Live data from Hacker News

Welcome to the Strip Mining Era of OSS Security

metabase.com

81–90 of 94 posts

Re: Welcome to the Strip Mining Era of OSS Security

#81
post #59

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That can't possibly be an argument for forbearing security vulnerabilities in software. It's an argument for prioritizing hypothetical flaws over real ones.

If these flaws are so important, users of open source (business or individual) need to pay up - literally. Pay the maintainers enough to justify spending the time on these things, including the opportunity cost of not working at other software jobs during that time. Pay each maintainer an absolute minimum of $200K a year or shut up and do the work yourself - in a fork if necessary.

This comment should not be greyed out. I feel that we all forget this far too much. You've exaggerated it somewhat.

There is no right to demand someone does something for free, and we have gotten dependent on people doing things for free. We don't have to pay people but if we don't want to, then we have to be willing to do it ourselves. Otherwise it could go away at any moment and we have no recourse.

Re: Welcome to the Strip Mining Era of OSS Security

#82
post #39

> Did you have other plans for the weekend? Or a long term project you’re prioritizing? That’s nice, you have a new plan — fix every vulnerability that comes in NOW. Or you know, provide the security companies and businesses using your software for free with all the fix timelines and out of hours support they’ve paid for (none).

It's not for the benefit of the security company though. In fact they get zero benefit from it. It's for the benefit of the users of the software which makes the calculus more complicated.

Re: Welcome to the Strip Mining Era of OSS Security

#83
post #37
post #32

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I had done a fair bit of reverse-engineering-jar-files in the pre-LLM era for various reasons. The biggest problem with decompiled java files was naming. The original variable names, class names etc were not retained and the decompiler would use some alphanumeric series. That'd make reading code very hard. Curious how the current LLMs are able to address this. Maybe it's able to figure out how the class, variable etc…

I expect Java would be easy-mode for the AI, they already do quite well reconstructing C++ from ghidra output in my experience from when I wanted to know what damage formula some game was using. As a reminder; your account has been shadow-banned, it looks like you got a little unlucky in 2016.

> I expect Java would be easy-mode

That makes sense. Java leaves metadata in compiled code to reconstruct better.

> your account has been shadow-banned, it looks like you got a little unlucky in 2016

I see. I wasn't aware. Thanks. I thought the two comments per day limit is for users with low karma. Anyway, I'm using that limit to push myself in being picky about posts to comment on and to improve the quality of comments.

Re: Welcome to the Strip Mining Era of OSS Security

#84
post #38

Whenever one of these vulnerability apocalypse posts comes along I cannot help but think of the Litany of Gendlin: What is true is already so. Owning up to it doesn't make it worse. Not being open about it doesn't make it go away. And because it's true, it is what is there to be interacted with. Anything untrue isn't there to be lived. People can stand what is true, for they are already enduring it. I cannot wrap my…

Humans are famously rational and ego-less.

Re: Welcome to the Strip Mining Era of OSS Security

#85

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is now the open source problem. And why my personal opus of work has been removed from online repositories. Who gave them "the right to scan"? You did by hosting your open source in public. But scanning a public service prior to AI was still covered by "Unauthorized System Access". But what if they are wrong, and given the self-serving nature of these scans, now your repo is just OJ Simpson? And your software is…

The open source problem argues for a modification of licenses to exclude certain uncompensated use in training commercial LLMs (which may arguably already be a violation). With careful prompting, LLMs will give up some of their sources and methods. Claude describes the legally and ethically suspect methods Anthropic used acquiring training materials for its models. The IP law and courts are starting to catch up (re:…

Thats how "theft" works. You take the stuff and run away as fast as you can.

Re: Welcome to the Strip Mining Era of OSS Security

#86

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That's not the whole picture though. Bugs exist anyway. The only practical concern is, which are practically most likely going to be used among all these bugs that yes exist and included in production.

You've described states one and two as outlined above. Whether a bug is exploitable is an entirely separate category of unknowable, because seemingly-innocuous bugs quite often have very deep and very subtle implications that when combined with another innocuous bug, result in an RCE or PE. Therefore, it's sensible to treat all bugs as potential threat vectors unless and until proven otherwise. Which brings us full c…

It's sensible just as it's sensible to have invulnerable immune system.

Sure, who wouldn't like to have that? Such a thing is impossible to reach starting with the same reason as Gödel's incompleteness theorem is a thing, plus a gazillion of more practical constraints.

Re: Welcome to the Strip Mining Era of OSS Security

#87
post #57

Earlier quoted context omitted.

In theory, the vulnerability was always there, and it's better to find out than not find out. In practice, how much effort it is to find vulnerabilities matters a lot. We're in a time where things that used to be quite hard are now easy and the rate of discovery will change. This rate of discovery matters a lot -- for OSS maintainer burnout if nothing else.

It matters in a positive sense; it's a thing that enables you to make some predictions about the state of the world tomorrow. It does not matter in a normative sense; OSS maintainer burnout is strictly a less important concern than software security, which is an externality of software development.

If the maintainers burn out, nobody's going to be making your software secure.

Re: Welcome to the Strip Mining Era of OSS Security

#88
post #87
post #57

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It matters in a positive sense; it's a thing that enables you to make some predictions about the state of the world tomorrow. It does not matter in a normative sense; OSS maintainer burnout is strictly a less important concern than software security, which is an externality of software development.

If the maintainers burn out, nobody's going to be making your software secure.

Then people will stop using that software.

Re: Welcome to the Strip Mining Era of OSS Security

#89
post #88
post #87

Earlier quoted context omitted.

If the maintainers burn out, nobody's going to be making your software secure.

Then people will stop using that software.

This is so far outside of reality that I can't believe I'm even commenting on it.

If you believe people don't use software that is unmaintained and hilariously out of date I genuinely don't know what world you live in or how to deliver the bad news to you.

Re: Welcome to the Strip Mining Era of OSS Security

#90
post #89
post #88

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Then people will stop using that software.

This is so far outside of reality that I can't believe I'm even commenting on it. If you believe people don't use software that is unmaintained and hilariously out of date I genuinely don't know what world you live in or how to deliver the bad news to you.

Oh, I agree that today there's a general expectation that externalized security doesn't matter and someone will always come around to rescue you (and your unmaintained dependency) from disaster. I'm just saying: infinite free bugs is likely to disrupt that equilibrium.
Post reply on HN