" is a one-and-done proposition because it's deterministic and is going to find what it finds the first time you run and nothing more. But a software security assessment project you run every year on the same target with different teams will turn up different stuff every year. I'm at pains to remind people how totally lame source code security scanners are. People keep saying "stat…

Interesting. Thanks for the info, I’m going to have to read up on this at some point.

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#859

Post by 6thbit »

theptip wrote: post #844
6thbit wrote: post #836

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's only a moat if you believe no competing lab will achieve similar or better results in a large enough time frame to profit from it.

Thats not what a moat means in business. It doesn’t mean impregnable, it just means expensive or difficult to cross. It is absolutely a moat if only $1T companies can afford the capex to compete.

non-zero already existing companies can afford to compete, so its not a great preliminary line of defense against your main enemies.

If the existing competition's turn around time to out-benchmark you is in the order of weeks, its an absolutely terrible moat.

Re: Project Glasswing: Securing critical software for the AI era

#860

Post by ofjcihen »

jstummbillig wrote: post #853
ofjcihen wrote: post #586

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I mean I work in this world and overhype is constant. Additionally those numbers are somewhat meaningless without more context.

Can you explain why they are meaningless without more context?

A 0 day is just a vulnerability that wasn’t known before now.

What’s the criticality of these? Are they realistically exploitable? En mass? Through a complex and highly contextual set of actions? What’s the impact? Etc etc etc.

Yes those numbers are a big change but they’re also not spelling doom for us in the security world until we actually know what they mean.

The demonstrated ones that they have on the red team blog are neat, the kernel chain is impressive and fun. But nothing I’m seeing here is as world ending as the presser implies.

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