Earlier quoted context omitted.
They didn't need to, all of the phone's data was in a non-e2e iCloud Backup, which they did unlock for the FBI. Hence, farce.
That's called a conspiracy theory.
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Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
841–850 of 860 posts
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#842Out of principle, I've wiped my iPhone and moved my primary SIM card to a Pixel 5 running https://calyxos.org
This CSAM scanning will do effectively zero to stop children from being abused. It will only serve to breach the client side of E2E across the industry. Apple's privacy credibility is shot. We need to push hard for true open source mobile.
Today's mobile duopoly (including the look don't touch that is Android), is the digital yoke of our times.
Support the Calyx Institute: https://calyxinstitute.org/
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#843Earlier quoted context omitted.
For one I don't think you should be taking photos of your kids in the tub. No one is going to want to watch those. Secondly if you manage to capture same position on your kid and same angle as someone in an abuse picture there might be something wrong with your bathing routine. This just feels like people constructing imaginary boogieman out of this
I both understand and acknowledge your position. I agree that this technology can do a lot of good if used for its intended purposes. However, it does strike me as a bit overarching. The question really is, will it be used for intended purposes or will it become like roadside drug sniffing dogs? A common euphemism is "probable cause on 4 legs." https://reason.com/2021/05/13/the-police-dog-who-cried-drugs... If it is…
I don't get why they would get all of the images taken that day if the flagged image doesn't actually contain any abuse material.
This might not be true, but I've always assumed that if I am suspected of something the police can already access all my iCloud (or any other cloud storage) images with court order.
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#844In their attempt to make this extra private by scanning 'on device', I think they've managed to make it feel worse. If they scan my iCloud photos in iCloud, well lots of companies scan stuff when you upload it. It's on their servers, they're responsible for it. They don't want to be hosting CSAM. It feels much worse them turning your own, trusty iPhone against you. I know that isn't how you should look at it, but tha…
The practical difference is that with on-device scanning, the system is just a few bit flips away from scanning every photo on your device, instead of just the ones that are about to be uploaded. With server-side scanning, the separation is clear—what's on Apple's server can be scanned, and what's only on your phone cannot. This all plays so perfectly into my long-time fears about the locked down nature of the iPhone…
You could enable scanning of all files using a few bit-flips, but that doesn't have any effect - the results need to be evaluated by someone. Afaik, the system is designed such that the client side does not know whether a match occurred. So to actually report anyone based on the results of the proposed CSAM scanner, Apple also needs to upload all of the scanned files, including the client-side scan result, to figure out whether there's a match.
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#845Earlier quoted context omitted.
CSAM scanning is probably the easiest thing they could do to satisfy this demand, and if you don't use iCloud Photos, you're not affected by it at all. As far as encrypted backups go, it's an open question whether they want to deal with the legal and support headaches that such a change would bring. If they continued to do nothing, Congress might force their hand by legislatively outlawing stronger encryption - they…
> For users, if you enable this feature, but then lose your password, you are entirely screwed and Apple can't help you. Exactly the same with the phone if you forget your PIN/passcode. So they already do this.
First, while the "Erase after X unsuccessful attempts" feature exists, I've never used it and really don't recommend anyone else do so unless you are exceptionally careful.
Second, my comment was meant in the context of iCloud - if you don't enable the feature as described, Apple may be able to decrypt and recover something, but if you do go all the way to the logical end, yes, you're out of options.
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#846Earlier quoted context omitted.
I both understand and acknowledge your position. I agree that this technology can do a lot of good if used for its intended purposes. However, it does strike me as a bit overarching. The question really is, will it be used for intended purposes or will it become like roadside drug sniffing dogs? A common euphemism is "probable cause on 4 legs." https://reason.com/2021/05/13/the-police-dog-who-cried-drugs... If it is…
I don't get why they would get all of the images taken that day if the flagged image doesn't actually contain any abuse material. This might not be true, but I've always assumed that if I am suspected of something the police can already access all my iCloud (or any other cloud storage) images with court order.
Yes, they'd get access to every photo you've ever taken if you suffer a hash collision.
What court order?
