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The Bitcoin Piñata

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Re: The Bitcoin Piñata

#81
post #65

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yup, this is work in progress. The first part of this is Jitsu, which is a DNS server that can spin up Unikernels on an incoming request. https://github.com/MagnusS/jitsu

Are the DNS requests used only to scale up in anticipation of more traffic, or is a steady stream of DNS requests required to keep the instances running once they are started? I see that there is an expiration TTL, but what happens if there is a download in progress for longer than the VM expiration time? Also how well does this work with persistent HTTP connections (and TLS handshakes)? i.e. will the browser keep a…

We're actually putting a paper together that uses Jitsu so you might find that answers most of your questions (the team is busy with eval at the moment).

For the time-being, Jitsu [1] 'just' spawns a unikernel which serves requests, with no apparently latency for the requester. At some point, when the unikernel hasn't done anything for a while, it is culled (which is something of an implementation detail). In principle, we should be able to use this as part of a set of tools to create the hyper-elastic clouds mentioned upthread.

[1] Just in Time Summoning of Unikernels

Re: The Bitcoin Piñata

#82
post #49

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not so odd, I don't always use nor redirect www either (well I do if it's for a client, but otherwise I usually can't be bothered). Edit: But I do get 404s when I click the "language-links" on the challenge pages, like http://cryptopals.com/sets/1/challenges/1/ruby . What are those anyways?

They are Solutions. The C++ one to the first exercise works: http://cryptopals.com/sets/1/challenges/1/cpp/

It's probably the only one that works, and it's just a hint (the conversion function is weird btw, it accepts hexadecimal symbols ranging from '0' to 'z'; it actually "decodes" any base from binary to triacontahexadecimal (36)).

Re: The Bitcoin Piñata

#84
post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The challenge is to present a certificate that the pinata interprets as being signed by the CA at the bottom of the page. If you succeed in doing so, you will be given the information required to transfer all of the BTC out of the address listed on that page.

Aaah, but you can try to do soooo much more! You can try to confuse the ASN.1 parser, or even the protocol level parser. You can try to defeat certificate validation logic. You can try to get handshake state-machine do an illegal transition. You can try to smash its memory and either read it or get your code into it. You can try to defeat its RNG. It doesn't let you do adaptive-plaintext attacks, but everything else…

I think you you guys have formally proven some of this correct? What did you use? Was a proof-assistant like Coq or a model checker or similar? And what properties have been proven correct (so we know what to avoid wasting time on :)?

Re: The Bitcoin Piñata

#85
post #84
post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Aaah, but you can try to do soooo much more! You can try to confuse the ASN.1 parser, or even the protocol level parser. You can try to defeat certificate validation logic. You can try to get handshake state-machine do an illegal transition. You can try to smash its memory and either read it or get your code into it. You can try to defeat its RNG. It doesn't let you do adaptive-plaintext attacks, but everything else…

I think you you guys have formally proven some of this correct? What did you use? Was a proof-assistant like Coq or a model checker or similar? And what properties have been proven correct (so we know what to avoid wasting time on :)?

No, or at least not yet. :)

You are probably thinking of these guys: http://www.mitls.org.

They have a killer TLS, but it drags the entire CLR in.

We are these guys: http://openmirage.org/blog/introducing-ocaml-tls.

Re: The Bitcoin Piñata

#86
post #84
post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Aaah, but you can try to do soooo much more! You can try to confuse the ASN.1 parser, or even the protocol level parser. You can try to defeat certificate validation logic. You can try to get handshake state-machine do an illegal transition. You can try to smash its memory and either read it or get your code into it. You can try to defeat its RNG. It doesn't let you do adaptive-plaintext attacks, but everything else…

I think you you guys have formally proven some of this correct? What did you use? Was a proof-assistant like Coq or a model checker or similar? And what properties have been proven correct (so we know what to avoid wasting time on :)?

[deleted]

Re: The Bitcoin Piñata

#87
post #70

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Syn flood...

Does mirage's TCP/IP stack implement syn cookies [0] when under attack? [0] http://lwn.net/Articles/277146/

i wasn't familiar with syncookies, but the article you linked to says

> Syncookies are discouraged these days. They disable too many valuable TCP features (window scaling, SACK) and even without them the kernel is usually strong enough to defend against syn floods and systems have much more memory than they used to be. So I don't think it makes much sense to add more code to it, sorry.

Re: The Bitcoin Piñata

#88

Where could I, a total beginner in crypto-stuff, learn more about this kind of thing? What would be the list of things I'd need to know how to do in order to "break in", and where could I learn how to do them?

Coursera/Stanford have a crypto course going on right now. It's already well under way but you can watch all the videos and (I believe) still do the quizzes and just pass on the certificate. https://www.coursera.org/course/crypto

Re: The Bitcoin Piñata

#89
post #63

I'm more interested in the OS they hosted their site on. Mirage, developed in OCaml for the cloud. The part that really interested me: "If a sudden spike in traffic occurs, the web-servers can be configured to create and deploy copies of themselves to service the demand. This auto-scaling happens so quickly that an incoming connection can trigger the creation of new server and the new server can then handle that requ…

You can read the original paper about Mirage here: http://anil.recoil.org/papers/2013-asplos-mirage.pdf (it's a pretty easy read for something with an abstract).

I love this idea so much. There's also OSv which targets the JVM instead of OCamL. It's an open source commercial enterprise. https://github.com/cloudius-systems/osv

Re: The Bitcoin Piñata

#90
post #85
post #84

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I think you you guys have formally proven some of this correct? What did you use? Was a proof-assistant like Coq or a model checker or similar? And what properties have been proven correct (so we know what to avoid wasting time on :)?

No, or at least not yet. :) You are probably thinking of these guys: http://www.mitls.org . They have a killer TLS, but it drags the entire CLR in. We are these guys: http://openmirage.org/blog/introducing-ocaml-tls .

You are right, I was thinking of miTLS.
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