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Windows SSL Interception Gone Wild

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Re: Windows SSL Interception Gone Wild

#81
post #49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

(3) Google; Chrome has a rather sophisticated mechanism for detecting MITM attacks, in that it's distributed with pinned certs for several Google properties, and phones home with reports of errors it receives. This is how the DigiNotar leak[1] was discovered. Perhaps because it was persistent and on the TCP stack level the phonehomes never succeeded? The retry logic should be robust enough to try to deliver the fraud…

Chrome does not warn if the non-official root certificate is custom installed on the local machine. It needs to do this because of the various corporate web filters and anti virus tools that MITM connections too. Maybe this is a practice that needs to stop. Malware scanners can scan on the local machine after the browser has decrypted the communication and web filtering, I think, is nothing but a sign of mistrust aga…

The only way Google "needs" to collude with corporate MITM tools is its desire to court user base from corporate IT depts (allowed de jure in many countries that have weak privacy legislation).

Usually Chrome is eager to show security-related notifications but for this there isn't even a yellow notification bar with "OK, got it" option.

Re: Windows SSL Interception Gone Wild

#82

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, and they do all that with the user's consent.

Um, really? How informed is that consent? What of sites that unilaterally change rules retroactively? Or fail to provide reasonable alternatives? Facebook does all of the above. To an extent that I don't trust it, and don't use it. But there are plenty of other services which wave the "but you consented!" flag. Google comes to mind, and I've had my set of issues with them as well.

Umm, if you're using Facebook, it should be fairly obvious that you are giving your information to Facebook. Yes, I call that an informed consent.

Re: Windows SSL Interception Gone Wild

#83
post #22

I think it's interesting that this BADWARE install was found more or less accidentally... apparently by some tech dude noticing that his bank login presented a Silverfish-issued CA cert. Shouldn't the possiblity have been forseen and addressed beforehand? Perhaps by... (1) Anti-virus / anti-malware makers. Does this software not notify the user when strange CA certs are put into a system's root certificate storage? I…

> (1) Anti-virus / anti-malware makers. Does this software not notify the user when strange CA certs are put into a system's root certificate storage? I understand that certain businesses do this for traffic monitoring... so it might be legit... but still, no user notification? It was installed by the OEM. Doesn't really help if it only notifies the OEM. > (2) Microsoft. Do their license terms really allow OEMs to in…

... or they could develop badware for Ubuntu.

Re: Windows SSL Interception Gone Wild

#84
post #49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Chrome does not warn if the non-official root certificate is custom installed on the local machine. It needs to do this because of the various corporate web filters and anti virus tools that MITM connections too. Maybe this is a practice that needs to stop. Malware scanners can scan on the local machine after the browser has decrypted the communication and web filtering, I think, is nothing but a sign of mistrust aga…

web filtering, I think, is nothing but a sign of mistrust against the users. What if it's the user who wants this filtering? I run a local proxy that MITMs to filter out ads, tracking scripts, and other undesirable things. It works in all the browsers I use regularly, and any browsers that happen to be embedded in apps, because this way the stuff I want filtered out never even reaches the browser.

Can you please tell more about your setup? Why a handful of browser plugins were not enough in your case?

Re: Windows SSL Interception Gone Wild

#85
post #74

"We've observed more than a dozen other software applications using the Komodia library" is the scary part.

How about MS's continued use of winsock?

Please elaborate? What about it? (Seriously, I'd like to know what the current perceived issues with winsock are, I'm a bit out of date with Windows security)

Re: Windows SSL Interception Gone Wild

#86
post #49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

(3) Google; Chrome has a rather sophisticated mechanism for detecting MITM attacks, in that it's distributed with pinned certs for several Google properties, and phones home with reports of errors it receives. This is how the DigiNotar leak[1] was discovered. Perhaps because it was persistent and on the TCP stack level the phonehomes never succeeded? The retry logic should be robust enough to try to deliver the fraud…

Chrome does not warn if the non-official root certificate is custom installed on the local machine. It needs to do this because of the various corporate web filters and anti virus tools that MITM connections too. Maybe this is a practice that needs to stop. Malware scanners can scan on the local machine after the browser has decrypted the communication and web filtering, I think, is nothing but a sign of mistrust aga…

Yes, "It needs to do this because of the various corporate web filters and anti virus tools that MITM connections too." Banks... imagine the irony.

Re: Windows SSL Interception Gone Wild

#87
post #32

Browser plugins can read SSL pages no problem. So why did Superfish not just present itself like a browser plugin? Then it's just normal bloatware and probably pulls in the same profit. Some people might uninstall it is the only reason I can think why they didn't go this route. They could have pre-bundled Chrome and FF to avoid having users ok the plugin installation.

> So why did Superfish not just present itself like a browser plugin They did this for years, actually. They paid add-on developers to bundle their shopping app with the developer's app. I remember this going on ~2010/2011 at least. People were not happy about it to say the least.

And VCs gave them money for this shit. What a fucked up investor world this is.

https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/superfish

Re: Windows SSL Interception Gone Wild

#88
post #39
post #36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Can browser plugins install root CA certs? Honest question, Im not sure but I would be surprised if they could?

You can write anywhere to disk where user has privileges (at least in FF). Not sure if that's enough. But I don't think you need a CA at all since plugins can see the full DOM (whether SSL or not). Like if you "inspect element", view source, or run firebug. The plugin is already written too: https://addons.mozilla.org/en-US/firefox/addon/windowshopper...

Mozilla should just pull this plugin from addons, seriously.

Re: Windows SSL Interception Gone Wild

#89

"We've observed more than a dozen other software applications using the Komodia library" is the scary part.

This. The install base is reportedly up to 40m users.

https://twitter.com/ow/status/568935755344580608

Superfish: Go shame yourself. If I was an investor in your company, I'd pull my money now.

Re: Windows SSL Interception Gone Wild

#90
post #22

I think it's interesting that this BADWARE install was found more or less accidentally... apparently by some tech dude noticing that his bank login presented a Silverfish-issued CA cert. Shouldn't the possiblity have been forseen and addressed beforehand? Perhaps by... (1) Anti-virus / anti-malware makers. Does this software not notify the user when strange CA certs are put into a system's root certificate storage? I…

(3) Google; Chrome has a rather sophisticated mechanism for detecting MITM attacks, in that it's distributed with pinned certs for several Google properties, and phones home with reports of errors it receives. This is how the DigiNotar leak[1] was discovered. Perhaps because it was persistent and on the TCP stack level the phonehomes never succeeded? The retry logic should be robust enough to try to deliver the fraud…

> Chrome has a rather sophisticated mechanism for detecting MITM attacks

Which obviously didn't work here, as Chrome was one of the most affected targets.

Firefox on the other hand, was more or less absent altogether. I know which browser I will trust.

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