Apple spots the hash collision, snitches on you, and then police get all your photos. Isn't that how this is supposed to work?
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#847Earlier quoted context omitted.
I like this take. It shortcuts around all the "but people misunderstand the technology" back and forth and gets to the root of it. "Don't scan my phone for stuff you can send to the police."
Should we consider the phone: - as part of the home? - as part of the human body? In either cases we’re allowed to do crime at home as long as no-one knows it.
Lol, this guy gets it.
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#848Earlier quoted context omitted.
Apple very recently promised that “what happens on iPhone stays on iPhone”. At literally the same time, they were building a system that was designed to break that promise. Why should we believe their new promises when their last promise was disingenuous? https://9to5mac.com/2019/01/05/apple-privacy-billboard-vegas...
How does this break that promise? Nothing leaves the phone unless the user chooses to upload their photos to a cloud service.
That setting is on by default.
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#849I just do not want Apple scanning my phone for the purpose of finding something they can send to the police. I’m not even talking about any “slippery slope” scenarios and I’ll never have any of the material they are looking for. And right or wrong, I don’t really fear a false identification, so this isn’t about a worry that they will actually turn me in. I just don’t want them scanning my phone for the purpose of tur…
From what I understand, Apple does not want to scan your phone. They want to have end-to-end encryption and store your photos encrypted. This is why they scan before sending them encrypted. They won't scan anything which you would not put in the cloud anyway. This is pretty clever way to preserve end-to-end encryption and satisfy requirement not to store anything CP related on their servers. Probably too clever for j…
>This is pretty clever way to preserve end-to-end encryption and satisfy requirement not to store anything CP related on their servers.
It's a pretty clever way to normalize adversarial devices, there's no preserving of any kind of privacy going on here.
I contend that if they are storing encrypted data that they cannot decode, then they are not knowingly storing CP at all.
If someone then downloads that, decrypts it with the key that only they know, and it turns out to be CP, then they are the ones storing CP, which as we all know is already illegal.
Obviously I'm not a lawyer and this isn't how icloud works, but lots of companies legally store encrypted data that they can't decode.
There's no legal requirement that the storage provider needs to ensure there's no CP, only that they don't knowingly store it.
Apple just doesn't want to allow people to have real encryption that they control, almost definitely so they can make more money by forcing people to use expensive icloud instead of local encrypted backups, and retain the ability to scan everyone's data. All under the flimsy excuse that 0.1% of people might forget their password and be unable to unlock their data. Nevermind you could only allow this for power users at their own request but "it's for your own good because you're too dumb to manage a password", lol fuck you Apple.
So it's just yet another self-serving, penny pinching, thinly veiled customer privacy violation, this time wrapped in a big fat "think of the children", which as we know is corporate-speak for "turn brain off now - we want to do $thing_you_wont_like".
I'm yet to think of how Apple plans to make money out of this one, but I'm sure there's an angle in there somewhere and we'll find out eventually.
Maybe simply that either NSA or China said "give us this new scanning system or we shut you down" - and I'm not American but I do wonder about people who still cling to the belief that the fourth amendment would be respected post Snowden revelations.
Hell, I'm Australian - they're probably just planning to push that hash-matched data through servers in Australia so they can see everything, because Australia has no bill of rights, and getting more authoritarian with every uncontested bill that passes. Or some other kind of "legal" fuckery to move even closer to the dystopia they are so hell-bent on creating.
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#850Earlier quoted context omitted.
>>> Only images that match the hashes of the database of CSAM held by the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) that are uploaded to iCloud Photos are checked. Incorrect. All files on the phone will be checked against a hash database before being uploaded to iCloud. Any time before, which means all the time, if you have iCloud enabled.
All files on the phone will be checked against a hash database before being uploaded to iCloud. A cryptographic safety voucher is created for each photo as they're uploaded. The iPhone doesn't know wether or not anything matched. Nothing happens unless the user reaches a threshold of 30 CSAM images that have been uploaded to iCloud Photos.
The phone also doesn't know whether something is about to be uploaded or not. Therefore, all files on the phone will be checked is the relevant portion of that sentence.