Identifying backdoors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in iOS devices • Hacker News Board

Re: Identifying backdoors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in iOS devices

#81

Post by iamshs » Sun, Jul 20, 2014, 3:29 PM UTC

jwr wrote: post #80

The key takeaway for me here is that it is much more difficult to access data on iOS devices if they are switched off. So, if you are in a situation where you can expect that your device will be accessed (e.g. crossing the US border), switch it off ahead of time.

And according to new diktat, you will have to turn your phone on while crossing borders (I guess only restricted to TSA yet) [1]. So once it is on, it will let you have all the packet sniffer log dump. And on US borders, non-US citizens will be made to enter their PINs [2]. Key takeaway for me is why is phone logging so much data without there being a need for it, and even eating into data capacity.

[1]- http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/06/tsa-cellphones-... [2] - http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/02/21/the-priva...

Re: Identifying backdoors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in iOS devices

#82

Post by rsynnott » Sun, Jul 20, 2014, 3:54 PM UTC

dm2 wrote: post #56

Why does Apple re-enable Bluetooth everytime you update iOS? "STOP RESISTING, WE WANT TO TRACK YOU" (iBeacon)

People seem to be massively confused about what iBeacon is. It's a thing which emits a signal which can be picked up by the device, and notify an application which has registered to receive it, which requires user approval; the application can then do something. It doesn't monitor devices.

Re: Identifying backdoors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in iOS devices

#83

Post by mike_hearn » Sun, Jul 20, 2014, 4:53 PM UTC

eevilspock wrote: post #44

eps wrote: post #14

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> evolve into the secure consumer device company They don't have this option. They are too big to not cooperate the US law enforcement and intelligence communities. They must cooperate, it's given. There are just way too many pressure points that can be exploited to make them cooperate, even against their will. If they start selling themselves as a secure and trustworthy device manufacturer you can rest assured it's…

but they DO have the option of designing their hardware and services to minimize trackable data, to get as close to "zero knowledge" as possible. The government cannot force them to collect data, only share data that they have collected. For example, there are alternatives to Dropbox that do this: http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/jul/17/edward-sno...

Governments can force them to do anything: they know where Tim Cook lives and can ruin his life six ways from Sunday. Really, other than all the selectively enforced laws that exist already, all governments have to do is start passing laws that say "all communication systems must be interceptible by the government". Indeed CALEA already does this, but it's (again) selectively enforced.

I don't know where this ends, but I suspect it ends up with lots of computer programmers rotting in jail, others going underground and everyone just accepting that they live in a totalitarian state run by the military, which constantly brainwashes its children to believe they live in the best country in the world.

Re: Identifying backdoors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in iOS devices

#84

Post by ibisum » Sun, Jul 20, 2014, 6:55 PM UTC

simscitizen wrote: post #71

The packet tracer is an interface to a tcpdump-like facility that's used for debugging. It requires you to connect the device to a Mac host. The interface is publicly documented: https://developer.apple.com/library/Mac/qa/qa1176/_index.htm...

Come on, this is a full packet dump of whatever you want. So .. why is it enabled by default, why isn't it in the developer image (only) if its so vital, and so on.

This was intentionally architected for exploit.

Re: Identifying backdoors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in iOS devices

#85

Post by rsynnott » Sun, Jul 20, 2014, 11:55 PM UTC

mcintyre1994 wrote: post #77

astrange wrote: post #72

Earlier quoted context omitted.

iBeacon is purely passive and cannot track you.

You could in theory set up a Bluetooth surveillance network though couldn't you? I really doubt that's remotely the goal for Apple but Bluetooth always on would make it possible I think.

It'd be quite a lot easier to do this with wifi, and indeed such systems exist, for monitoring people in shops etc. iOS 8 makes it substantially harder for these to work effectively (through randomised MAC addresses when looking for networks), which seems like an indication that Apple isn't interested in facilitating this sort of thing.

Re: Identifying backdoors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in iOS devices

#86

Post by Nanzikambe » Mon, Jul 21, 2014, 12:37 AM UTC

mark_l_watson wrote: post #13

majke wrote: post #2

Mr Zdziarski gave this talk also at the HOPE conference yesterday. It's highly recommended. Slides: http://www.zdziarski.com/blog/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/iOS... For the people wanting to secure their iphone, go to the end to the slide "Apple Configurator" and follow the described steps to disable your iphone from paring with anything.

Thank you very much - bookmarked. BTW, Apple is missing a great opportunity in my opinion. They don't need a ton of user data to make money and could evolve into the secure consumer device company. I see only upside for Apple if they work towards making as secure as possible devices.

Whilst I see your point, and I would love a major mobile device manufacturer to enter that space, there's a large barrier for Apple: the underlying operating system is not open source. Whilst that remains the case, the question of security ultimately breaks down to Apple saying "Trust Us". Given recent revelations, that's not something that should be afforded to any company that fails to demonstrate a commitment to protecting the personal data of it users from everyone including itself.

A 3rd party audit of the source would go some way toward building that trust, but falling short of a publicly available code-base allowing independent verification, I doubt it would be enough.

Re: Identifying backdoors, attack points, and surveillance mechanisms in iOS devices

#87

Post by bdowling » Wed, Jul 23, 2014, 10:12 PM UTC

astrange wrote: post #72

dm2 wrote: post #56

Why does Apple re-enable Bluetooth everytime you update iOS? "STOP RESISTING, WE WANT TO TRACK YOU" (iBeacon)

iBeacon is purely passive and cannot track you.

The iBeacon transmitter may be passive, but the signal is typically passed to an app running on a phone, which can do anything, including post all it's position and time info to a server online.

The good news is that it appears to be opt-in. In most, if not all, instances a user needs to install an app and enable location services before the iBeacon will trigger anything. No app listening for a particular beacon or set of beacons, no problem.

Of course, there could also be malicious code running on the phone, installed by the government or spies, that could silently record everything. That could work now with gps, voice and video recording, wifi network positioning, etc. iBeacon is just one more set of data to collect.