Earlier quoted context omitted.
I would call this a "self-induced man in the middle attack". You're telling your computer that cloudflarechallenge.com is his server.
The point is you can connect to it with HTTPS and your browser doesn't throw up big flashy warnings. It's basically proof that he has got the private key, since he can impersonate cloudfarechallenge.com with regards to SSL.
CloudFlare's Heartbleed challenge cracked
81–90 of 155 posts
Re: CloudFlare's Heartbleed challenge cracked
#82Reading Cloudflare's blog post[0], they keep referring to the exploit having a length of 65,536 bytes, and how an allocation of that size is unlikely to find itself lower in the heap. That is true - but this exploit doesn't depend on setting a length of 65,536. The server takes whatever length the client gives it (which is, afterall, the bug). Most of the early exploits just happen to set the maximum packet size to g…
How do you know when you've found a piece of a key?
But brute force everything you get back? Easy.
Take every key-sized chunk of heap you got back, and see if, when interpreted as the key, it is the private key to the public cert. When found, send it in!
Re: CloudFlare's Heartbleed challenge cracked
#83Earlier quoted context omitted.
The point is you can connect to it with HTTPS and your browser doesn't throw up big flashy warnings. It's basically proof that he has got the private key, since he can impersonate cloudfarechallenge.com with regards to SSL.
He doesn't have to have the private key, only a private key that was signed by any of the hundreds (counting intermediate CAs, thousands?) CAs trusted by his browser.
Re: CloudFlare's Heartbleed challenge cracked
#84Earlier quoted context omitted.
The point is you can connect to it with HTTPS and your browser doesn't throw up big flashy warnings. It's basically proof that he has got the private key, since he can impersonate cloudfarechallenge.com with regards to SSL.
He doesn't have to have the private key, only a private key that was signed by any of the hundreds (counting intermediate CAs, thousands?) CAs trusted by his browser.
He's presenting the CloudFlare-obtained cert (which the site offers up on request), so the lack of a warning means he's got that private key.
Getting another CA-signed certificate, naming 'www.cloudflarechallenge.com' and matching another private key, would itself be an impressive compromise, though not the challenge CloudFlare made or what he's demonstrating.
Re: CloudFlare's Heartbleed challenge cracked
#85Reading Cloudflare's blog post[0], they keep referring to the exploit having a length of 65,536 bytes, and how an allocation of that size is unlikely to find itself lower in the heap. That is true - but this exploit doesn't depend on setting a length of 65,536. The server takes whatever length the client gives it (which is, afterall, the bug). Most of the early exploits just happen to set the maximum packet size to g…
"We fixed the flaw on Monday March 31, 2014 for all CloudFlare customers, with public notification on Monday April 7, 2014, after the researchers' public announcement." -- https://support.cloudflare.com/hc/en-us/articles/201660084-U...
Re: CloudFlare's Heartbleed challenge cracked
#86Earlier quoted context omitted.
Example from a memory dump on a vulnerable server (username & password changed to protect the innocent): `..?...t?.R...t> ...ned....userna me=0000000+0ew+0 user&password=my passw0rD.~Jt.... .3z..a.......... One of the things that caught me off guard, but isn't surprising is that some hosting companies don't use VM isolation, thus it was possible to pull memory from other sites which may have been patched. Hopefully h…
"[H]osting vendors that don't have isolated VM's don't also allow users to install their own OpenSSL as this would become a vector to compromise neighboring hosts." Could you explain this please? Here's a possible scenario... I root virtual machine X running on host Z (using heartbleed). Another machine running on Z is virtual machine Y. Because X and Y are not isolated, and I am running whatever I want on X, I can f…
Re: CloudFlare's Heartbleed challenge cracked
#87Reading Cloudflare's blog post[0], they keep referring to the exploit having a length of 65,536 bytes, and how an allocation of that size is unlikely to find itself lower in the heap. That is true - but this exploit doesn't depend on setting a length of 65,536. The server takes whatever length the client gives it (which is, afterall, the bug). Most of the early exploits just happen to set the maximum packet size to g…
How do you know when you've found a piece of a key?
Re: CloudFlare's Heartbleed challenge cracked
#88Earlier quoted context omitted.
How do you know when you've found a piece of a key?
I would think that there could be some application of how genome sequencing is done? From what I understand chains of DNA are cut by restriction enzymes and these random chains are assembled together by some clever algorithms?
Re: CloudFlare's Heartbleed challenge cracked
#89The important thing to know here is that you not only have to change your current certs you ALSO HAVE TO REVOKE THE OLD ONE. If you only change your current cert to get a new key but you don't go through the revocation process of the old certificate if someone managed to get the old one they can still use it for a MiTM attack - as both certs would be valid to any client.
Also, cert revocation just barely works, in some browsers, with EV certificates, after old CRLs expire over a course of months: http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2013/05/13/how-certificate...
Specifically, I'd be most interested for such a walkthrough for Google Chrome on OS X, which most people I know use.
Re: CloudFlare's Heartbleed challenge cracked
#90Earlier quoted context omitted.
The point is you can connect to it with HTTPS and your browser doesn't throw up big flashy warnings. It's basically proof that he has got the private key, since he can impersonate cloudfarechallenge.com with regards to SSL.
He doesn't have to have the private key, only a private key that was signed by any of the hundreds (counting intermediate CAs, thousands?) CAs trusted by his browser.